The Brexit reset
The reset can be understood in terms of two kinds of process. The first kind consists of the things which the UK can do unilaterally, meaning without any agreement from the EU, such as maintaining regulatory alignment with the EU, both by eschewing active divergence and by avoiding passive divergence. There are many signs that this kind of reset is underway. This is beneficial, as it means that businesses do not have to produce to two different standards, but doesn’t in itself improve terms of trade with the EU. Moreover, as occurred last week with the introduction of the EU General Product Safety Regulation, there are some forms of EU regulatory change which cannot simply be ‘shadowed’ by the UK (or, in this case, and others relating to goods trade, Great Britain), but have to be accepted as new barriers to trade.
The second kind of process consists of things involving negotiation with the EU. Most obviously that means agreeing measures which go beyond the existing Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), perhaps including a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement, a Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS) agreement, and a Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications agreement. It could also include a security and defence pact. However, it also includes negotiations within the various mechanisms built into the existing agreements because there are some things potentially within their scope (such as linking carbon pricing systems) which, if pursued, would contribute to a reset.
Equally, there are other things, including the full implementation of the Windsor Framework, the resolution of ongoing problems in implementing the settled status scheme for EU citizens in the UK, and the full introduction of UK import controls, which are likely to be seen by the EU as a prerequisite for any substantive new agreement(s). This was brought into sharp focus this week with the news that the EU is taking the UK to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over its failures, going back to 2020, to uphold all the citizens’ rights provisions agreed in the Withdrawal Agreement and some other matters (all of which, be it noted, go back to the Tory government’s alleged failure to do what it, itself, had agreed; note also that it agreed to the ECJ’s role in these matters).
Resolving such issues is part of the reset because it would help to rebuild trust with the EU and to improve the ‘tone’ of the relationship, something which has been underway since the election, and which saw further developments in the last fortnight. These included Rachel Reeves attending the EU finance ministers' meeting and Keir Starmer meeting the President of the European Council. It’s wrong to scoff at such things as mere symbolism: symbolism matters, not least because of the way it relates to trust.
As for substance, there have been further signs that the UK will end up agreeing some form of YMS. Doing so, along with extending the agreement on fishing rights beyond its expiry in June 2026, looks to be the basic requirement of agreeing any wider reset with the EU. How the substance of the reset develops from now on will define Labour’s post-Brexit policy and, indeed, the UK’s post-Brexit polity, and negotiations with the EU look set to be the Brexit story of 2025 and perhaps beyond.
The reset backlash
Although these two reset processes have barely begun, it is already clear that what the economics commentator Simon Nixon calls “the Brexit reset backlash” is now underway, and it has gathered force just in the last two weeks. Thus last weekend saw the reset being denounced in the Mail on Sunday as what David Frost called, with his trademark dreary predictability, the work of a “Surrender Squad” which is set on “betraying” Brexit. An accompanying editorial warned that Starmer’s plans will make Britain “a rule taker” rather than “a rule maker”.
The next day, again in the Mail, Boris Johnson fulminated about the need to “fight, fight and fight again for the freedoms people voted for in 2016”. Meanwhile, in the Express, Johnson again appeared, this time to warn that the UK’s accession to the CPTPP, which occurred last Sunday, was in danger of being sacrificed by Starmer (a particularly disingenuous comment, as there is nothing in the reset which is anticipated to preclude CPTPP membership, including an SPS deal). And in this week’s PMQs Kemi Badenoch accused Starmer of being “about to give away our hard-won Brexit benefits” whilst the Sun launched a “campaign to stop Brexit betrayal”.
These and many other examples of the backlash reprise all the rancid arguments of the last eight years with the ever-present accusations of betrayal along with those of ‘submission’ to the EU and lack of patriotism. There’s something particularly fatuous about calling the reset a ‘betrayal’ when it comes, as it often does, from those who have spent those eight years calling every single aspect of Brexit a betrayal. Just how many times can Brexit be betrayed? However, the backlash is also distinctive, or at any rate specific, in being aimed at particular possibilities envisaged within the reset such as a carbon emissions agreement and an SPS agreement. In particular, the backlash has, rather belatedly, honed in on Labour’s longstanding omission of ECJ jurisdiction from its ‘red lines’.
A new phase in the battle for the post-Brexit narrative
Thus this reset backlash can be understood as a new phase in the battle for the post-Brexit narrative. The first phase of that battle began in earnest after the transition period ended in January 2021, and it was decisively lost by the Brexiters. That is evidenced by the now well-established negative public view of Brexit. For example, according to the Statista data series, since June 2021 the view that it was ‘wrong to leave’ has always been greater than the view that it was ‘right to leave’, with the gap between those rising steadily. In June 2021 44% said ‘wrong’ and 43% said right, but by May 2024 (the latest date in this data set) those figures were 55% and 31%. Many other polls and similar polling questions show the same pattern. At the same time, Brexiters became increasingly unwilling to defend Brexit and increasingly convoluted in such defences as they offered.
The reset can be understood in terms of two kinds of process. The first kind consists of the things which the UK can do unilaterally, meaning without any agreement from the EU, such as maintaining regulatory alignment with the EU, both by eschewing active divergence and by avoiding passive divergence. There are many signs that this kind of reset is underway. This is beneficial, as it means that businesses do not have to produce to two different standards, but doesn’t in itself improve terms of trade with the EU. Moreover, as occurred last week with the introduction of the EU General Product Safety Regulation, there are some forms of EU regulatory change which cannot simply be ‘shadowed’ by the UK (or, in this case, and others relating to goods trade, Great Britain), but have to be accepted as new barriers to trade.
The second kind of process consists of things involving negotiation with the EU. Most obviously that means agreeing measures which go beyond the existing Withdrawal Agreement (WA) and Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), perhaps including a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement, a Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS) agreement, and a Mutual Recognition of Professional Qualifications agreement. It could also include a security and defence pact. However, it also includes negotiations within the various mechanisms built into the existing agreements because there are some things potentially within their scope (such as linking carbon pricing systems) which, if pursued, would contribute to a reset.
Equally, there are other things, including the full implementation of the Windsor Framework, the resolution of ongoing problems in implementing the settled status scheme for EU citizens in the UK, and the full introduction of UK import controls, which are likely to be seen by the EU as a prerequisite for any substantive new agreement(s). This was brought into sharp focus this week with the news that the EU is taking the UK to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) over its failures, going back to 2020, to uphold all the citizens’ rights provisions agreed in the Withdrawal Agreement and some other matters (all of which, be it noted, go back to the Tory government’s alleged failure to do what it, itself, had agreed; note also that it agreed to the ECJ’s role in these matters).
Resolving such issues is part of the reset because it would help to rebuild trust with the EU and to improve the ‘tone’ of the relationship, something which has been underway since the election, and which saw further developments in the last fortnight. These included Rachel Reeves attending the EU finance ministers' meeting and Keir Starmer meeting the President of the European Council. It’s wrong to scoff at such things as mere symbolism: symbolism matters, not least because of the way it relates to trust.
