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Much
attention has been focussed on the dismissal of warnings from Airbus – and an
increasing number of other businesses - by Jeremy Hunt, Boris Johnson and
others. Less attention has been given to the
specific reason given by Hunt as to why Airbus should keep quiet: that it
undermines the British government’s capacity to negotiate with the EU. This is
nonsense, for the simple reason that the EU negotiators, and all informed
commentators, know full well how damaging Brexit will be for most businesses,
especially those with closely integrated European Just-in-Time
supply chains (£) like Airbus but, to varying degrees, all businesses
of all sizes which trade with the EU-27. Indeed companies and trade bodies
have been warning about it for well over two years and with growing insistence
since last year, because
of the way that business investment cycles and location decisions work.
This isn’t a game of poker – or, if it is, it is one in which both players can
see each other’s hands. The only
people who persist, wilfully, in not recognizing this damage are the Brexiters
who dismiss it as (of course) Project Fear. Even that dismissal is perverse,
since if the warnings are indeed nonsense then making them would not be helpful
to the EU negotiators in the way suggested by Hunt anyway. In fact, the
only thing which make the negotiations difficult is that Britain, to the extent
that its government can agree on an aim, is seeking as the outcome things that
it has already excluded by virtue of its red lines. Specifically, Britain is
seeking something like the kind of frictionless trade that is only achievable
by being in the single market and a customs union, which it has ruled out; and
participation in agencies and programmes regulated by the ECJ, which regulation
it has rejected. So, in
summary, this is the central paradox of the government’s Brexit approach thus
far: it is seeking to negotiate something which it has already rejected. This is the
real meaning of the ‘Barnier
stepladder’. It is not so much that, as leading Brexit academic Professor
Anand Menon recently put it, “this is the choice that the EU has presented
us with”. It is rather just a tabulation of the types of relationship which
have been identified by numerous other
analysts, going back well before the referendum – but set against the red lines
Britain itself has specified. It’s true that
Britain can expect to have a ‘bespoke deal’, but only in the trivial sense that
every relationship with the EU has its own particularities (e.g. the Canada FTA
is different to the South Korean FTA): but the basic binary of being inside or
outside the single market is unavoidable, as
Sir Ivan Rogers, amongst many others, has repeatedly pointed out. On Barnier’s
diagram, the British red lines mean that the only trade options left are a
Canada style FTA or no deal. Personally, I
do not see how a Canada FTA (or any other FTA) can be compatible with the
UK (and EU) red line of there being no hard Irish border. But, leaving that
aside for today (although, of course, it is a core issue), we might wonder why
Brexiters are so troubled by this? After all, before the referendum, those who
were not saying that we would be ‘like Norway’ were usually, like Boris
Johnson, extolling the virtues of a Canada-type arrangement. If this were
indeed so desirable then, again, there would be no problem save, perhaps,
timing. The EU are, apparently, quite willing to enter into such a
relationship. But, of
course, Johnson’s was a false prospectus. As he and other Brexiters were warned,
but ignored, at the time, a ‘Canadian’ hard Brexit would be completely inadequate
for services, and also for most manufacturing, because of the non-tariff barriers
that the single market seeks to abolish. A no deal Brexit would be even worse
for trade and – potentially far more immediately damaging – for non-trade
issues such as air travel. Again, there’s no mileage in the idea, floated by
Fox, Davis, Johnson and others, that somehow the EU can be made to believe the
UK would walk away with no deal: it is, literally, incredible and the EU know
that to be so whatever bluster the Brexiters put up. No country is going to
deliberately engage in such self-immolation (though that does not mean it might
not happen through a series of accidents). So at least
for the government – although some ministers have apparently still not grasped
it – it is no longer possible to regard either Canada or, still less, no deal
as viable policy. Thus it has lighted on the idea that it is possible in some
way to ‘negotiate’ membership benefits without membership. That won’t happen
not because the EU are punishing us, and certainly not because we have ‘shown
our hand’, or had it revealed by Airbus et al but, simply, because it is a
logical and legal impossibility. The question
then becomes: is the government going to realise that in time, which means
either forcing the Brexiters within and outside the government to accept that
or at least to face them down? This, supposedly, is what
next week’s cabinet meeting is intended to result in, but we have heard
that before. Perhaps the pressure of time and the pressure from businesses will
yield results this time. I am not so sure, though, because even the softening
of hard Brexit which seems to be under consideration seems to be a long way
from realism, being based, still, on the ‘customs partnership’ idea and, now,
on seeking single market membership for goods only. The former is an entirely
untested and highly bureaucratic model, relying on high levels of trust and
goodwill. The latter, I believe, seriously understates the complex
inter-relationship between goods and services and, even if the EU accepted it I
doubt it could be made to work in practice. I’ll post more on this if and when
it emerges as government policy. The fact
that, thus far, the government have refused to face up to the real options
available and the choices to be made is what is leading so many businesses to
speak out now (and, it seems,
many more are saying similar things privately). It is not simply about no
deal Brexit versus hard Brexit, it is that even hard Brexit will damage them.
