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Friday, 30 October 2026

A conversation about the future?

In my previous post, I suggested that since proposing a new ‘national conversation’ about Brexit in his party conference speech Andy Burnham had nudged that conversation forwards in two ways. One was by indicating that accepting the status quo of UK-EU relations would not be an acceptable outcome of the new conversation, and the other was by acknowledging the reality of Russian attempted interference in the 2016 referendum and, by implication, the fact of Russia’s strategic interest in Brexit.

Since then, he has made a further intervention, and perhaps the most significant so far, in proposing an “honest conversation” about freedom of movement (of people) and implying that he, and a future Labour government, would be “open to the idea” subject to it being approved in a referendum (although, subsequently, it was suggested by ‘Downing Street sources’ that a referendum might not be required).

This is an important development because, more than probably anything else, freedom of movement (FOM) was central to the outcome of the Brexit referendum and has also been the most neuralgic aspect of Brexit for the Labour Party. So, whereas the Tory ‘red line’ on a role for the ECJ was effectively, albeit quietly, erased by Keir Starmer, that of ‘no FOM’ persisted and, with it, the red line on single market membership (let alone EU membership). That is apparently now in the process of changing.

Predictable reactions

The reaction to this development was predictable. Brexiters denounced it as betrayal, though why people who constantly complain that they are ‘not allowed to talk about immigration’ should regard a ‘conversation’ about FOM with such horror is not clear. Nor is it clear why people who constantly complain that we have ‘Brexit in name only’ regard it as possible to betray Brexit. These denunciations included the inevitable stupidity of Nigel Farage and Reform railing that FOM could result in all 450 million citizens of the EU moving to the UK. This is obviously ludicrous, especially as, if anything, the increasing prosperity of EU member states in, especially, eastern and south-eastern Europe means that it is highly unlikely that future FOM would see a repeat of the arrivals level of the early 2000s.

Predictable as this reaction was, it served as a salutary reminder that there will be ferocious resistance to every step towards joining the EU or its institutions, even as small a one as ‘having a conversation’ about doing so. Actually, Brexiter resistance to this conversation is, itself, an index of the abject failure of Brexit. After all, if it had been even half as successful as its leading advocates promised it would be by now, such a conversation would result in massive public support for staying out of the EU, rather than the opposite sentiment shown by opinion polls. Brexiters don’t want the issue re-opened not because, as they claim, it was ‘settled’ by the 2016 vote but because they know it remains unsettled and unpopular.

Partly related to that, there are some reasons to think that the familiar terms of this resistance have declining purchase. For one thing, the salience of FOM as a Brexit issue has diminished. An IPPR report last week showed that it featured well below issues such as Euro membership, fishing rights, and losing independent trade deals in reducing support for joining the EU (figure 6, p.11 in link). The probable reasons for this are not altogether happy ones. Amongst those whose hostility to immigration is primarily racist, it seems as if the experience of post-Brexit immigration has made the prospect of what they see as more likely to be ‘white Christian’ immigrants from Europe relatively palatable. The far-right focus is now far more on Muslim asylum seekers arriving in small boats than Polish plumbers arriving on EasyJet. Within that, the claim that Brexit is responsible for ‘the small boats crisis’, which Burnham has made several times (although, for reasons given in a recent post, it is somewhat misleading), along with the persistent conflation of asylum-seeking with immigration, seems to have reduced the enthusiasm for Brexit amongst those most ideologically exercised about immigration.

Burnham also appeared to speak to the post-Brexit experience of immigration by suggesting that FOM is more likely to be associated with shorter, work-related, stays in the UK rather than permanent settlement. The way that was expressed was not exactly a challenge to anti-immigration xenophobia, and it is far from clear that Burnham is open to a ‘new conversation’ about that, even in relation to the EU, given reports that the UK is still resisting the agreement of a ‘youth mobility scheme’. But, more charitably, his comments about FOM did gesture towards the reason why it is not regarded, in most EU countries, as immigration per se (as Sir Ivan Rogers pointed out in his evidence to the House of Commons ‘Brexit Committee’ in 2017). That reason was better captured by Mike Galsworthy of the European Movement this week, when he stressed that FOM is “a fluid two-way exchange”.