As for substance, there have been further signs that the UK will end up agreeing some form of YMS. Doing so, along with extending the agreement on fishing rights beyond its expiry in June 2026, looks to be the basic requirement of agreeing any wider reset with the EU. How the substance of the reset develops from now on will define Labour’s post-Brexit policy and, indeed, the UK’s post-Brexit polity, and negotiations with the EU look set to be the Brexit story of 2025 and perhaps beyond.
The reset backlash
Although these two reset processes have barely begun, it is already clear that what the economics commentator Simon Nixon calls “the Brexit reset backlash” is now underway, and it has gathered force just in the last two weeks. Thus last weekend saw the reset being denounced in the Mail on Sunday as what David Frost called, with his trademark dreary predictability, the work of a “Surrender Squad” which is set on “betraying” Brexit. An accompanying editorial warned that Starmer’s plans will make Britain “a rule taker” rather than “a rule maker”.
The next day, again in the Mail, Boris Johnson fulminated about the need to “fight, fight and fight again for the freedoms people voted for in 2016”. Meanwhile, in the Express, Johnson again appeared, this time to warn that the UK’s accession to the CPTPP, which occurred last Sunday, was in danger of being sacrificed by Starmer (a particularly disingenuous comment, as there is nothing in the reset which is anticipated to preclude CPTPP membership, including an SPS deal). And in this week’s PMQs Kemi Badenoch accused Starmer of being “about to give away our hard-won Brexit benefits” whilst the Sun launched a “campaign to stop Brexit betrayal”.
These and many other examples of the backlash reprise all the rancid arguments of the last eight years with the ever-present accusations of betrayal along with those of ‘submission’ to the EU and lack of patriotism. There’s something particularly fatuous about calling the reset a ‘betrayal’ when it comes, as it often does, from those who have spent those eight years calling every single aspect of Brexit a betrayal. Just how many times can Brexit be betrayed? However, the backlash is also distinctive, or at any rate specific, in being aimed at particular possibilities envisaged within the reset such as a carbon emissions agreement and an SPS agreement. In particular, the backlash has, rather belatedly, honed in on Labour’s longstanding omission of ECJ jurisdiction from its ‘red lines’.
A new phase in the battle for the post-Brexit narrative
Thus this reset backlash can be understood as a new phase in the battle for the post-Brexit narrative. The first phase of that battle began in earnest after the transition period ended in January 2021, and it was decisively lost by the Brexiters. That is evidenced by the now well-established negative public view of Brexit. For example, according to the Statista data series, since June 2021 the view that it was ‘wrong to leave’ has always been greater than the view that it was ‘right to leave’, with the gap between those rising steadily. In June 2021 44% said ‘wrong’ and 43% said right, but by May 2024 (the latest date in this data set) those figures were 55% and 31%. Many other polls and similar polling questions show the same pattern. At the same time, Brexiters became increasingly unwilling to defend Brexit and increasingly convoluted in such defences as they offered.
The arrival of the new government has provided Brexiters with an opportunity to regroup. In addition to opposing the reset itself, this regroup has two main axes.
The first axis consists of trying to give the impression that all the false claims made for Brexit were, in fact, being delivered on by the Tory government and are only now being squandered, or failing to materialise, because the Labour government has turned its back on them. Thus the fact that the Tories found that substantial regulatory divergence was impractical, and regulatory freedoms were largely an illusion, is being glossed over, and the failure to deliver them blamed on Labour. In a similar way, Badenoch and others are pretending that it is only Labour’s lack of commitment (£) which stands in the way of a supposedly (though actually fictitious) “oven ready” UK-US trade deal, especially once Trump returns to power.
The second axis is to re-write the ongoing damage of Brexit as being, in fact, the failure of the Labour government. Though minor in itself, a strikingly brazen example was an article in the Telegraph (£) last week bemoaning that “London’s stock market is in danger of sliding into irrelevance under Labour”. Yet, last January, an article in the same paper (£) reported that Brexit was “the prime suspect in the death of the stock market”. Not only were they in the same paper, but both articles were co-authored by the very same journalist, Chief City Correspondent Michael Bow.
This is only a small foretaste of what is likely to come. In particular, sooner or later (and sooner, if a reset with the EU is going to happen), the government is going to have to introduce full import controls. These are a direct consequence of Brexit, but one the Tories postponed multiple times, as did the Labour government this autumn. Undoubtedly when it happens it will be blamed on Labour mismanagement and, very likely, twisted round to be blamed on the reset itself (i.e. as a ‘concession’ in order to get the reset).
Labour’s culpability
In a sense, Labour have only themselves to blame. Promising to ‘make Brexit work’ was always likely to lumber the government with responsibility for all the ways in which Brexit does not, and will never, work. Nor has the government helped itself since coming to power. For example, treating, and initially rejecting, YMS as an ‘unacceptable EU demand’ simply plays into the hands of Brexiters, enabling them to present it, if (and almost certainly when) accepted, as a ‘capitulation’. It would have been much better to treat it as a great prize, and evidence of the potential value of the reset.
Another example is the UK’s accession to CPTPP. Of course the Trade Secretary, Jonathan Reynolds, was bound to speak positively about this, but he was not obliged to do so in terms almost identical to those which would have been used by his Tory predecessors, saying it showed that “Britain is uniquely placed to take advantage of exciting new markets” etc. Here, again, the government is too willing to accept the Brexiters’ framing.
In the same way, the Brexiter attack line that the reset will make Britain a ‘rule taker’ ought to be challenged head-on by emphasising that Brexit created a situation where Britain is, in practice, a rule-taker (think tethered plastic bottle caps). The reset is partly designed to deal with this reality in a more efficient way, by facilitating alignment through, for example, the Product Regulation and Metrology Bill, and perhaps in due course by agreeing to, for example, dynamic alignment of SPS regulations. So, far from being the cause of rule taking, the reset is a consequence of it and, in turn, a consequence of the delusions of Brexit.
In short, if the reset is to be successfully defended against the backlash, it will be necessary to challenge, and to not to reproduce, the underlying framing Brexit of itself. Just talking of the Tories’ “botched Brexit deal” isn’t enough. What is needed is a positive justification of the reset.
Justifying the reset
The most crucial justification is that the Labour election manifesto was quite clear about its intention to seek to reset relations with the EU. Conversely, the attempt the Brexiters are now making to depict the reset as undemocratic and a betrayal of the 2016 vote is, unequivocally, a lie. To the ire of many of its supporters, the Labour government is not reversing Brexit, and there is nothing at all in the referendum or what happened afterwards to say the UK-EU relations are bound to remain in the form Johnson and Frost negotiated (a form which, anyway, included provisions for future changes). Indeed, the crux of the Brexiters’ argument was that the British parliament should be free to pursue the policies which British electors had mandated. The reset has that mandate.
