Should Labour be bolder about Brexit?

One of the benefits of having re-enabled comments on this blog, to me at least, is to be able to see what issues get flagged up by readers as interesting or debatable. Last week’s post was mainly about the government’s Autumn Statement, but many of the comments focused on my far briefer observations about Labour’s post-Brexit policy. I have written about that at length in the past, but it is clearly an issue which is becoming more pressing as the next election gets closer, with some recent well-informed speculation (though that is all it is) that it could be as early as May 2024. And, of course, recent and current opinion polls suggest that Labour will win, which also adds salience to the question of how they would approach the UK-EU relationship in government.

Curtice’s analysis of the Labour vote

This issue has also been getting fresh attention because of recent remarks by the eminent polling expert Professor Sir John Curtice about the structure of current voter support for Labour. He suggests, in quite forceful terms, that “Labour’s presumption that they couldn’t get into an election winning position without fundamentally changing the character of their support vis à vis Brexit has been demonstrated to be false”. He makes three key points to explain and justify that. First, that those 2016 leave voters whose support Labour have gained since the 2019 election are atypical leave voters in that they tend to be those who now support re-joining the EU. Second, in line with general shifts against support for Brexit, those people who did vote Labour in 2019 are even more likely to be opposed to Brexit now than they were then. And, third, new voters, who were too young to vote in 2016 and/or 2019 are overwhelming pro-Labour and anti-Brexit.

The implication of this might be (I am not sure that Curtice has said this in terms, but it is certainly the conclusion that many are drawing from what he said) that Labour could have adopted, and could still adopt, a more strongly anti-Brexit position without threatening its chances of winning the election. That would, presumably, mean adopting a policy of seeking to re-join the EU or, at least, the single market (and/or entering into a comprehensive customs union with the EU). On Curtice’s analysis, such a policy would go with the grain of most of those intending to vote Labour. It would also (this is my view, not what Curtice said) be a far more credible economic policy because of the now strong evidence, discussed in my previous post, of the damage Brexit has done, and will continue to do, to growth and investment.

Economics and honesty

The economic argument appears to me to be unassailable, and as I observed last week it is quite dishonest for Labour to suggest that any changes that could realistically be made to the existing Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) would make much economic difference. Labour’s proposals shouldn’t be entirely dismissed, though, as they will smooth some of the roughest edges of what Frost and Johnson agreed. There is also some validity in Labour’s argument that, from the perspective of investment, there is a value simply in providing stability and consistency. That was the message from business (£) at this week’s ‘global investment summit’, and Labour’s commitment to maintaining regulatory alignment with the EU speaks to that. There is also value in possible improvement to security cooperation, and in a general improvement in the tone of relations with the EU. But the benefits of what can be done within the TCA framework shouldn’t be over-stated.

That doesn’t mean getting het up about Labour’s ‘make Brexit work’ slogan which, vapid and irritating as it is, is no more than slogan. Nor is it to make the common criticism that Starmer is indulging in ‘cakeism’ with his proposals. That is off-beam, in that things like a Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) or Veterinary deal, a TCA mobility chapter, and a security pact have been on offer from the EU in that past, and if Starmer pursues them it will be on a something-for-something basis, not the something-for-nothing which defines cakeism. But, as someone commenting on last week’s post under the name ‘El Fred’ put it, it could be regarded as a kind of ‘shrinkflated cupcakeism’ if that means that Starmer is at least implying that it would be possible to yield significantly larger benefits without changing the fundamental structure of the TCA.

One issue here, economics aside, is simply that it would be a refreshing antidote to the years of political dishonesty about Brexit if Labour were to tell the truth. After all, it is dishonesty which got us into this Brexit mess and, whether in relation to Brexit or anything else, it is honesty which the public say is what they most want from politicians. At the least, honesty would mean Labour being open about the fact that their post-Brexit proposals will make very little economic difference. But, refreshing as that might be, it would not be a viable policy position in itself, since it would invite the obvious demand for them to develop proposals which would make such a difference. That takes us back, then, to some version of ‘rejoining’, with the implication of the Curtice analysis being that this would not preclude Labour being in an election-winning position.

Could Labour change policy?

I don’t question for a moment that Curtice is right in his account of the structure of the Labour vote. But I’m not convinced that it carries the implication that Labour could adopt some version of a re-join policy without suffering electorally. One problem is just that there may be a difference between the overall structure of the Labour vote, as outlined by Curtice, and its structure within particular Labour marginal seats and Labour target seats. I don’t know, and it would only be possible to know through constituency-level polling. But I assume Labour conduct such polling and, if so, perhaps it is this which explains their stance but, of course, the results of these polls are not in the public domain.