The case for gradualism

However, criticism of Burnham’s latest statement was not confined to Brexiters. Some ‘joiners’ saw it as far too timid: why not drop the FOM red line immediately? What about membership of the Euro and of the Schengen agreement, which Burnham still regards as out of scope? But there is a good argument that such reactions ignore, or underestimate, just how long and difficult the process of building a durable consensus for joining the EU (or even the single market) will be. At the moment, there is even some opposition within the Labour Party, with Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood reported to be “furious” about Burnham having opened the question of FOM and Melanie Onn, the Labour MP for  Great Grimsby and Cleethorpes, writing that doing so “risks undermining voter trust”.

And securing support within the Labour Party is only the first, and easiest, part of this process. It’s not a matter of the government simply announcing a new policy, but of securing robust support for it, whether or not it is put to a future referendum, and this requires concerted input from a wide range of political, market and civil society actors. Crucially, it will be necessary to maintain that support through what are likely to be long, complex and politically controversial negotiations. If there is one lesson, above all, which joiners should have learnt from Brexit it is that, like leaving, joining (in whatever meaning) is a process not an event.

For those who are serious about wanting this process to be successful, rather than simply to enjoy a cathartic moment of pleasure, there is therefore a strong case that it is good tactics to try to gradually build the durable consensus needed for it to be sustainable domestically and to be credible to the EU. On this argument, going faster or more boldly would be worse in terms of securing that outcome. In any case, if Burnham’s intention is (as it appears to be) to have some kind of new proposal in Labour’s next election manifesto then he has actually been reasonably quick in starting to move away from Starmer’s position.

What that new proposal will be is unclear. The way in which Burnham is talking at the moment sounds, as Niall Ó Conghaile has written this week, as if seeking some form of ‘Swiss-style’ relationship might be in prospect. If so, it’s important to understand that, as Ó Conghaile explains, that relationship is different to what was called the ‘Swiss model’ at the time of the 2016 referendum and its aftermath, and which was widely understood to be an unappealing model from an EU perspective. Since then, the EU and Switzerland have completed a modernized agreement which was signed this year. One reason why this latter agreement might end up being Burnham’s preferred option is that it would not entail Euro membership which, as shown by the IPPR report I quoted above, is the issue most likely to sap public support for joining the EU [1]. It could also be an appealing model for the EU, Ó Conghaile argues, providing the potential benefits of closer economic and defence ties without the risks of the UK becoming a disruptive and possibly only temporary member of the EU.

Whether this, or something like it, or even seeking to join the EU, becomes Labour’s settled policy at the next election remains to be seen. But whatever the policy is, the important question is not so much about the current speed of travel, assuming the next election is at least two years away (though other views are available), but about how robustly Burnham will argue for it when it is made. It is one thing to push for a ‘new conversation’ (not to imply that doing so is altogether easy), but quite another to defend a new policy when the undoubtedly ferocious attacks on it begin. It is becoming a pervasive criticism of Burnham, across several policy areas (not just EU relations), that he seems more comfortable opening debates about future options than making and championing decisions.

The problems with gradualism

Strong as the argument for ‘gradualism’ may be, there are two obvious objections to it. One is just the continuing economic damage of Brexit. So far as I can see, the Office for Budget Responsibility’s report on this week’s budget did not make an explicit calculation of the foregone economic growth Brexit has caused, and so presumably adheres to its estimate of a long-term cost of 4% of GDP (itself lower than other credible estimates). However, the report did make reference (paragraph 1.5, p.10) to “rising barriers to trade after EU exit” as one of a series of “adverse shocks [which] have continued to hit the UK since the 2008 global financial crisis”, contributing to “structural trends” which have resulted in weak growth in GDP and personal disposable income. These shocks in turn “have resulted in elevated levels of government borrowing and debt in the UK” (paragraph 1.6). The key terms in all this are “structural” and “continued” as much as, or more than, “adverse shock”, posing the question: how long are we to continue to accept this damage?