The second justification is that the reset also has popular support. The latest evidence for that came with a report from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) which includes a lot of crunchy survey data about public attitudes in the UK and in EU member states to UK-EU relations. I won’t even try to summarise it here but, as regards UK opinion, a couple of figures are worth flagging. One is that, overall, 55% favour closer relations with the EU, 22% favour relations as they are and 10% favour more distant relations. The other is that, amongst ‘Red Wall’ voters these figures are 44%, 14% and 18% respectively. Additionally, and prominently reported, the survey found majority support, even amongst leave voters (54%), for the return of freedom of movement in return for single market “access”.
These figures, especially the latter, attracted a certain amount of exuberant comment from ‘remainers’ or ‘rejoiners’ along the lines that the Labour government no longer need fear public opinion, not just as regards a reset but as regards reversing the entirety of, at least, ‘hard Brexit’ (i.e. no single market). I don’t think it is anything like as simple as that, whether viewed in terms of the narrow calculus of Labour electoral advantage or from the broader terms of the politics of Brexit.
On the first, it may well be the case (and, though I don’t have the data, I suspect it probably is) that a relatively small number of voters who don’t want closer relations and don’t want freedom of movement, and who feel strongly about both, could prevent Labour winning the next election. The wider issue is that opinion polls have many limitations, and can’t capture how voters would react if Labour followed where these ones point, given the backlash that would result. Most importantly of all, for Labour now to abandon its ‘red lines’ would immediately deprive the government of the democratic legitimacy which the election has given to its reset policy.
It may be tempting to think that, since that reset in itself attracts the ferocious and dishonest backlash we are seeing, the government might as well go the whole hog and pursue a reversal of Brexit, just as its Brexiter critics claim it to be doing. Actually, if anything, the backlash shows how limited Labour’s space for manoeuvre is. But the more important point is that there is a huge difference between defending against a false charge and against one which would be true. Moreover, if there is ever to be a durable rejoin policy it would have to be one which clearly had democratic legitimacy. So whilst the opinion polls give strong support for Labour’s reset, that is all they do.
The third justification for the reset is its substantive benefits. Just last week saw the publication, for the first time so far as I know, of a credible estimate of its economic impact. It came from John Springford of the Centre for European Reform, and, whilst necessarily rough and ready, suggests that the reset could deliver an annual uplift of 0.3% to 0.7% in the long-term, defined here as ten years.
Of course this is fairly trivial compared with the foregone GDP growth resulting from Brexit (and, actually this is Springford’s main point). However, in a generally low-growth economy, it is not nothing. For example, on present OECD predictions, UK growth in 2024 will be 0.9%. Moreover, on this estimate the reset is of considerably greater benefit than the long-term annual uplift of the CPTPP deal, estimated to be 0.04% to 0.08% of GDP. Even the Brexiters' much-vaunted UK-US trade deal would only be worth an estimated 0.07% to 0.16% of GDP. So, small as the value of a reset may be, those who dismiss it as worthless should be careful not to inadvertently give the backlashers a free pass on how it compares with such ‘Brexit benefits’.
In any case, the reset has more than an economic value. For one thing, if achieved, it would have a defence and security value, and that at a time of huge international turmoil. For another, it could act as a confidence-building measure to be built on subsequently. Indeed - and this, too, ought to concentrate the minds of those ‘rejoiners’ who dismiss the reset as trivial or even pointless - if there is ever to be a route to joining the EU again it seems all but certain it would need to pass through something like the reset along the way.
The bigger picture
It is in this latter respect that the Brexit reset backlash is most important, and most dangerous. At one level, it is just about domestic politics. It is a transparently opportunistic attempt by both Tory and Reform parties to re-kindle the populist anger of the referendum, and the ‘Brexit wars’ which followed, in order to boost their electoral fortunes.
At another level, those attempts are inseparable from UK-EU relations. The Brexiters’ visceral hatred of the EU makes them determined permanently to pollute those relations with their political faeces. They know that the more anti-reset opposition they can whip up, the less likely it is that the EU will have the confidence to entertain even minimally closer relations, let alone anything else. Already Jacob Rees-Mogg is urging “both the Tory and Reform leaders … to promise if elected to leave any new Labour deal”, and that is quite deliberately designed to wreck EU confidence in the reset. It is hideous and, if anything deserves the label, ‘unpatriotic’ in its attempt not just to derail the elected government’s reset policy but to engender perpetual hostility with Britain’s neighbours and allies. But it is happening and it can’t be wished away.
In that sense, this new phase in the battle for the post-Brexit narrative is a crucial one for the government but, more widely and in the longer-term, for anyone who rejects the vicious and self-harming politics of Brexitism. Labour’s reset may be frustratingly timid, but the backlash against it is a reminder of the obstacles even to timidity. If it is defeated by that backlash, or even if it allows the Brexiters to regroup, the hold of that vicious and self-harming politics on our country will be strengthened. Conversely, if the Brexiters lose this second phase in the battle for the post-Brexit narrative, as they did the first, those politics will be weakened. At one level, the reset is about technocratic tinkering with the UK’s relations with the EU, but there is much more stake than that. Hence, indeed, the Brexiters’ desire to destroy it.
With that, another year of Brexit blogging ends. Many thanks to all who have read this year, taking the total visits to this site to well over the 10 million mark, and the number of posts to over 450. Your readership is always appreciated, and never taken for granted, especially with the huge volume of blogs, newsletters, vlogs, and I-don’t-know-whats that compete for attention. Thanks, too, for the (generally) urbane and (often) interesting comments made since I re-opened the facility a bit over a year ago. Best wishes to all readers for Christmas and the New Year. The next post will be on Friday 10 January 2025. I think I will continue in the new fortnightly pattern, but if (as seems possible) there is a lot of Brexit-related news next year then I might revert to the weekly format.
The first axis consists of trying to give the impression that all the false claims made for Brexit were, in fact, being delivered on by the Tory government and are only now being squandered, or failing to materialise, because the Labour government has turned its back on them. Thus the fact that the Tories found that substantial regulatory divergence was impractical, and regulatory freedoms were largely an illusion, is being glossed over, and the failure to deliver them blamed on Labour. In a similar way, Badenoch and others are pretending that it is only Labour’s lack of commitment (£) which stands in the way of a supposedly (though actually fictitious) “oven ready” UK-US trade deal, especially once Trump returns to power.
The second axis is to re-write the ongoing damage of Brexit as being, in fact, the failure of the Labour government. Though minor in itself, a strikingly brazen example was an article in the Telegraph (£) last week bemoaning that “London’s stock market is in danger of sliding into irrelevance under Labour”. Yet, last January, an article in the same paper (£) reported that Brexit was “the prime suspect in the death of the stock market”. Not only were they in the same paper, but both articles were co-authored by the very same journalist, Chief City Correspondent Michael Bow.
This is only a small foretaste of what is likely to come. In particular, sooner or later (and sooner, if a reset with the EU is going to happen), the government is going to have to introduce full import controls. These are a direct consequence of Brexit, but one the Tories postponed multiple times, as did the Labour government this autumn. Undoubtedly when it happens it will be blamed on Labour mismanagement and, very likely, twisted round to be blamed on the reset itself (i.e. as a ‘concession’ in order to get the reset).
