The government needs a post-Brexit strategy

It would be unfair to expect the Labour government to have achieved much yet. The peculiar timing of the election, in combination with the parliamentary recess, meant that there has been even less ‘political time’ than the three months of calendar time since then. That was mainly absorbed by dealing with the riots, with a degree of effectiveness which stopped them spiraling into a crisis, and beginning the process, both real and theatrical, of ‘discovering’ that the previous government left an economic and social disaster to be dealt with. This was the message of Keir Starmer’s ‘Rose Garden’ speech this week, effectively heralding the start of the new political year.

It would also be unfair to deny that the government has already made some real progress with what it promised for the UK’s relationship with the EU. Although Starmer said nothing in the Rose Garden speech about the EU or Brexit, the next day he promised to “turn a corner on Brexit” prior to trips to Germany, to discuss a new bilateral treaty, and thence to France where he met Emmanuel Macron. That followed the pattern begun from his government’s first hours and days, when he and his ministers took a series of steps to improve the tone of the relationship. It’s worth stressing this, as it is all too easy to forget just what a departure it is from the previous government, and the last few years. Moreover, these are necessary steps to effect any and every improvement in the substance of the relationship, up to and including any possibility of ever joining the EU in the future. So what has happened already shouldn’t be dismissed or belittled.

However, it clearly isn’t anything like enough, for two obvious reasons. One is that despite the repeated references to a  ‘re-set’ in the tone of relations, doing so cannot be the one-off event that this word implies. It will be an ongoing process. The other is that improving tone isn’t an end in itself, but a prelude to improvements in the substance of the relationship. Actually, despite their obviousness, I think these are oversimplifications in that, in reality, the relationship between tone and substance is recursive rather than linear, with substance impacting on tone as much as tone impacts upon substance. In particular, trust will have to be rebuilt iteratively, through both actions and words.

What does the government want to do about Brexit?

Beyond these obvious points, there is a much deeper issue. The government has yet to articulate its overall desire, or hope, for the UK’s post-Brexit relationship with the EU. Starmer talked this week of an “ambitious” re-set of relations – but ambitious for what, and why, and how, and when?

So far, before, during, and since the election, these questions have partly, and most vociferously, been answered negatively, in terms of the ‘red lines’ of not joining the single market, a customs union, or the EU itself. By definition, that does not provide a positive template for the future. The more positive answers have been, yes, to ‘re-set’ the tone and, on substance, to pursue a short list of discrete initiatives. The principal items on that list are a security and defence pact, a Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary (SPS) agreement, a mobility agreement for travelling artists, and mutual recognition of professional qualifications.

Even here, there is still remarkably little detail of what the government will seek, and in what time frame it hopes to reach these various agreements. An SPS agreement, in particular, seems to be the main improvement the government anticipates for border frictions, and yet it has remained resolutely ambiguous about what type of agreement it expects to reach. The important differences between types of agreement, both technically and in their political implications, have been discussed on this blog in the past and were recently excellently summarized by trade expert Sam Lowe, the principal one being between ‘equivalence’ agreements and ‘dynamic alignment’ agreements. Labour’s ambiguity cannot persist now it is in power, and it is hard to believe that those within government do not realise that there is actually only one choice.

For the reality is that if there is to be an agreement with the EU it will only be on the basis of some form of ‘dynamic alignment’ (since the EU long ago rejected an equivalence agreement as unworkable). If the UK doesn’t accept this, then there will be no SPS deal, but even if it does, with negotiations expected to begin in early 2025, it will take time. So, in either scenario, what happens to the much-delayed introduction of full import controls? What about the mounting costs of those controls which have been implemented, which businesses are now reporting to be even higher than the previous government had claimed? What about the bio-security risks being taken until such time as there is either an SPS agreement or import controls are fully introduced? Indeed, is the entire ‘2025 UK Border Strategy’ for “the world’s most effective border” still in place?