In this sense, whilst it is true that businesses want clarity, it certainly does
not follow that once they have clarity they will be happy to stay in the UK. It
is just that they will then be able to make the decision as to whether to stay
or not, with all that means for jobs and taxes which the Labour Party would do well to note. Thus clarity may be good for
them, to allow them to make plans, but it won’t necessarily be good for the
rest of us: for many manufacturing and services businesses the only clarity
that will make them likely to stay would be for Britain, in fact or in very
near effect, to stay in the single market and a comprehensive customs union. In the
absence of that, there probably won’t be big, immediate pull outs – especially where
there are large sunk cost installations as in the car industry - but, rather,
gradual disinvestment over many years. Indeed, there is already evidence of
that as
the government’s own figures show. But whilst ruling out the least economically
damaging option, the government has not accepted what the alternatives must, by
definition, be. What businesses are saying to them is that it’s
time – in fact it’s long overdue – to get real. In that way, far from
undermining the negotiations they are pushing for the only way in which the
negotiations can make progress.
It is now
two years since Britain, in a catastrophic and historically unprecedented act
of national self-harm, voted to leave the EU. Since then we have seen the
installation of a new Prime Minister who, when she had the strength to do
otherwise, endorsed not just Brexit but a hard and divisive form of it. Of her
own volition, albeit urged on by the Brexiters, she started the Article 50 process
with no idea about how to undertake it – perhaps the biggest strategic error in
modern British history. She then called and failed to win outright a General
Election – perhaps the biggest political error in modern British history. A weak and
deeply divided government is now embroiled in negotiations with the EU with
little sign that it understands the complexities involved, or even the most
basic realities. Effectively, it is trying to operationalise the central lie of
the Leave campaign: that it is possible to leave without consequences.
Meanwhile, the economic damage is growing and Britain is experiencing a
bitterly divisive cultural war. On this blog
I have traced these developments as they have unfolded on a weekly basis, but
in this post I want to step back from the details to paint a broad picture of
how we got to where we are now, and what we might expect from now on. The campaign
and its consequences It is
important to keep remembering what happened during the referendum, because the
claims made during the campaign, and the claims made about the campaign since
then, continue to structure the current debate. It has
become fashionable to say that both campaigns were equally dishonest, but that
simply is not so. Leave mainlined on what even they admitted was a lie about
the EU budget contribution and NHS funding, and another lie about impending
Turkish membership of the EU. And these
were just the headline lies. Beneath them were a myriad of others, such as that
future terms could be sorted out informally before Article
50 was even triggered
so there was no danger of a cliff-edge fallout; that the Irish border would be unaffected; or that a good, quick exit deal was
assured because ‘German car makers’ would insist on it as endlessly
claimed by Brexiters, including businessman Peter
Hargreaves who paid
for a leaflet to be sent to every UK household at the start of the campaign
urging a leave vote. No one has
ever been held to account for these and all the other lies told during the
campaign. Since then, we’ve also learned enough about the
conduct of the Leave campaign and possible Russian interference to, at the very least, place a cloud
over the legitimacy of the result. By contrast,
Remain was certainly pedestrian and passionless, but its projections (based on
assumptions and models, of course, but not lies) of the consequences were not
‘Project Fear’, as repetitively and routinely alleged, but attempts to counter
the vague and unsubstantiated claims of Leave that all would be well, or even
rosy, if we left. It’s notable that such claims have since been repudiated by
many Brexiters, most recently Nigel Farage. There are
reams that could, have been, and will be written about all this.