Labour’s culpability
In a sense, Labour have only themselves to blame. Promising to ‘make Brexit work’ was always likely to lumber the government with responsibility for all the ways in which Brexit does not, and will never, work. Nor has the government helped itself since coming to power. For example, treating, and initially rejecting, YMS as an ‘unacceptable EU demand’ simply plays into the hands of Brexiters, enabling them to present it, if (and almost certainly when) accepted, as a ‘capitulation’. It would have been much better to treat it as a great prize, and evidence of the potential value of the reset.
Another example is the UK’s accession to CPTPP. Of course the Trade Secretary, Jonathan Reynolds, was bound to speak positively about this, but he was not obliged to do so in terms almost identical to those which would have been used by his Tory predecessors, saying it showed that “Britain is uniquely placed to take advantage of exciting new markets” etc. Here, again, the government is too willing to accept the Brexiters’ framing.
In the same way, the Brexiter attack line that the reset will make Britain a ‘rule taker’ ought to be challenged head-on by emphasising that Brexit created a situation where Britain is, in practice, a rule-taker (think tethered plastic bottle caps). The reset is partly designed to deal with this reality in a more efficient way, by facilitating alignment through, for example, the Product Regulation and Metrology Bill, and perhaps in due course by agreeing to, for example, dynamic alignment of SPS regulations. So, far from being the cause of rule taking, the reset is a consequence of it and, in turn, a consequence of the delusions of Brexit.
In short, if the reset is to be successfully defended against the backlash, it will be necessary to challenge, and to not to reproduce, the underlying framing Brexit of itself. Just talking of the Tories’ “botched Brexit deal” isn’t enough. What is needed is a positive justification of the reset.
Justifying the reset
The most crucial justification is that the Labour election manifesto was quite clear about its intention to seek to reset relations with the EU. Conversely, the attempt the Brexiters are now making to depict the reset as undemocratic and a betrayal of the 2016 vote is, unequivocally, a lie. To the ire of many of its supporters, the Labour government is not reversing Brexit, and there is nothing at all in the referendum or what happened afterwards to say the UK-EU relations are bound to remain in the form Johnson and Frost negotiated (a form which, anyway, included provisions for future changes). Indeed, the crux of the Brexiters’ argument was that the British parliament should be free to pursue the policies which British electors had mandated. The reset has that mandate.
The second justification is that the reset also has popular support. The latest evidence for that came with a report from the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) which includes a lot of crunchy survey data about public attitudes in the UK and in EU member states to UK-EU relations. I won’t even try to summarise it here but, as regards UK opinion, a couple of figures are worth flagging. One is that, overall, 55% favour closer relations with the EU, 22% favour relations as they are and 10% favour more distant relations. The other is that, amongst ‘Red Wall’ voters these figures are 44%, 14% and 18% respectively. Additionally, and prominently reported, the survey found majority support, even amongst leave voters (54%), for the return of freedom of movement in return for single market “access”.
These figures, especially the latter, attracted a certain amount of exuberant comment from ‘remainers’ or ‘rejoiners’ along the lines that the Labour government no longer need fear public opinion, not just as regards a reset but as regards reversing the entirety of, at least, ‘hard Brexit’ (i.e. no single market). I don’t think it is anything like as simple as that, whether viewed in terms of the narrow calculus of Labour electoral advantage or from the broader terms of the politics of Brexit.
On the first, it may well be the case (and, though I don’t have the data, I suspect it probably is) that a relatively small number of voters who don’t want closer relations and don’t want freedom of movement, and who feel strongly about both, could prevent Labour winning the next election. The wider issue is that opinion polls have many limitations, and can’t capture how voters would react if Labour followed where these ones point, given the backlash that would result. Most importantly of all, for Labour now to abandon its ‘red lines’ would immediately deprive the government of the democratic legitimacy which the election has given to its reset policy.
It may be tempting to think that, since that reset in itself attracts the ferocious and dishonest backlash we are seeing, the government might as well go the whole hog and pursue a reversal of Brexit, just as its Brexiter critics claim it to be doing. Actually, if anything, the backlash shows how limited Labour’s space for manoeuvre is. But the more important point is that there is a huge difference between defending against a false charge and against one which would be true. Moreover, if there is ever to be a durable rejoin policy it would have to be one which clearly had democratic legitimacy. So whilst the opinion polls give strong support for Labour’s reset, that is all they do.
The third justification for the reset is its substantive benefits. Just last week saw the publication, for the first time so far as I know, of a credible estimate of its economic impact. It came from John Springford of the Centre for European Reform, and, whilst necessarily rough and ready, suggests that the reset could deliver an annual uplift of 0.3% to 0.7% in the long-term, defined here as ten years.
Of course this is fairly trivial compared with the foregone GDP growth resulting from Brexit (and, actually this is Springford’s main point). However, in a generally low-growth economy, it is not nothing. For example, on present OECD predictions, UK growth in 2024 will be 0.9%. Moreover, on this estimate the reset is of considerably greater benefit than the long-term annual uplift of the CPTPP deal, estimated to be 0.04% to 0.08% of GDP. Even the Brexiters' much-vaunted UK-US trade deal would only be worth an estimated 0.07% to 0.16% of GDP. So, small as the value of a reset may be, those who dismiss it as worthless should be careful not to inadvertently give the backlashers a free pass on how it compares with such ‘Brexit benefits’.
In any case, the reset has more than an economic value. For one thing, if achieved, it would have a defence and security value, and that at a time of huge international turmoil. For another, it could act as a confidence-building measure to be built on subsequently. Indeed - and this, too, ought to concentrate the minds of those ‘rejoiners’ who dismiss the reset as trivial or even pointless - if there is ever to be a route to joining the EU again it seems all but certain it would need to pass through something like the reset along the way.
The bigger picture
It is in this latter respect that the Brexit reset backlash is most important, and most dangerous. At one level, it is just about domestic politics. It is a transparently opportunistic attempt by both Tory and Reform parties to re-kindle the populist anger of the referendum, and the ‘Brexit wars’ which followed, in order to boost their electoral fortunes.
At another level, those attempts are inseparable from UK-EU relations. The Brexiters’ visceral hatred of the EU makes them determined permanently to pollute those relations with their political faeces. They know that the more anti-reset opposition they can whip up, the less likely it is that the EU will have the confidence to entertain even minimally closer relations, let alone anything else. Already Jacob Rees-Mogg is urging “both the Tory and Reform leaders … to promise if elected to leave any new Labour deal”, and that is quite deliberately designed to wreck EU confidence in the reset. It is hideous and, if anything deserves the label, ‘unpatriotic’ in its attempt not just to derail the elected government’s reset policy but to engender perpetual hostility with Britain’s neighbours and allies. But it is happening and it can’t be wished away.