Leaving that speculation aside, for Labour to espouse any version of re-joining would not just be one policy amongst others, an uncontroversial addition to their existing proposals. It would inevitably become the major focus of the campaign, overwhelming every other debate. That would carry huge dangers for Labour because, despite what Curtice says about the structure of their vote, it doesn’t follow that voters who support re-join see this as the central political issue, or that they would support another referendum, which would certainly be a necessary prelude to re-joining the EU or even the single market [1].

On the first point, of course some Labour voters do see Brexit as the major issue, but there will be many shades of strength of feeling about that, even amongst some who would vote to re-join. Remainers and re-joiners are not a homogenous group, and most readers (as well as the writer!) of this blog are hardly likely to be representative of them. So the danger for Labour is that they are seen as ‘banging on about Brexit’ when it is not the priority issue for the voters. The LibDems (although for them the electoral calculations will be different) also seem alert to this danger. For, indeed, current polls show that only 15% of the electorate think ‘leaving the EU’ is amongst the top three issues facing the country, and just 13% of the 18-24 age group do so. Even amongst 2016 remain voters the figure is only 22%, amongst LibDem voters it is 23% and amongst Labour voters it is 20%. It’s true that the issue that does most concern voters, ‘the economy’, is inextricably bound up with Brexit, as are some of the others, but it doesn’t follow that voters see it in those terms or, if they do, that they see it as the main factor.

On the second point, recent polling evidence suggests that only 39% of the population support another referendum being held in the next five years. That rises sharply to 63% amongst those who intend to vote Labour but, also amongst Labour-intending voters, 25% are opposed to such a referendum (the split amongst 2016 remain voters is almost identical). Even looking two terms ahead, to a referendum within the next ten years, the figures remain similar at 69% and 17% [2]. Again, it’s not clear what strength of feeling attaches to these views, but there must be at least some who are opposed to another referendum so strongly that the prospect of one would dissuade them from voting Labour, and at least some, perhaps many, who are in favour but whose support for it is fairly lukewarm, at least to the extent of not regarding it as a priority for the next Labour government.

How would changing Labour’s policy affect the Tory vote?

There’s another important campaign issue in this which Curtice’s analysis ignores (or, at least, it does in the clip I am discussing). Labour’s Brexit position is not just about the structure of the Labour vote, it also affects the structure of the opposition vote. If Labour put forward a re-join policy, that would enable the Tories to re-group and rally around a ‘defend Brexit’ campaign, galvanizing its core vote and, in particular, making it much easier for them to hoover up Reform Party voters who, as the opinion polls stand, look set to split the right-wing, Brexit-supporting vote. For these are voters to whom Brexit really is a defining issue.

At the moment, attempts to give a ‘vote Farage, get Starmer’ message to such voters have little chance of success. They don’t loathe Starmer as they did Corbyn, and they think Labour are probably going to win in any case. So they have a free-hit protest vote against Rishi Sunak, who they don’t regard as ‘real Conservative’ anyway. But the moment Labour adopted a re-join policy all that would change, and with current opinion polls giving Reform as much as 10% of the vote that could have a big effect. Perhaps that effect would be enough to keep Labour out of power but, even if not, then it would certainly be enough to reduce its majority, and enough to stave off a possible Tory wipe-out.

This point, just on its own, makes Labour’s stance explicable, and might also carry weight with those rejoin voters tempted to ‘punish’ Labour for the insufficiency of its Brexit policy. There is a real, epochal chance for the Tory Party to be not just defeated but annihilated in the election. It’s a chance that actually arises from Brexit itself, in that it is this which has created a schism in the electoral coalition between ideologues and pragmatists that normally holds the British right together. Small wonder that Labour don’t want to squander the possibility of such a prize by gifting the Tories a way of preventing such a schism.

What would changing policy mean for a Labour government?

This reasoning becomes all the stronger by considering what would it mean for Labour in government, even assuming it could win an election on a re-join platform. That could only mean re-joining becoming the dominant political issue for its entire first term, and an issue where success could by no means be guaranteed. It would mean holding another referendum with all that, by now, we surely know that entails for marginalizing every other issue. And it would mean winning it, which is far from certain especially if, as would surely be vital to settle the matter, it was this time held on the basis of a super-majority being needed.