The outcome we know: a narrow victory for leave. The narrowness is important as
it means there was never the unequivocal result subsequently claimed. That is
why the Brexiters constantly talk about it having been the biggest vote in
British history – meaning the total number of votes cast was the highest – as
if that implied an overwhelming vote for Brexit. In fact, the most accurate way
of describing the result would be that the country replied ‘we don’t really know’. Moreover,
the combination of Leave’s lies and their failure to specify what leaving meant
in terms of the future means that there is not (as many Leavers seem to sense)
any real mandate for Brexit, and certainly not hard Brexit. Many leading
leavers campaigned on the basis of staying in the single
market, for all that
they deny it now. Others, like Michael Gove, talked ambiguously of being part of a “free trade zone that
extends from Iceland to the Russian border” whilst making no budget payments
and having no ECJ jurisdiction. If that meant anything, it meant being, like
Iceland, in EFTA/EEA. From these
lies, ambiguities and confusions much has flowed. Crucially, the fact that
Britain voted against being in the EU
but not for anything else. The claims
now made by Brexiters that the vote itself mandated hard Brexit (in the sense
of leaving the single market and any form of customs union) is very easily
disproved. If it were true, it would not have taken seven months of argument
and speculation before this meaning was
announced by Theresa May in her Lancaster House speech of January 2017. Two years of
chaos In the two years
that have followed the referendum, we have seen economic and political chaos. Economically,
what was dismissed as Project Fear has largely come true. The latest research from the Centre for
European Research
suggests, amongst other things, that the British economy is 2.1% smaller than
it would have been had the vote gone the other way. That it has not been more
severe is mainly because Article 50 was not triggered immediately in the way
that forecasters
had reasonably assumed because Cameron had said it would be the case. Even so,
there was an immediate and massive currency collapse (which, in itself, would
in any other circumstances have been a major political crisis) and consequent
inflation and real wage erosion, collapsing investment, a recruitment crisis in
the NHS and elsewhere, and the beginnings of what threatens to be a
catastrophic brain drain, corporate pull-out and tax base collapse. There is now
a crescendo of warnings from business that we are very close to the point
of no return. Whole sectors – from strategically crucial science to socially
crucial care homes - are in turmoil as, relatedly and even more importantly,
are the lives of millions of EU-27 people here and UK people in EU-27 who have
based their entire life plans on Britain being in the EU. Politically,
the vote saw an immediate crisis that was resolved by anointing a Prime
Minister who failed to undertake the obvious act of leadership which was to find a form of Brexit which would be
bearable for most people on both sides of the narrow divide. Instead, she insisted that Brexit must mean
the hard Brexit of
the Tory Ultras and of UKIP. With that, she not only ruled out an EFTA/EEA soft
Brexit for trade but by insisting on there being no role whatsoever for the ECJ
she has created massive problems across a host of other areas. The
implications for Northern Ireland are now widely recognized, but there are many
others. For example, it is the hard line stance on the ECJ which means that we
must also leave Euratom, with numerousconsequences including for the availability of cancer treatment. Such a prospect was not even
remotely discussed during the referendum and is highly unlikely to be what
anyone thought they were voting about. Something similar could be said of EASA,
the European Aviation Safety Agency, also thrown into doubt by hard Brexit
with potential effects on flying rights within Europe. There is not
even the shadow of the pretence that this approach to Brexit is in ‘the
national interest’. It is about, as the whole situation has always been about,
an implacable, dogmatic minority of Tory MPs and the ungovernable party and
country they have created. Indeed, having lost her majority in the botched and
unnecessary General Election (which, don’t forget, she insisted until she
called it would not be in the
national interest, but when she called it did so on the basis that it was) May is more than ever the prisoner
of the ERG Ultras and, now, the DUP. Nowhere is
this lack of concern with the national interest clearer than on the international stage, rendered all the more complex since
the election of Donald Trump. Britain now no longer has any
coherent or workable geo-political strategy, something which is good news only
for Vladimir Putin. Worse, we have become an international laughing stock both for the crazy Brexit decision
and for the woeful ignorance and
ill-preparedness of
the way we are attempting to implement it. But the Christmas cracker patriots
don’t care about that. No harm that they do to our country can ever be too much
in exchange for their intellectually moribund and practically flawed notion of
sovereignty, and no lie is too great to be told in pursuit of it. For that
matter, these great patriots have been more than happy to ramp up the internal divisions
they have created. More sinister than their adolescent sneering at ‘remoaners’
is their McCarthyite rhetoric of ‘saboteurs’ and ‘traitors’ subverting
‘the will of the people’, matched at street level by the upsurge of violence against
EU – and indeed non-EU – immigrants, and rape and death threats against their
opponents. Their ambition to pauperize and isolate our country is not
sufficient: they also want to grind us into cultural dust. The ironies
of victory Yet
alongside that is a huge irony. From the moment of the referendum result, and
ever more clearly as time has gone on, it has been plain that despite years of
having dreamt of Brexit the Brexiters have not the tiniest clue as to how to
put it into practice. Not even a rough plan. All they have are vapid slogans which
do not begin to address the cataclysm they have unleashed. Even now they
continue to talk in meaningless or nonsensical terms of ‘securing access’ to,
and having ‘frictionless trade’ with, the single market, or of ‘trading on WTO terms’, refusing to engage with the
enormous practical complexities that Brexit entails. Perhaps that
lack of substance explains the viciousness of their rhetoric. At all events it has
meant that they are wholly dependent on ‘the establishment’ – the civil
service, business and civil society leaders, most of whom know that Brexit is a
crazy idea - to try to implement their nonsense. But, even with that
dependence, they still lash out at any expert who dares to inject any
realism into the debate meaning that government policy has been constructed within a bunker of
yay-saying groupthink. Indeed
victory has neither assuaged the anger of the Brexiters nor given them much joy.
