So the much
vaunted Tory
rebellion on the ‘meaningful vote’ amendment ended not with a bang but a
whimper. Those who held out – Allen, Clarke, Lee, Sandbach, Soubry and
Wollaston – deserve very high praise but in the end, as
outlined in my previous blog post, there were not enough of them who had
the steel to stand firm. Unlike the Brexit Ultras, they seem to look for
reasons not to rebel rather than being constantly on the lookout for
opportunities to do so.
I received
some criticism for that comment, as have others saying similar things, for
giving insufficient weight the extraordinary level of pressure and outright
bullying the potential rebels were subjected to. I certainly don’t
underestimate that, and it is a mark of how toxic and vile political culture
has been made by Brexit that bullying and death threats now characterise it.
But my comment is not meant to be judgmental, just factual: whatever the
reason, and however understandable it may be, as a matter of fact the rebels do
not, in sufficient numbers, have the determination to rebel.
That may
change, for example over possible amendments to the Trade Bill to insist on a
customs union but I think this is unlikely for two reasons. First, because on
the customs amendment to the Withdrawal Bill the rebels were bought off with
the fudge of a ‘customs arrangement’, so why wouldn’t the same thing happen
with the Trade Bill? Second because if, as seems to be the case, Grieve and
others held off on the basis of the damage it would do to the government to be
defeated on the meaningful vote amendment then that argument would be far
stronger in relation to the Trade Bill customs amendment. For if that were
carried it would rip apart a central strand of the government’s entire approach
to Brexit in a way that would not have been true for the meaningful vote issue.
I don’t
suppose, by the way, that the climb down will win the putative rebels any great
respect or gratitude from the Ultras for having ultimately put party loyalty
first, nor do I imagine that those Ultras will take it as an example of how
they, too, should be willing to compromise in a spirit of unity. Rather, it
will just confirm their sense that they, rather than the rebels, have the
ruthlessness to hold fast to what they want and that they will continue to get
it.
However, one
aspect of Wednesday’s vote that I have not seen commented on is that it may end
up backfiring rather badly on the Ultras. Take a step back from the immediate
drama, and what happened at that vote was truly bizarre. For who would ever
imagine that a legislative body when asked - about any issue, let alone one of
such gravity as Brexit – whether it would like a meaningful vote would give the
answer ‘no, thanks’? It’s an extraordinary idea that any group of lawmakers would
choose to neuter itself to executive power in this way. But this is what our
MPs have done.
Given that this
is the case, it applies quite as much to the Ultras who cheered it on as to the
rebels who went along with it. So if it turns out that the government negotiates
a form of Brexit that the Ultras find objectionable then they will find, to
their chagrin, that they have engineered a situation in which it is they who
will have to take it or leave it.
There are
many straws in the wind that something like this is going to unfold. Sam Coates
of The Times argued last weekend
that the ludicrous ploy (which has since rather backfired) of claiming a ‘Brexit
dividend’ for the NHS was a sop to the Brexiters in preparation for the
government making numerous concessions on its red lines in the next few weeks.
That seems plausible in that unless the ECJ red line, in particular, is
substantially softened, if not abandoned, the prospects of meaningful progress
on security cooperation and participation in many EU programmes is highly
unlikely.
It is a
point that May has half-conceded before, both in her Munich
speech on security, but also in relation to the phase
1 agreement on citizens’ rights. It was always crazy to have drawn that
line so firmly anyway, the more so when accompanied by the strategy – if it can
be graced with the name – of seeking to opt back in to as much of the EU as
possible after Brexit. It is really the key stumbling block to creating some
kind of Association Agreement with the EU which many, including
most recently the eminent barrister and Brexit commentator George Peretz QC,
see as a more logical aim than that of a Free Trade Agreement. If May’s ‘deep
and special partnership’ is to mean anything, it entails something akin to the ‘Ukraine
model’, but that is unachievable without some role, even if backdoor, for
the ECJ or, conceivably, some new kind of UK-EU court with the ECJ as the
ultimate arbiter.
Another such
straw in the wind can be found in Pippa
Crerar’s report in today’s Guardian
to the effect that the government’s “direction of travel” is to stay in a
single market for goods trade. Such an idea seems to be a version of what is sometimes
called the ‘Jersey model’,
and it is not without substantial difficulties to my mind, at least. Principal
of these is that it is not always possible to separate goods and services in any
neat way (e.g. maintenance contracts associated with goods).
One irony of
such a model is that it would finally make use of the old Brexiter saw about
the advantages of the UK trade deficit with the EU, since Britain does indeed
have a deficit in goods trade; but by the same token it would have a chilling
effect on services trade, where Britain runs a large surplus with the EU. But,
in any case, the point for present purposes is that if this is indeed the
direction of travel it will entail concessions both on the ECJ and also, most
likely, freedom of movement of people.
So that,
too, would enrage the Brexiters whose only comfort would be that independent
trade deals – in services only – would become possible. That would be mainly
symbolic, of course – almost no free trade agreements touch deeply on services,
primarily because to do so entails the kind of common regulatory framework that
Brexiters regard as incompatible with (what they mean by) sovereignty. Then
again, the entire notion of an independent trade policy is primarily symbolic
anyway, since in economic terms British trade is served much better by single
market membership and access to EU-brokered trade deals.
None of this
should remotely be taken to imply that some version of either the Jersey or the
Ukraine models would in my view be a good thing for Britain. Both of them, like
any other form of Brexit, are damaging to Britain and sub-optimal (economically,
politically and culturally) compared to remaining in the EU. But given that Britain
seems determined to make itself a worse place in all these respects such models
are – by a long way – better than the ‘no deal’ catastrophe that remains a very
real possibility.
Rather, my
point is that if one or other (or another) of these kinds of compromises with
May’s ill-judged red lines is in prospect it will put the Ultras on the wrong
side of the decision to reject a meaningful vote. This isn’t to posit May as
some Machiavellian genius, playing a cunning long game to thwart the Ultras. As
Rafael
Behr argued this week in a very acute profile of May’s leadership, she is
bereft of pretty much any of the leadership skills which Brexit demands of her.
And as I have said myself in the past, she appears totally lacking in any strategic
thinking, rather than the day-to-day tactics of keeping her government going
and her party from completely imploding.
The window
of time such a purely tactical approach is rapidly closing now. With the
latest Westminster games now over, talks with the EU
resume in earnest in the run up to the EUCO meeting in a week’s time. As
the ever-excellent Tony
Connelly, RTE’s Europe Editor, argued last Sunday “the view from Brussels
and Dublin is that Westminster is quite simply in a parallel universe”, quoting
a senior EU official to the effect that a “cataclysmic” outcome is a
conceivable prospect. So events in Westminster may have ended with a whimper,
but just around the corner there may be a big bang to come in Brussels.
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