The other, and perhaps even more urgent, objection to gradualism is the geo-political landscape, which was the main focus of my last post. Since then, the situation has worsened in terms of the growing clarity of Trump’s support for Putin (even if the failure of their client candidates in the elections in, respectively, Brazil and Serbia gives some relief to the general gloom). The possibility of Trump losing badly in the US mid-terms should not be regarded optimistically in terms of this landscape, since it is likely to lead him to focus on his foreign policy (if we can grace it with that name). Thus there is a significant danger that the pace of international events is simply too fast for the capacity of British politics to rectify the strategic error of Brexit.

Economics and geo-politics intertwined

Actually, whilst there is both an economic and a geo-political case for urgency, it’s perhaps under-appreciated just how closely they are linked. There are reams that could be written about that linkage, but I’ll just mention two current examples.

One is simply that were it not for the dire effect of Brexit on tax revenues then it would be relatively easy to fund the increases in defence spending needed to robustly challenge Russian aggression. As I discussed at the time of last year’s budget (and I don’t think there have been any updated figures) it is estimated that in 2024-2025 tax revenues were between £65 billion and £90 billion less than they would have been as a result of Brexit. If the true figure were only half of the lower end of that range, then it could fund a near doubling of the entire defence budget (£37.5 billion) for that year. Far less than that would be needed to reach the government’s target of spending 3.5% of GDP on defence, and to do so immediately rather than by 2035.

The second example is the ongoing issue of whether the UK will align with the EU in imposing tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles (EVs), in order to secure agreement from the EU to waive the increased tariffs on British EVs which are due to come into force next year under the terms of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement. Failure to secure that agreement would be a substantial blow to the UK’s car industry, which has already suffered considerably because of Brexit. Yet aligning with the EU’s EV tariffs would risk China acting on its recent threat to impose retaliatory tariffs on the UK. More widely, this relates to the UK’s attempt, which Burnham has made a priority, to participate in the EU’s ‘Made in Europe’ scheme because UK solidarity with the EU over China EV tariffs would boost the case for participation whilst, conversely, a lack of solidarity would weaken it. [2]

Trade expert David Henig argued this week that Burnham’s desire to join ‘Made in Europe’ as an important part of his wider ‘re-industrialization’ ambitions is a key driver of his move to open the FOM discussion. The technical details are complex but the general implication, as Henig puts it in the subtitle of his piece, is that “if you aren’t the US, EU, or China, you’re increasingly the victim of coercion”. Another trade expert, Sam Lowe of the Chatham House thinktank, made a similar point this week, arguing that ‘Made in Europe’ is likely to force the UK to choose between Brussels and Beijing. (I do recommend reading both pieces in full to gain an understanding of all this.)

From this perspective, the Brexiter idea of a ‘nimble’ Britain dancing lightly around the trade bloc behemoths – always a dubious proposition – has become an economic absurdity as the geo-political landscape moves increasingly to one of ‘great power politics’ carving out spheres of influence. In short, this new landscape doesn’t just have security and defence consequences, it also has economic consequences.

Focusing on the future

That Brexit is fundamentally out of kilter with the realities of contemporary international relations is at the heart of another new IPPR report, authored by Mihir Sharma and Laura Chappell, as indicated by its title: New World, New Relationship. It is well worth reading in full, but the crux of it is: “that Britain needs the countries of Europe as its primary political, economic and geopolitical partners. A relationship focused solely on trade does not speak to the needs we identify, and the hard truth is that no alternative – a US-focused special relationship, or an unmoored ‘global Britain’ – works for us in an age of geoeconomic blocs.” (p. 36)

Many of the arguments given in support of that claim will be familiar to readers of this blog, but perhaps the most important feature of the report is that it is, from beginning to end, focussed on the present and the future. This matters because, regardless of whether approached gradually or with more urgency, there is a danger that Burnham’s new ‘national conversation’ will fall back in to exactly the same terms as that which was had at the time of the referendum.