They have almost completely given up on making any positive
claims for its possibilities and, at best, offer a dour, Dunkirk spirit,
backs-to-the-wall grind and at worst a ludicrous, lachrymose, self-pitying
victimhood that the EU is ‘punishing’ us for leaving rather than taking responsibility for
the consequences of
the choice that they urged, so mendaciously, upon us. I say ‘us’ because it is
not just remainers who have something to complain about, so too do those who
were duped into voting leave by the breath taking lies of the Brexiters, lies
which still pour incontinently out of them. Many, as the voting statistics
show, were from the poorest and most vulnerable in society who will be most
badly affected by Brexit and least able to insulate themselves from its
effects. The politics
of the impossible Meanwhile,
the negotiations with the EU are making little progress, partly as a
consequence of the reckless irresponsibility of triggering Article 50 before
holding an election, thus wasting three of the twenty-four months available. There
is still, even now, no agreed plan as to what Britain wants to achieve, still
less a plan which is remotely viable: the continuing refusal to face up
seriously to the Irish border issue being the most egregious example. The
government’s entire position continues to be the
wholly illusory fantasy that it is possible to be both outside the EU and yet, in some magical
way, to continue to enjoy most of the benefits of being a member (lamentably, Labour’s policy is almost identical). To take just one of many examples
which illustrates, in microcosm, this point consider the European Medicines Agency
(EMA). Brexiters like David Davis
opined that there was no reason why it could not stay in the UK (£). In
fact, the EMA is leaving and with it not just numerous jobs (and associated
taxes) but Britain’s place as a global scientific and commercial hub in
pharmaceuticals. That was an inevitable consequence of Brexit, but how did
Brexiters react? By saying
that the EU was punishing Britain. It’s important
to understand this central fact: Brexit is in many people’s view undesirable,
but the form in which it is being pursued, even if it were desirable, is impossible. Yet whilst
pursuing a course which, to get anywhere near achieving it, would require
maximum flexibility from the EU, goodwill has been shredded by bellicose
rhetoric, accusations of punishment, and hostility and suspicion about ‘the
other side’. Perhaps the most damaging aspect of the British approach has been
the way that immediately after have reached the phase 1 agreement senior Brexiters, including
David Davis, seemed to imply that they were not bound by it. This led in
due course to the Prime Minister herself declaring that the backstop
arrangements agreed for the Irish border, that she had signed up to, were not,
in fact, acceptable to her. That has not only led to the talks stalling over
the legal text of the Withdrawal Agreement but has also seriously undermined
trust. This is compounded by many ‘noises off’ from Brexit Ultras to the effect
that once Brexit has formally happened anything agreed to get past that date is
up for re-negotiation. Internally,
we are a country still bitterly divided and the wounds are daily re-opened by
the crowing of the Brexiters and the hard line decisions of the government. There
is neither in parliament nor – according to recent opinion polls – any longer a
majority in the country for Brexit and certainly not a majority for hard Brexit. But parliament – or more accurately
the House of Commons – has refused to use its power to do anything to even moderate
Brexit, a situation made more complicated by Labour’s ambiguous and evasive
stance. In the
absence of any effective brake being put upon them the Brexiters are able march
us on, like First World War generals, high on gimcrack patriotism,
plethorically flushed with self-righteous certainty, prideful of their own
willed and wilful ignorance - urging the troops to one more big push, regardless
of – no, glorying in - the resultant slaughter. The more
damaging and impossible the plan, the more viciously they wave the tattered
banner of ‘the will of the people’, virtually the only argument they now make
for a policy that the majority of people no longer support. Meanwhile, many who
know full well that what is unfolding is
a disaster effectively shrug their shoulders and say that nothing can be done
and that, no matter how foolish it is, it must be done. No good
outcomes are left It is still,
even at this late hour, just about possible that we can avoid catastrophe and I
fervently hope that we do. At the moment, all outcomes seem about as likely as
each other, and none of them are good, they just come in varying shades of bad. Perhaps the
most likely outcome now is years of transitional agreements and ongoing talks
which will be unsatisfactory to leavers and remainers alike, and will result in
a slow-burn economic decline and waning geo-political relevance. There could
be a no deal crash out in March 2019, with unimaginable consequences –
shortages of food and medicine, suspension of flights and much else - in terms
of economic hardship and political convulsions. That is both possible and for a
small hard core of Brexiters desirable. Or there
could be another referendum – and today’s People’s Vote march in
London shows that there is strong support for that - the result of which
would be unpredictable and the consequences, either way, highly polarising. Or … who
knows? All of this is uncharted water, and few who have observed the last
couple of years would dare predict what will happen now. Even so, no
one should imagine that there is any scenario in which we go back to being the
country we were on 23 June 2016. That country is, irrevocably, gone.