In that sense, this new phase in the battle for the post-Brexit narrative is a crucial one for the government but, more widely and in the longer-term, for anyone who rejects the vicious and self-harming politics of Brexitism. Labour’s reset may be frustratingly timid, but the backlash against it is a reminder of the obstacles even to timidity. If it is defeated by that backlash, or even if it allows the Brexiters to regroup, the hold of that vicious and self-harming politics on our country will be strengthened. Conversely, if the Brexiters lose this second phase in the battle for the post-Brexit narrative, as they did the first, those politics will be weakened. At one level, the reset is about technocratic tinkering with the UK’s relations with the EU, but there is much more stake than that. Hence, indeed, the Brexiters’ desire to destroy it.
With that, another year of Brexit blogging ends. Many thanks to all who have read this year, taking the total visits to this site to well over the 10 million mark, and the number of posts to over 450. Your readership is always appreciated, and never taken for granted, especially with the huge volume of blogs, newsletters, vlogs, and I-don’t-know-whats that compete for attention. Thanks, too, for the (generally) urbane and (often) interesting comments made since I re-opened the facility a bit over a year ago. Best wishes to all readers for Christmas and the New Year. The next post will be on Friday 10 January 2025. I think I will continue in the new fortnightly pattern, but if (as seems possible) there is a lot of Brexit-related news next year then I might revert to the weekly format.
All very predictable. If the Brexiters didn't want to be rule-takers, they shouldn't have pushed Britain out of the EU.
ReplyDeleteVery best wishes and many thanks to you for the great work over the years
ReplyDeleteWarmest thanks to YOU ! Your commitment, expertise, clarity, patience... Your blog is another mental life line.
ReplyDeleteLet's hope that next year will be a better year for a lot of people and countries even if the odds are not very in favour ... But, do enjoy, before that, a good and festive end of this year !
ReplyDeleteHappy New Year from an Italian reader.
ReplyDeleteIn the EU media, the denunciation against your government is reported as news of secondary importance, after domestic politics, the war in Ukraine and the Middle East, elections in France and Germany, Trump slurring Musk and football matches.
However, if this denial of the rights of EU citizens were to turn into a new "Windrush Generation", you can be sure that it will make the front page.
Are you going to continue making posts like this, because frankly they achieve nothing useful, apart from making our efforts to try and repair the colossal damage caused by the Tories' selfish act of party mismanagement seem pointless? If all you are going to do on here is snipe at us, then ciao, and don't return.
DeleteWhy not useful? If the UK wants to repair the relation with EU, it's must be a two-sided thing. If the other side is not interested, that makes reparation difficult
DeleteHis comments are basically trolling, as all that he does is insist that we are wasting our time trying to improve relations with the EU despite a new, more friendly government being in charge. Why is he even bothering to read Chris's blog if he regards us with such contempt? He should go, and make way for someone more helpful.
DeleteHi, sorry if my comments bother you. I just wanted to update you on how your situation is perceived in the EU because it will be the European nations that will evaluate a new application for membership or whatever your government chooses. If disinterest seems like a bad thing to you, well, at least public opinion is not against it.
DeletePlease be assured that your comments are welcomed by me. My response to this particular one is that I wouldn't expect UK politics, including its ongoing Brexit debates (such as they are) to be of much interest in other countries. For most people and media in EU countries Brexit is yesterday's news. But ofc citizens rights still has the capacity to be news in those member states that have many citizens living in the UK.
DeleteHello from an Italian. The reason why I follow the blog is this: in Italy we have a party called "Lega Nord", born in the 80s with the declared aim of dividing the productive northern Italy "Padania" from the dead weight of the south, imagine the area of London that wants to become independent. And, until your referendum it was strongly against the EU and in favor of leaving. Furthermore, the minister Matteo Salvini is declared a friend of Putin with investigations underway for 49 million rubles. In practice, Salvini is a Farage who failed to ruin Italy, and Brexit was a mistake that we could copy. Now, after the referendum, Salvini, is an asshole but not stupid, he stopped trying to take us out of the EU but continues to aim at conservative and racist voters with pro-Putin anti-NATO propaganda like Farage in areas with an elderly population where young people tend to emigrate to make a career. And do you know what was the most desired destination on the continent until 2016? London. I am talking about a party that has between 10% and 30% of the consensus. In practice I follow these interesting analyses because the situation could develop similarly here too.
DeleteThank you for your continuous analysis and follow up of the Brexit psychodrama. It is necessary to keep telling the truth and fight all misinformation and exaggerations from the MSM. Thank you for keeping us all sane when most people seem to have gone mad. Merry Christmas to all and a prosperous 2025.
ReplyDeleteLabour made their own bed when they jumped on the Brexit bandwagon, they'll regret voting for the referendum legislation, voting to trigger A50 and then following the conservative line of 'Brexit means Brexit' for many, many years to come.
ReplyDeleteI think they'll do the bare minimum 'reset', I can't even see them shadowing EU standards. I wouldn't be surprised if they signed some kind of trade deal with the US that would permanently diverge us from EU standards.
Great article btw.
On rule-taking rather than rule-making, that is unequivocally what “we” voted for. The referendum was about giving up all say in the rules applying to our main market.
ReplyDeleteBest wishes to you Chris for Christmas and the New Year. Many thanks for your great commentary and astute insights.
ReplyDeleteYes, what a monumentally stupid blunder by Yvette Cooper in September to peremptorily reject the Youth Mobility Scheme proposal by decrying it as "free movement", which is unacceptable to her because "we're not going back into free movement". So now if Labour ever does agree to a YMS the Tories can immediately respond with accusations that Labour is "bringing back free movement, that's what your own Home Secretary called this". Why didn't she just say something like "we'll keep an open mind, we're not going back to free movement, but a YMS is not necessarily free movement"?
ReplyDeleteAnyway Chris, thanks for your many incisive and thought-provoking columns, and have a merry Christmas and a Happy New Year!
Apart from her desire to reduce immigration to blunt attacks on Labour over it, Cooper, apparently, is one of the 89 Labour MPs with Reform in 2nd place in their seats after the July General Election, and that must be weighing on her mind as well.
DeleteTypo: "is of considerably greater than the benefit".
ReplyDeleteThanks, now corrected
DeleteMay also want to look at hone/home in (as in homing pigeon?)
DeleteThe hone/ home thing is an ongoing debate, but 'hone' is arguably ok, especially in this context as I'm trying to indicate a sharpening of focus
DeleteHappy Brexitmas Chris Grey and everyone
ReplyDeleteAnother predictable example of Telegraph double-think: "‘I’m losing a third of my business thanks to new EU laws" (https://www.telegraph.co.uk/money/eu-red-tape-costs-me-2k-a-month/)
ReplyDeleteNo, you are losing a third of your business because of Brexit.
The great news is of course the UK does not have to comply with those nasty EU laws.
Delete... unless as a UK manufacterer want to export to EU, of course!
/s
Thank you Chris for another year of informed commentary and reflection on the Brexit shimozzle
ReplyDeleteYour objective analysis and passion for the truth over self-inflicted isolation has been an important reference for many since you started your blog. I’m so glad that you remain committed to the cause and continue to bring clarity and balance as we strive towards a more sensible outcome for EU relationships.
ReplyDeleteWishing you a happy and peaceful break over the Christmas and New Year period.
Merry Christmas Chris, a Happy New Year, and many thanks for your wonderful work!