That would be inadequate in itself, precisely because it would fail to recognize all that has changed since then, including the many ways in which the EU, itself, has changed. But it would also give unwarranted credence to the probably widespread sentiment that ‘we can’t go through all that again’ (which is exactly the line Kemi Badenoch is already taking). Moreover, it would give credence to the Brexiter claim that the 2016 vote expressed an inviolable ‘will of the people’, that ‘revisiting’ what it led to constitutes a ‘betrayal’, and, with that, would lend support to Dominic Cummings’ idea that a future ‘stay out’ campaign could successfully rally under the slogan ‘tell them again’.

In recognizing that what is at stake is not ‘revisiting 2016’ but is a whole new conversation, which arises from new circumstances, it will also be important that this is not based simply on fear. It is true that the new geo-political landscape is a profoundly dangerous one, made more so by the isolation of Brexit. But the flipside of that is a positive effect which might not have been so apparent but for Brexit. As Ian Dunt argues in a recent article (the title of which, ‘Europe is the Future Now’, also emphasises a forward-looking orientation), that effect is to have clarified that Britain, and British people, have a European identity: “We are bonded together not just through our shared history and geography but through our values, our ideals and our joint vision of the future. We want collective solidarity, the rule of law and democratic institutions rather than despotism and war.”

A bigger conversation?

Whilst all of this relates to the new conversation about the UK and the EU, it could be an opportunity for a deeper and more extensive national conversation. So much of Brexit and Brexitism is connected with an aggrieved nostalgia encapsulated in the phrase ‘I want my country back’. It is a sentiment which preceded Brexit and which has become, if anything, more pervasive since Brexit. Often it is associated with hostility to immigration but always, axiomatically, it is past-orientated, whether in referencing cosy village tearooms or wartime heroism, in harking back to ‘the good old days’. Along with that, almost inevitably, goes disdain for the present and despair for the future.

Perhaps, then, the still nascent conversation about the UK and the EU could become something else, an occasion to articulate something so absent from contemporary politics that it seems almost absurd to imagine it: optimism.

 

Notes

[1] The biggest question mark about whether the ‘new Switzerland’ model could be a template for UK-EU relations is the Schengen agreement, to which Switzerland is party but Burnham has implied would not be part of Labour’s new policy. But the basic point holds that, as things stand (and it can’t be emphasized strongly enough that we are only at the very beginning of this ‘Burnham phase’ of the Brexit saga), it looks as if Burnham sees the landing zone for Labour’s new policy to be something short of joining the EU and in that sense some form of what we used to call ‘soft Brexit’. In principle (although, as ever, there is a lot of complexity about the practice) that has always been negotiable with the EU. See also the ‘UKICE staircase’.

[2] There is a bigger point here, which is that the EU, as a union of states, the single market, as a regulatory union, and the customs union as a common tariff entity have developed over time to create an interlocking eco-system. That fact has become somewhat lost in the Brexit debates, which have often concentrated on the ways that, in principle, the different elements can be disaggregated (EU, single market, customs union). The EV tariffs issue, and ‘Made in Europe’ more generally, also shows that alongside the well-known Brussels Effect on regulation (i.e. the regulatory pull of the EU) there can also be a kind of Brussels Effect on trade tariff policy.

32 comments:

  1. It's good that the EU membership debate is gently reopened.
    But the reactions from either side are odd.
    From the Leave perspective, they ought to be overjoyed at the prospect of more debate and a second vote. For, surely, they would say - "Look at the economic success 10 years of Brexit has brought. Look at how the nation is powering ahead with global deals. We're bound to win a second vote - and more decisively - and silence all the Europhiles"
    In other words, more falsehoods.

    But the pro side is even odder.

    The EU is a mature organisation with many rules, benefits and responsibilities for all members, jointly decided, jointly enforced. Yet the Burnham GB doesn't want to join that organisation. It wants a bespoke, special deal. Or as it is properly called, cakeism.

    The EU has its strengths and weaknesses. Its pros and cons. 27 nations are - by and large - OK with this and another half dozen would like to join on the available terms.

    But somehow, not us. We're special. The 27 owe us a special deal.
    I increasingly hate this GB exceptionalism.

    Either be proud enough to say that we want to join a team of nations working to mutual benefit, or go away and sulk like a self-pitying teenager.