Then, if all that was achieved, it would just be the beginning of a prolonged process of application to join, an application which might well fail. For, as has so often been pointed out, the EU, and its individual members, are likely to have grave reservations about UK membership. Those reservations would be all the greater if the referendum were again held as a simple majority vote, and that vote was only narrowly to re-join. But even a super-majority would not in itself eradicate the fear that, in a few years, with a new government, the UK would change its mind again. And even if that hurdle were overcome, the accession process would take time, and might not be completed by the end of Labour’s term of office. So it would go into the following election without having delivered its flagship policy.

A better approach?

Taken together, these arguments provide a strong case for the approach Labour have adopted. Where I think they have made a serious mistake is in being so dogmatic in opposing any form of re-joining, ever. It is easy to understand why, because the Tories would have exploited any ambivalence in order to claim that Labour has a ‘secret plan’ to re-join. They have tried that anyway (£), but it has had little traction precisely because it is so clear that there is no such plan. And, by the way, the Tories’ attempts in this regard give further weight to the point that, from their point of view, a Labour re-join policy would be an electoral boon, and perhaps the only thing that can save them.

However, understandable as the dogmatism of permanently ruling out re-joining may be, it has created a nasty straitjacket for the future. As I argued exactly a year ago, I think a better policy would have been to say that re-joining would have to await a strong popular and cross-party consensus, putting the responsibility with the Tories, where it properly lies, and, in the meantime, to propose improving the TCA, if possible, without over-claiming for its economic effects. This would have the virtue of honesty, an honesty which would also provide the political justification for the limitations of Labour’s policy.

Facing up to reality

With all this said, whatever I think, or whatever anyone may think of the arguments in this post, what seems unarguable is that Labour are not going to change their current Brexit position, and that becomes all the more so the closer the election gets. Even if it isn’t until the end of next year, there just isn’t time to make, communicate, and consolidate support for such a change. So, even if it is true that Starmer could or should have had a bolder position from the outset, it isn’t going to happen now.

Thus, like it or not, for voters dissatisfied with, or even disgusted by, the current position the choice will be whether to use their vote to make a Labour government or a Conservative government more likely (I phrase it that way as, in different constituencies, the voting implication of that will be different). Of course, that choice isn’t just about Brexit, but, on Brexit, even given the limitations of Labour’s policy it would be wrong to think that there is no difference between them and the Conservatives, so it’s a choice that matters and, anyway, it’s the only choice that is going to be on offer.

In a sense, the choice facing the most committed re-joiners is the mirror-image of that facing the most committed leavers. The latter have the choice of voting for what, in their terms, would be the Brexit purism of the Reform Party or the hopelessly compromised and deeply suspect Conservative Party. At the moment, it looks as if enough will choose ‘purity’ to keep the Conservatives from power. The choice on the other side, for ‘purist re-joiners’, is whether they want to do the same to Labour.

 

Notes

[1] There is a view sometimes expressed amongst advocates of single market (SM) membership that re-joining that, rather than the EU, would not require a referendum. There are three variants of that view. One is that, unlike EU membership, SM membership would not be a constitutional change. The second is that SM membership would have been compatible with the 2016 referendum result, and so would not require another referendum. The third is that, if Labour won an election on a rejoin SM policy, that would provide all the mandate needed.

All three versions, even if legally correct (which is arguable), are hopelessly naïve politically (in ways reminiscent of the LibDems’ ‘revoke Article 50’ policy in 2019 which, as I argued at the time, was deeply flawed both in principle and as a political tactic and strategy). For one thing, they all imply that it would be legitimate for a future Tory government to reverse policy, which also makes it an unappealing prospect for the EU/ EFTA. But that is part of a bigger issue: whatever we now do, it surely has to be permanent, and needs to be unequivocally seen as legitimate, rather than achieved by what is, or could easily be represented as, some sleight-of-hand or trickery. The Brexiters failed to achieve that, even with a referendum. If they had succeeded, we wouldn’t even be debating these matters any more. So if we have learnt nothing else from them, and from the Brexit saga generally, it is that such a mistake can never be repeated.

[2] This poll also shows that support for an immediate referendum is much weaker, with only 42% in favour and 48% against amongst Labour-intending voters (and almost exactly the same amongst 2016 remain voters). But it’s not clear what weight to put on that as the question was about a referendum “in 2023”, a pretty absurd one given that it was asked in August 2023. So I think the five- and ten-year questions I’ve referred to are the more important ones. Even so, the answer to the ‘in 2023’ question does underscore the point that support for re-join if there were to be another referendum is the not the same as support for attempting to re-join by holding another referendum.