ReplyDeleteFood for thought from today's news...
ReplyDeleteAccording to estimates from the World Bank, there is a chance that Poland’s GDP per person will outstrip the UK’s in the coming years if each country remains on its present growth trend.
Membership of another centralised body, the European Union, has aided Poland’s rapid economic development. After joining in 2004, the country immediately benefited from access to the single market, European labour, more public money, foreign direct investment flows and greater investor interest.
“It is difficult to overstate the importance of EU membership for Poland’s economic development,” Kevin Daly, co-head of the economics team covering central and eastern Europe, the Middle East and Africa at Goldman Sachs, said. “Easy access to the EU single market is a major draw for foreign direct investment into Poland, which has been the primary driver of economic growth.”
Perhaps that will present UK plumbers and dentists with job opportunities?
DeleteThis ever changing world needs sanity. Thank you for contributing to our understanding of the UK position in this ever changing world.
ReplyDeleteMerry Xmas to all.
When allies succumb to discord, only their enemies profit. It’s time to remind the Brexiters, and their media backers, of this every time they open their crooked mouths.
ReplyDeleteMerry Christmas and a Happy New Year hopefully not ecessitating weekly overwork for you.
ReplyDeleteMerry Christmas and a Happy New Year, hopefully not necessitating weekly overwork for you.
ReplyDeleteCan I add my thanks to all those who have offered theirs. Your analysis has been essential reading for those of us who oppose Brexit. Best wishes for 2025.
ReplyDeleteMany thanks for your latest blog - as usual, thoughtful, intelligent and realistic. Very best wishes for Christmas and the New Year.
ReplyDeleteUnless something completely unexpected happens, like the discovery of gold in Yorkshire, the UK will be much poorer at the next election than it is today.
ReplyDeleteThe betting markets currently have the Conservatives favourites to win the next election but Nigel Farage has a strong showing with 30% implied probability of winning.
Personally, I think Farage is more likely to win as our crazy electoral system can hand a giant majority to a party on only around 30% of the vote, which is about 60% of people who voted Leave, and I don't see either Labour or the Conservatives doing very well.
In a sense, Farage already has won the next election anyway, in that he has persuaded both Labour and the Conservatives to adopt most of his policies anyway.
The EU is entirely capable of similar political analysis so any form of reset seems very unlikely to me, and again looking at the betting markets there are no odds available for rejoining the Single Market but there is a market for leaving the ECHR. The direction of travel is clear to me.
Much will depend on Lib Dem’s and Greens. The left vote has been split since 1922 but until now the right vote has only had one ‘home’. Let’s see how they cope.
DeleteThank you very much for your detailed and informed comment.
ReplyDeleteChris - Excellent blog, as usual. Happy Christmas and best wishes for 2025.
ReplyDeleteAs regards the “reset”, understandably the EU remains wary of the UK’s track record of inconsistent implementation of prior agreements. The ECJ case underscores unresolved obligations, reflecting a deficit in trust. From the EU’s perspective, engaging in new negotiations may risk further unmet commitments or future backtracking.
The EU might reasonably question the durability of any agreements reached under a Labour-led “reset,” particularly given the strength of the “Brexit reset backlash” in UK politics. Brexiters, emboldened by media campaigns and political figures such as Johnson, Frost and a Trump/Musk-supported Farage actively working to undermine any closer alignment with the EU, screaming “betrayal” every tentative step of the way, raises concerns for the EU about any long-term stability in UK-EU relations.
It is also clear that the EU has broader strategic priorities, including navigating geopolitical tensions, the green transition, and internal cohesion among member states - not to mention dealing with Trump 2.0. A reset with the UK, especially one requiring significant negotiation, may not rank highly on the EU’s agenda, particularly if it risks reopening old Brexit wounds or emboldening euroskeptic factions within member states.
If the EU does not secure its own UK-related priorities (fishing rights, EU citizens rights and a YMS) then, the “reset” could produce the opposite of its intended effect and set back the UK-EU relationship even further.
While symbolic gestures, such as Keir Starmer and Rachel Reeves meeting EU leaders, signals goodwill, the EU may prefer incremental adjustments as already contemplated in the Brexiter-sanctioned Withdrawal Agreement or TCA. Such a piecemeal approach would allow some trust-building without the risks of an overarching negotiation process.
In summary, the EU’s somewhat less enthusiastic stance on a reset may be rooted in concerns about trust, political sustainability, and the practical value of deeper ties at this juncture. While a reset could pave the way for more constructive relations, the EU will likely proceed cautiously, ensuring that any engagement is conditional on clear and consistent commitments and, perish the thought, concessions from the UK. For the UK, this means overcoming domestic political resistance and delivering tangible progress on existing agreements to rebuild EU confidence. Without this groundwork, the EU may view the reset as more of a British domestic political strategy than a credible basis for renewed partnership.
Fingers (and toes) crossed.
The UK has long misunderstood the European Union, seeing it mainly as an economic arrangement and overlooking its broader political and social ambitions. Whether advocating for Remain or Leave, Brits largely focused on trade, markets, and the bottom line. They rarely engaged with the EU’s deeper purpose: fostering integration and shared sovereignty to build a more united Europe free of past national/regional rivalries.
ReplyDeleteFrom its beginnings, the EU has pursued “ever-closer union,” politically, socially, and economically. That vision never resonated with the UK, which prioritized sovereignty and independence. Britain’s opt-outs from Schengen and the Eurozone underscored its discomfort with European “federalism”. Brexit was the culmination of this unease, but the campaign leading up to it, and criticisms since, fixated on economics rather than this underlying divide.
These differences still shape UK-EU relations. While there is room for practical collaboration - on trade, security, or science - a deeper reset is unlikely. The EU’s integrationist aspirations and the UK’s emphasis on autonomy remain fundamentally at odds. Moreover, Brexit has left scars. For the EU27, the UK’s departure wasn’t just a policy disagreement but a rejection of the “European project” itself, making the EU reluctant to extend concessions.
Ultimately, any future UK-EU relationship will likely remain transactional rather than transformational. The UK’s continued focus on economics, rather than the political and cultural foundations of the EU, has left it fundamentally out of step. Brexit wasn’t just an economic break; it was a political and cultural parting of ways that, unfortunately, limits how far relations can now be rebuilt.
These are very good and important points. Because the blog focus is post-Brexit events as they happen, they are things I tend not to discuss here, but they are crucial to understand those events, and future prospects, properly, as you imply. In case of interest, I discuss some of this in my book on Brexit, in a section entitled 'Looking backwards to look forwards', in the Concluding chapter.
DeleteThank you Anonymous & Anonymous for variously keeping us informed about how Italian/etc media are reporting (or not) the UK strife, and how the EU has seen the UK (and the British) as being merely transactional commercial operators. Please keep in mind that there are quite a lot of us in the UK who do have a wider and deeper vision of ever closer union, for the very reasons the EU came into being. However we are not at all represented by any of the UK political parties, and our views are not carried in the UK media. So you can be forgiven for not hearing from those who are British-Europeans. This is not because we do not exist at all, but rather because the UK political structures & processes give us no realistic path to power at present. And frankly, also, because many of us have fled, emigrating. But still we exist and it would be very much appreciated if the EU could speak up for us, and insist that we British-Europeans be given a hearing, even where those who control the strings in the UK do not wish our voices to be heard.