    However, I sadly know that in the real world, cakeism is the only way we'll get back some of what we threw away in '16

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    1. I agree with you. I can only assume that the UK is suffering from an allergy to other European countries

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  2. It seems that Burnham wants Labour to talk about Rejoining, and to have the domestic & foreign political benefits of talking about Rejoining, without having any of the domestic political disadvantages of actually doing something about Rejoining. Almost as if Labour wants the votes of (growing majority) Rejoiners at the next election, without losing the voters of the (dwindling minority) Leavers. Personally I don't think voters are that simple-minded and they will see through this from both directions, and vote for the real thing with whichever political parties offer their preferred flavour. Which means Burham's Labour risk losing both sets of voters. The sooner that Labour get off the fence the more likely they are to benefit in voting terms. And in the meantime the UK economy gets ever more disadvantaged, both in the short term and the long term.

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  3. I find this blog as insightful as ever - thank you - but please - Why oh Why do you hardly ever mention the Liberal Democrats who articulate so many of the arguments and policy directions recommended here?

    The role of the LIb Dems, in pressuring the government to move faster towards some kind of new relationship with Europe on the one hand and proving a political home for those internationalists/economic liberals on the other who despair of the Conservative party seems ever more important.

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  4. I understood Burnham's idea to be there are different levels of 'nearness', rather akin to Barnier's 'staircase'. But I've not seen anyone try to articulate the conversation in that way. The Customs Union, will certainly make it easier for business, but it will only be a small step forward. As jobs would probably be the measure for most people, that may help a little although the jobs market, especially at the lower end, is currently particularly challenging.

    Only when you put FOM (of people, the other three seem to be ignored) on the table do the benefits to the UK become much stronger because we would be able to partake in many more EU Programmes. The effect on jobs would probably be a lot more significant, as access to 450 million more people would be much more easily available to UK businesses (I'm thinking SMEs and entrepreneurial individuals for whom it is currently too difficult to trade).

    But this is a complex area, with the explanation for each 'level' very complex and dry. I would have thought this was a good topic for a BBC documentary, truth to power and all that, but they seem to me to be particularly weedy, especially in challenging a conservative (small c) pensioner audience. And they have let the country down before, refusing to make clear that virtually no one in 2016 thought brexit was a good idea -- except Patrick Minford.

    We seem to have gone immediately to an in or out mentality, rather than the more nuanced approach that Burnham is suggesting. Or is that because the brexiters are an unthinking bunch -- we are England and that is that? Anyway, as long as brexit is back on the table it makes it tricky for the Conservatives ('Your Project') and forces Reform to double down on and defend their core vote. And it makes the point that as the EU is constantly changing so the refuses to die. So it may actually be good politics for the next three years.

    We will see.

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  5. At the Labour Party Conference thIs year, Andy Burnham proposed a new ‘national conversation’ about Brexit. Subsequently he has called for an “honest conversation” about freedom of movement (of people). He has also said that many people were surprised that the UK ended up outside the Single Market at the end of the Brexit process.

    The UK ended up outside the Single Market because there was a moral panic about freedom of movement (of people) (FoM) at the time of the referendum and FoM is one of the four pillars of the Single Market. If people were confused about that it was because the national conversation was confused. When people like Gove said that the UK would still be in a trade area stretching from Iceland to the Urals, did they mean they wanted to stay in the Single Market or that the UK should try to negotiate an agreement which would be more or less the same thing or were they just bloviating? That was unclear, and nobody pushed back hard enough against this kind of statement to get any clarity.

    If we are to have an honest conversation about FoM the starting point should be, in my view:-
    - FoM is one of the four pillars of the Single Market and the EU is extremely unlikely to countenance an opt-out on this
    - it is far from clear what the objections are to FoM.

    If the Home Secretary Shabana Mahmood is “furious” about Burnham having opened the question of FoM, I think we should be told why she thinks FoM is bad for the UK. Melanie Onn MP should explain why what the objections of voters are to FoM if opening the question “risks undermining voter trust”. Apparently some voters are really angry about FoM; Rachel Reeves said just after the referendum that the country would explode if FoM wasn’t ended, implying that some people were threatening violence. On the other hand other voters are angry that the UK left the Single Market. We aren’t going to have a national conversation unless we know what evidence underlies the panic about FoM.