The absence of strategy

However, the real absence in the government’s approach isn’t the lack of detail on individual initiatives like an SPS agreement. Just as the government’s negative red lines do not offer a ‘template for the future’, neither does its list of wants. What is missing is any strategic framing.

Without such a framing, there is no logic guiding, or explaining, why it is these particular areas, and not others, which are the focus, or how the different initiatives are supposed to fit together. For example, as mentioned in a previous post, the government has already announced there will be legislation to keep the UK aligned with EU product safety rules. That’s an important decision. But why these rules and not others? The same question could be asked of reports that the government may seek to link UK and EU REACH systems for chemicals regulation.

The most likely reading of the government’s approach, and the safety rules policy supports it, is that it will seek, in all areas, the maximum closeness, cooperation and alignment with the EU short of breaking the Labour manifesto commitment to its negative red lines. All of its leading figures were opposed to Brexit, and whilst they no longer speak of it having been a massive mistake it is hard to believe that they do not still think so. At the very least, none of them is an ideological Brexiter, wanting divergence at any price as a matter of principle. Starmer has more or less said that in terms.

Even if this were not so, this government will be aware, just as the last one discovered, that basic practicalities mandate closeness (hence, whatever some of the Tory Brexiters wanted, there was so little divergence from the EU under the Tories). That may have been a distasteful necessity from a Tory point of view, but is likely to be seen as a virtue by Labour ministers and MPs. And the issue here isn’t just one of regulatory alignment, it is that over a whole swathe of economic and geo-political issues the UK’s proximity to the EU, both geographical and ideological, tends to mandate close cooperation. Hence the folly of Brexit, but even post-Brexit the same logic applies.

However, if this is the approach, then it hasn’t been announced as such, and doesn’t seem to be embedded in the government’s own inner workings. This was illustrated by the mess of this month’s mixed messages about whether the government would agree to an EU proposal, which first emerged in April, for a youth mobility scheme (YMS). As also happened at that time, YMS was immediately and falsely framed as being about ‘freedom of movement’, but whereas in April Labour (and the Conservatives) immediately rejected it, this month there was an initial report that the government was considering it. This was immediately contradicted by another unnamed government source, although with careful wording (‘no plans’ etc.) so it hasn’t been definitively ruled out. This week Starmer was similarly careful not to do so, although he did not endorse it either (also this week, exactly the same kind of wording was used in relation to rejoining the Erasmus+ programme).

Of course it is possible to read too much into this episode. It was summer, many politicians and officials were on holiday, and the status and credibility of the sources of the stories was unclear. But, apart from the confusion caused by these contradictory messages, the more significant issue to my mind is the way that the original story did not suggest that the government wanted a YMS, but that it might have to “give ground” on it to the EU in order to secure other agreements, for example on SPS. On that account, even if YMS is ever agreed, it would be grudging and transactional. On the subsequent account, it wasn’t being considered. So on neither account of the government’s position was there any suggestion that YMS would be actively welcomed, but nor, beyond the irrelevant mention of there being no return to freedom of movement, was there any explanation of why it shouldn’t be welcomed.

Joined-up government?

The YMS example is just one illustration of the absence of a coherent post-Brexit strategy. Last November, David Lammy, now the Foreign Secretary, said that relations with the EU would be Britain’s “number one” foreign policy priority. But if that is so, it cannot simply be a matter for the Foreign Office.

For example, whilst foreign policy and trade policy aren’t the same thing, they do overlap, so how does that square with Trade and Business Secretary Jonathan Reynolds’ threnody to the supposed value of global trade deals in an article last Sunday? It’s true that Reynolds also wrote of the importance of trade with the EU – referring to the usual standard list of measures I mentioned earlier – but such a twin-track approach self-evidently doesn’t imply prioritization.