DeleteJust to say thank you to all readers who have sent good wishes for Christmas and the New Year in these comments, and via other means. I haven't replied to them individually, but they are all much appreciated and reciprocated. Back in 2025!
ReplyDeleteIf I may add - I doubt if Leaver's ( me included) or many Remainers understood the depth of Brexit and the repudiation of the project on the then and current EU leaders - Mrs Merkel's memoirs are explicit at her humiliation.
ReplyDeleteAs Anonymous wrote - the UK Just didn't share and still doesn't share EU integration objectives & all this entails.
I think the TCA can be built on which is a good thing - I doubt it will come close to what the EU really wants but then strategic autonomy for the EU and UK are manifestly very different things.
Maybe a good arns length transactional relationship is the best we can hope for - for the next generation.
No need to go very far your words are as good as it gets.
DeleteYou probably as many leave voters are looking forward for the chicken poo coming from the US, enjoy it. This must be your big strategic aims, poo, be it in rivers or the plate. Such big thinking.
One thing is clear, the eu is a peaceful organisation with superior standards to bother the UK and the US. Why this is strategically inferior unfortunately I don't get it but I guess I ll find out.
I would clarify your comment in that I would replace UK with England.
DeleteThere was a very different view in Scotland where the economics were barely mentioned, with most of the support for EU membership being belief in the actual project.
For example this famous speech https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0YH2r08dkGg you could not imagine any English politician saying that.
Post Brexit, the entirety of Scottish protest has been about being cut off from the European family with virtually no mention of the economics at all.
My honest view as a Scot is that England really doesn't belong in the EU simply because even on the Remain side people simply don't seem to get it (other than a very small minority, some of whom are active on this blog).
@John Jones
ReplyDeleteEngland didn't share the EU's objectives on integration, etc, but Scotland (62% Remain, a figure which would be a fair bit higher now) certainly did. This will in time lead to the breake up of the UK union, which no longer has any raison d'etre, leaving England with profound questions to answer as to its identity. At the moment, the best it can do is Starmer, Badenoch and above all Farage. God help the place if it can't come up with something better.
I think a Scotland in the EU would be a good thing for England.
DeleteGiven the transfer cost to Scotland & their health demographic ( which is generally considered to be awful).
Clearly deals on steroids would have to be done on a) a hard border/common
travel area b) a currency - it won't be the £/sterling guaranteed by BoE & it can't be the euro for 5 or 6 years c) migration rights of current Scot's & the millions of Scot's who live in England d) Scottish debt & how it's paid off.
The theory sounds fine - just got a horrible feeling that the practical mechanics of seccession will be order's of magnitude harder than Brexit - let's not mention Wales - oh, and if Scotland does ever manage to secede - it's likely that England & Wales would ever return to a new EU for another 50 or so years.
I do agree. As an English person who, like Irish writer John Banville, has zero truck with nationalism, I suspect English politics will become deeply unpleasant. Wish I had an Irish grandparent.
DeleteJohn's comment is exactly the position the Remain campaign took, which was to attack the overall union but instead to focus on the economics and the detailed practicalities of leaving.
DeleteIn both cases, I would have argued the exact opposite.
In the EU referendum I would have argued that the UK has a proud record of European leadership and fighting for European democracy right the way from the world wars to the present day where we are helping European countries recover from communism and stand together against external threats like Russia.
In the the Scottish referendum I would have argued that Scotland is an economic powerhouse, the only part of the UK where the ports send out more containers than arrive, accounting for the vast majority of the UK's natural resources
industries with a proud record of leadership within the UK's union.
The polling numbers for the UK union are absolutely dire now, with 40% of Scots believing Scotland would be economically better in the EU and only 24% thinking the UK would be better. Emotional support for the union is only high among pensioners.
Even me, who was a very active member of the No campaign, would prefer Scottish independence, even if it shrunk the economy, to living under Prime Minister Farage, which seems a highly likely event.
I suppose a big argument against the Brexit betrayal gibberish would also be to recall the Brexit policies put into action during Liz Truss's vandalic premiership. They already had their chance and fail.
ReplyDeleteJust want to join others in thanking you for another year of detailed, thoughtful Brexit-related blogging.
ReplyDeleteThe current post handily demonstrates just how useful this long-running big picture view still is, because being able to identify connections/undercurrents/trends in Brexitism over the past decade and into the future really matters. (Well, it certainly should to the current gov; I'd love to think some people close to Starmer read your work.)
Hope your festive break is a good one and best wishes/good health to you for 2025. I suspect the pace of things to talk about will not slow with Trump back in office!
We can see the trajectory with regards to membership of the CPTPP, Labour talking up a US trade agreement and the allowing of pesticides banned within the EU.
ReplyDeleteSupport for the UK agriculture sector is low with the policy of inheritance tax that will force small farms to sell their business and thus the talk of an SPS agreement is nonsense just to keep pro EU Labour supporters on board.
Thank you again Professor Grey, we admire and appreciate your continuous analysis. It's always a titanic endeavour to fight against something like Brexit for two reasons: you need to tell the truth and provide flawless evidence based information at all times, while the other side can make things up and spread fact free nonsense everywhere.
ReplyDeleteAnother difficulty emerges when you win an argument or prove someone wrong: you will be then labelled as an elitist, arrogant snob.
In conclusion, there is no other way but to keep telling the truth. We are the grown ups in the room. Happy 2025!
A very happy new year from France. Looking forward to your forthcoming articles throughout 2025.
ReplyDeleteThank you Professor Grey for your insightful work and best wishes for 2025.
ReplyDeleteBrexit was what the UK electorate wanted.
Brexit was what they got.
From my perspective as a continental European, Brexit is a striking example of democratic choice (like the recent Trump election victory in the USA). It is a choice fraught with hostility and contradictions, yet it cannot be dismissed as a mere mistake. Neither can it be solely attributed to uneducated voters, misinformation, media manipulation, or foreign interference - though these factors may have played a role.
The United Kingdom’s decision to leave the European Union in the 2016 referendum, reinforced by the European parliamentary elections of May 2019 (where the Brexit Party emerged as the largest winner), and the December 2019 general election (where Boris Johnson’s Conservatives secured an 80-seat majority on a “get Brexit done” mandate), was a clear and sustained rejection of the European project. This occurred despite the UK’s uniquely advantageous membership terms, which sought but failed to reconcile its political and cultural divergences with the rest of the EU. Accompanying this decision was an antagonistic and often disrespectful stance from British leaders, MPs, MEPs and media, which strained relations further.