    And if the UK Government is going to ask the EU if the UK can access the Single Market while opting-out of FoM (which Emily Thornberry suggested a couple of weeks ago), I think that we should know why the UK Government is asking this question again when they should already know the answer. Repeatedly raising the idea that the UK can access the Single Market without FoM suggests an inability to come to terms with this hard choice which was rarely made clear ten years ago.

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  6. Great analysis, as always. One tiny point: I think that "... will fall back in to exactly the same terms as that which was had at the time of the referendum" could be phrased more clearly.

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  7. Great analysis, as always. One tiny point: I think that "... will fall back in to exactly the same terms as that which was had at the time of the referendum" could be phrased more clearly.

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    1. Agree, I wrote it badly. The 'that which' is meant to refer to the conversation at the time of the referendum. But it's a very clumsy formulation. Apologies!

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    2. Apology declined as unnecessary – but apologies from Brexit protagonists are welcome.

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  8. Thank you for another thoughtful post. It seems to me that the political advantage of Burnham's approach is that it is a step towards a gradualist approach to rejoin - while we wait for support to grow. But it would be easy to pivot to a more radical approach as events develop between now and the next election/manifesto and the Overton Window moves. So I would say a good managerial approach.

    In terms of getting a broad based and stable sentiment for rejoin a major problem it seems to me is that there is no right of centre party advocating for it. So where does a socially conservative but transactionally pro EU voter go? By mirroring Reform the Conservatives are ignoring what would have been their natural constituency.

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    1. Or more importantly, where does an economically conservative, pro business and pro trade voter go ? The answer of course is that they have long since stopped voting, and no longer even show up in party opinion polls. It's possibly no coincidence that if you add up Conservative and Reform polling - and then deduct the estimated 10-15% of them who nevertheless do not support Brexit - you get to the overall 30-35% range now indicated for "staying out".

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  9. David Henig's “if you aren’t the US, EU, or China, you’re increasingly the victim of coercion” is highly optimistic as regards the EU given the EU's failure to counter US pressures (like in the rather one-sided recent 'trade deal') and more generally current diplomatic impotence.

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    1. That is mostly down to bad reporting.

      Media concentrated on rather irrelevant tariffs instead of the much more important regulations.

      The tariffs were meant to coerce the EU into changing regulation like the Digital Market Act but failed to have such effect.

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    2. Indeed, the EU strategy appears to be throwing Trump a fish every now and then so he feels like he is winning, while not actually changing anything on the policy side.

      It doesn't play well in a lot of media, but then, the EU was never concerned about its public image, that was always for the Member States.

      If the Member States wanted the EU to have a good public image, they would have funded a marketing department.

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  10. Great insight as always.

    Would be really interested in your thoughts on the overlap between electoral reform and the rejoin process.

    As others have noted, British exceptionalism leads many on the rejoin side to ignore the EU's position. They are highly unlikely to give the UK a special bespoke deal when the UKis still an "elected dictatorship", with a future Farage / Tory government able to tear the whole thing up on perhaps as little as 33% of the vote.

    Personally I don't see any prospect of a better deal without electoral reform that, whilst it doesn't prevent tearing up the deal, makes it much harder to do.

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    1. Former EU Council President Charles Michels has recently said, "the EU would not demand guarantees against a future (UK) government reversing course".
      And in practical terms, "tearing up the whole thing" would be much more difficult than Farage or Badenoch might currently wish to imply : Firstly, in the likely scenario of a fresh referendum - they would require yet a further (third) referendum to avoid over-riding the "will of the people". In the less likely route of a general election straight "Return" mandate, both Reform and Conservatives would then be obliged to base their future campaigns almost entirely on a new set of Brexit 2.0 "benefits". As Dirty Harry almost once put it - Do you feel lucky, Punk ?

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    2. Michels was expressing purely his own personal opinion; it has zero relevance to what the EU will or will not demand.

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  11. Well Burnham has really opened the floodgates now! And what is remarkable is the lack of pushback from the right wing.

    I live and work in the Nordics, and travels extensively. Schengen is a wonderful creation. Why on earth has the UK been so negative about Schengen? I cannot really see what the downsides are.

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    1. The 'problem' is implicit in how you describe where you work and live. Those of us who work, travel and study across the continent, and have friends and relations there do not see the problem. Schengen and the ability to move freely across the continent is indeed great.

      But to others the fear of the foreigner is real. In conversation with a good friend the other day, she commented 'I could never be in favour of being in the EU after what the Germans did to my grandad in 1942.'

      No amount of rationality can brush away such searing - if perhaps inappropriate - emotion.

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    2. A lot of opposition to the Schengen Agreement is based on a lack of information, misunderstanding and/or misinterpretation.

      Often easily recognizable in comment which mistakenly assume it is about freedom of movement of people, or others which think would impact the UK's ability to control immigration.

      The latter misunderstanding is directly fed by slogans such as "take back control of our borders" as if passport checks at the border had any meaningful contribution to immigration control for a country with dozens of visa-free travel agreements.

      Given that passport checks have become increasingly time consuming the removal of passport queues through Schengen membership might actually become a selling point if the lack of knowledge can be addressed as well

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    3. That is an excellent point - trying to explain to people that free movement of people and Schengen are two completely different things feels like banging my head against a wall. It's because the word "borders" is often used metaphorically, to signify an abstract notion of administrative control. The purpose of such metaphors is to make abstract concepts more vivid and lively, and they certainly do that job - but they also bypass rational thought. Metaphors really are a plague...

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  12. The obvious slogan for rejoin is “Are you better off now than before Brexit?” The answer according to the OBR papers is no, and it is very difficult question to deflect. It focuses debate on what actually happened.

    I would also always label the Liz Truss Trade Deals, exactly that. Even the Australians themselves said they couldn’t get believe what they had managed to get. The Mandelson US deal was even worse, and it’s still not clear how it is going to be funded, with fees at 4x the previous EU net contribution.

    Timing for a referendum couldn’t be better with the likely change of government in France meaning two of the biggest economies will have leaders who want to repatriate powers from the EU to nation states, which is something comfortable for the UK.

    On the Euro, I am considering funding some research from YouGov on public opinion. Is it really the case that people don’t want to half their mortgages, half their car finance or enjoy tax cuts as UK government debt interest drops to Eurozone levels? I would be very interested in finding out.

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    1. I would also be very interested in the results of a proper poll on adopting the euro, and I would consider chipping in to crowdfund it.

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  13. I think Burnham has something like the recently revised Swiss arrangements in mind. No customs union, so the UK keeps its trade deals with other countries. No euro.
    UK would make financial contributions but with clear economic benefits in return.
    It would also explain why he is starting to talk about freedom of movement.
    The EU has now tidied up much of its previously awkward arrangements with Switzerland so a similar arrangement for the UK might not be as problematic. Some variation on the ‘Swiss model’ might also be a template for ‘associate membership’ being discussed with Canada.
    I think this may be where the conversation is heading.

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  14. The common element in Leave and Rejoin is what was a hallmark of the original Leave/Remain "debate": the absence of any discussion of just how much grunt work there is in "Leaving" or "Rejoining". Leaving ignored the effort of replacing a host of regulations, data systems, and infrastructure, and Rejoining ignores the ugly reality that there's no reason for the EU to grant the exceptions needed to get Britian into the EU when it was in startup mode. The EU doesn't "need" Britian. Britian needs the EU.

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  15. Regarding the part of this post which states, "Amongst those whose hostility to immigration is primarily racist, it seems as if the experience of post-Brexit immigration has made the prospect of what they see as more likely to be ‘white Christian’ immigrants from Europe relatively palatable," I advocated during the referendum debate that we who wanted to remain in the EU should not be averse to using unsavoury tactics. The horrible campaign on the Leave side was not above that and you don't win political votes by being nice.
    I would have used the following : "There's going to be immigration one way or another. Would you prefer it to be from Poland or Pakistan? From Belgium or Bangladesh? From Italy or India?"
    As I said, it's unsavoury but it would have struck a chord among the racists and the xenophobes.