For decades, Eurosceptic politicians and media in the UK actively undermined the EU’s legitimacy, using articles, speeches and theatrical gestures to deride European unity. From mocking EU leaders to referring to the Union as the “EUSSR,” and even turning their backs during the European anthem, these actions symbolised a persistent hostility. The UK electorate’s endorsement of Brexit, despite the EU’s consistent accommodation of Britain’s exceptional demands, will not be forgotten in Brussels or elsewhere within the Union. While Brexit was unwelcome, the EU adapted swiftly to the new reality and, five years on, appears content with how the relationship has evolved.
Post-Brexit, the behaviour of the UK government only intensified pre-existing tensions. Promises of “taking back control”, “independence” and “sunlit uplands” have led to economic uncertainty, trade disruptions, and a diminished global presence for the UK in an increasingly fragmented world. For years, British politicians blamed the EU for their domestic failures, and even today, adherence to the Brexiter-negotiated Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) is portrayed by some as punitive.
The arrival of a Labour government and its talk of a “reset” in UK-EU relations, accompanied by repeated invocations of “red lines,” has left EU leaders sceptical. Is this a genuine attempt to repair years of damaged relations, or merely a calculated effort to regain lost economic advantages without embracing a true partnership?
The EU remains open to dialogue, but any future engagement must be grounded in mutual respect and clear commitments to cooperation (including implementation of prior agreements). Warm, vague platitudes from a nation whose political leadership has often been inconsistent and untrustworthy will not suffice. If Britain truly seeks to move beyond hostility and engage constructively, it must demonstrate sincerity and goodwill. Until then, scepticism will prevail in EU capitals, and EU leaders will likely maintain a cautious stance, prioritising the interests of their members above all.
Wishing you, your family and all your readers a peaceful new year as we try to navigate a turbulent world as good neighbours.
I can appreciate & understand many of the points you make in your comments - however, I think it underlays the decision making of why the UK actually voted by a small majority to leave the EU - I've argued in public especially the national press inc the FT that leaving the EU was both an intellectual and emotional decision - albeit that the ballot paper was ostensibly an in/out choice.
DeleteOver the 45 years of EEC/EU membership, I argued that few in the UK felt an emotional attachment to Brussels & what it stood ( or stands for).
Brexit merely corrected an historic anomaly.
For a successful reset to happen - it's going to take a lot more than the UK to blow sweet nothings to the EU - the EU really has to convince the UK that integrating closely with the EU really is the only way to enjoy all the benefits of being a member, including giving up, ultimately the beloved £/sterling - we've a long way to go in my view.
It is often portrayed in the UK (notably by “remainers”) that the UK had the “best” membership deal of any country. You too have fallen into this trap by describing it as “uniquely advantageous”.
DeleteFrom an EU-perspective, nothing couldn’t be further from the truth. While it is true that the UK had an exceptional membership deal, it was as a result of the fundamental incompatibility between the UK’s mercantilist approach to membership and the broader EU27’s ambitions for political and cultural (as well as economic) integration. I was very sorry to see the UK leave the EU but as time goes on I accept that it may have been inevitable.
The EU has now slid the proposed UK-EU Youth Mobility Scheme across the table a few times. It begins to seem that the real messages are 1) either the UK does it the EU's way, or not at all; and 2) the EU will select items that - in their acceptance - force UK politicians to publicly explain to the UK electorate how doing it the EU-way is in fact good for the UK. Even the slowest students learn eventually.
DeleteTo Anonymous (published on 4 Jan at 15.05) - the elephant in the room - really is one of non shared objectives or non alignment - it's a hard concept to get hold of (for many and especially younger remainer's) but fundamentally all the UK ever wanted was the original EEC 'common market' - whereas Heath and many other Tory 'wets' wanted a closer union including for some, a full on political and economic union.
DeleteMaybe with greater honesty all those years ago - the political and economic union would have been an easier sell.
Given what's happened to the EU since 2016 and the slowly decaying economies of Germany, France and to an extent, flat lining Italy, it's hard to see how the current government, however EU friendly can really get close to what is now being openly perceived as a decaying polity and not the success that was sought or promised.
As with so many others, I hope you have had a Merry Xmas, and a Happy New Year. May I just ask one question: John Springfield has provided an estimate of how much the Brexit reset will be worth to the UK economy. What would happen if the UK rejoins now? Surely the UK will not be able to just turn up in Brussels as if nothing has happened, and there will be many broken bridges that just cannot be rebuilt (eg European customers re-routing supply lines). What is the estimate for how much benefit UK (and of course Europe) would gain from a hypothetical rejoin?
ReplyDelete'What is the estimate for how much benefit UK (and of course Europe) would gain from a hypothetical rejoin?' In general terms, I expect benefits would be very positive, but in terms of shutting up fascistic, ignorant morons like Farage, priceless.
DeleteThe OBR are a brilliant resource, and they also have unique access to government information which is not made available to other forecasters. They are still sticking with their 4% loss of productivity see https://obr.uk/forecasts-in-depth/the-economy-forecast/brexit-analysis/
DeleteThey very much look at direct impacts but exclude things that are harder to measure.
The don't look at the worsened UK/US trade deals which replaced the EU/US trade deals now have quite a lot of Buy American provisions, so the US public sector can no longer buy from British companies if there is an American (or EU!) alternative. UK/US trade is excluded from the OBR analysis. (Who thought Liz Truss was the right person to negotiate this?)
There's no mention of the impact of UK business being excluded from standard making. I am literally no longer in the room during consultations, so that means my competitors are free to bend the standards to their benefit, and then sell into the UK.
Another big one that isn't mentioned is Horizon which funds a huge amount of research and requires collaboration. Unfortunately, if an EU researcher tries to work in the UK they are hit personally with visa and NHS fees, so the best researchers generally don't partner with British institutions, or if they do, to ensure the work physically done elsewhere, which is far from ideal.
The final one is the OBR treats all immigration as being economically the same, but we know that immigration from high-productivity countries is economically better than lower-productivity countries where human capital is less developed. Also on the subject of immigration we have reduced retirees migrating to Europe by about 100,000 which is extra pressure on the NHS and housing.
These four areas, are all very important and need to be added to the 4% estimate. It is very hard (probably impossible) to put a number on them though.
In Norway, there is significant interest in the election campaign in Iceland, particularly the discussion about a potential referendum on applying for EU membership. Iceland joining the EU could mean the end of the EEA Agreement, says one academic.
ReplyDeleteEU membership brings benefits to the many.
And then there is the UK that regrets the loss of the benefits
Best wishes for 2025, and again many thanks for your blog that provides excellent insights. Until recently I was in charge of an organisation with offices in the EU and in the UK and have had to deal with all the practical issues stemming from Brexit. Therefor the topic has my interest.
ReplyDeleteHowever, up to now this whole issue was mostly a government(s) related issue (except, one could argue, the interference of media moguls swaying public opinion). Now it seems that big tech bosses, especially mister Musk, are getting involved. I find it worrisome that Musk now is mingling in German politics (supporting AfD) and UK politics (supporting Farage) thereby adding a new layer to European politics that is not democratically controlled. It consists of money and the distribution of misinformation and influencing public opinion.
I realise this seems far from a reset debate, but I am afraid it will still influence it.