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  16. Surely the 800lb gorilla missing from the FoM conversation is that the UK is CURRENTLY suffering from a substantial lack of skilled labour, across the skilled/unskilled spectrum, at least in part BECAUSE OF Brexit?

    If I were a 'small boat person' from one of the MENA countries the UK has been helping to bomb the crap out of over the last few decades, ad I had minimal building/electrical/healthcare skills, the UK is now exactly the kind of place I'd want to move to because it needs me economically...

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  17. There were two articles in the Guardian on Sunday 1st November about Rachel Reeves and her view that "leaving European Union has made Britain ‘poorer, weaker and less secure’".

    "Rachel Reeves says UK’s future is in EU as she backs Andy Burnham on Brexit"

    "How Rachel Reeves has mapped out the economic agenda for Andy Burnham’s government".

    Both are quite boosterish of the former Chancellor, and neither mentions that she made a speech at the Labour Party conference ten years ago in which she said that the country would explode if Freedom of Movement didn't end. Only a few months ago, Jake Richards was quoted as saying that the British people had decided that they didn't like Freedom of Movement.

    This raises a number of questions about the proposed conversation about the EU. Has the conversation already started? Who can participate? How do you and I participate? And are we just assuming that the FoM bogeyman has disappeared? Has Blue Labour dropped its objections to FoM? None of the conversation so far has any meaning if the assumption is till that the EU will let the UK have a opt-out from FoM.

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  18. The conversation is no longer about “reversing Brexit”, it is about whether, in a changed world, Britain in the 2030s sees itself outside the emerging European economic and security system or inside (or closely aligned with) it.
    It’s that simple.

    This framing also changes the demand on politicians. It is not just what closer integration would cost or require, but what continued distance will cost both economically and strategically. Gradualism may be politically tempting but the danger is that events set the timetable before British politics has finished its conversation, which hasn’t really started yet.

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  19. "Whilst all of this relates to the new conversation about the UK and the EU, it could be an opportunity for a deeper and more extensive national conversation. So much of Brexit and Brexitism is connected with an aggrieved nostalgia encapsulated in the phrase ‘I want my country back’. "

    The desire expressed by "I want my country back" applies to me as a die-hard re-mainer/joiner.

    MY country was a member of the EU and I will never forgive the Brexiteers for taking it away from me.

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  20. Just few comments on the "Swiss Solution".

    0) The new version has been signed by both EU and Swiss governments and ratified AFAIK by the EU Parliament. The Swiss have yet to ratify it. Doing so will require a "Referendum". The Swiss are fighting about whether a simple "Volksmehr" (majority of the popular vote (as set out in the Constitution) is enough, or whether also a "Ständemehr" (a majority of the Kantons) should be required. This is interesting because the central Cantons in Switzerland are VERY conservative and are likely to vote against ratification so they can likely block acceptance even thought their combined population is very small.
    1) It (the old and the new) includes almost full FoM as a one of the bilateral treaties.
    2) The whole ratification process in Switzerland and expansion of of the original so-called Bilateral Treaties and Schengen/Dublin took several referenda in total (around 6, I lost count ) - just for comparison.
    3) The ethno-nationalist party in Switzerland the Swiss Peoples Party (ger. SVP) is the largest party in Switzerland and has consistently opposed the EU since about 1992. They also recently strongly influence the other centre-right parties. They are like a mix of Tory and ReformUK. Just for information.
    4) The old Treaties gave the Swiss "access" to EU Law by writing all the EU regulations etc. which were to apply in each of the sectors into the treaty. They thus become "International Law" which the Swiss constitution obliges them to accept so they also become in a way Swiss law. The big problem is they are static. When the EU changes a regulation included in the treaty, that part of the Treaty ceases to have effect. There are ways to update but they rely on good will. Under the new treaties updates should happen automatically - a big no-no for the ethno-nationalists.

    Sorry - a bit of a random comment but it does illustrate that in Switzerland the CH-EU relations have been fought over for years and the fight will continue. Just like in the UK.

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