It may be reasonable enough, given the government’s red lines, to pursue global trade deals, but there’s no need to pretend, as the Brexiters did, that they can be of great importance. So if Labour’s trade policy is to be consistent with its foreign policy, and if it is to be consistent with a re-set from the Tories’ approach, Reynolds would, or should, be positioning improving trade with the EU, even within those red lines, as the priority rather than engaging in boosterism about how wonderful CPTPP accession will be.

Similarly, the government has promised that a coherent industrial strategy will be central to its purpose. That, too, needs to be consistent with post-Brexit policy, with the manufacturing body MakeUK already calling for it to include measures to address the damage Brexit has caused. These measures would go beyond the government’s list of priorities, to encompass, for example, addressing the effect of ‘rules of origin’ in the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). So will the government seek a full and formal re-negotiation of the TCA, or at least (given that the EU is unlikely to agree to that for the foreseeable future) identify that as a long-term aspiration? A different, though somewhat related, question is whether the government will seek an expansive approach to the 2026 TCA review, and if so what incentives will it offer the EU to engage in that?

On the specific issue of rules of origin, might the government seek to join the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean (PEM) Convention which, arguably, could help to address that problem? Or, in relation to a different issue, might it seek to re-open the UK’s failed application to re-join the Lugano Convention on cross-border commercial disputes? Or, in relation to yet another issue, with both economic and environmental policy implications, will the government seek to link the UK and EU Emissions Trading Schemes?

The point here is not, primarily, that the government needs to add to the short list of discrete measures or potential agreements, thus making it a long list. Rather, it needs to set out the overall framework and principles – the ‘vision’, to use a rather putrid term – through which the UK will seek to develop its post-Brexit relationship with the EU. That would also entail engaging extensively with all EU members, not just Germany and France, and not as a way of trying to circumvent Brussels, but as part of a coherent ‘neighbourhood’ policy. Equally, the government needs to connect this policy with its other intended reset with the devolved administration and regional Mayors.

Developing such a post-Brexit strategy would not, and could not, mean a huge, single, ‘Big Bang’ negotiation with the EU, or a quick process of delivery. The avenues for change will be the multiple ones of the different agreements and forums created by the complex architecture of Brexit. But it would mean that in each of those avenues the UK would be working towards an overall purpose, rather than piecemeal haggling and horse-trading.

The case for an explicit post-Brexit strategy

Crucially, such a strategy needs to be openly articulated. At the moment, whilst the implicit logic of the government’s approach is, at least arguably, one of maximalism, it certainly hasn’t been explicit about that. Its reticence presumably derives from its continuing fear of the pro-Brexit media and the possible effects on Labour leave voters, allied with the fear of being seen to be ‘banging on about Brexit’ and out of step with voters’ priorities.

It’s easy to understand those fears, when even Starmer’s trip to Germany this week led to accusations that he was reversing Brexit, as if leaving the EU had meant never talking to any of its member states ever again. Actually, a good response to such accusations would be to quote the Vote Leave campaign promise that Brexit would mean “we have better relations with our European friends”.

At all events, the government’s idea seems to be to pursue post-Brexit policy by stealth, through various boring technical adjustments, whilst in public talking about ‘tough negotiations’ with the EU over more high-profile issues. But if this is so it will create several major problems, as well as miss some major opportunities.

Firstly, it will make it much more difficult to maintain the attempt to improve the tone of the relationship, and to develop substantive improvements to it. This goes back to my point about the recursive relationship between tone and substance. An interesting post by Pascal Lth on the Europe Tomorrow substack argues that the defensiveness with which Labour responded to the YMS proposal was a “strategic mistake” not least because the UK will probably end up agreeing to it anyway, and therefore squandered “an ideal opportunity to rebuild trust through an agreement on a proposal of mutual interest”.

I think his more general point is, and if it isn’t then it’s the point I’m trying to make here, that a new and trusting tone in the relationship can only be effective if it is publicly acknowledged. Only that can shift the relationship from one of transactional negotiation aimed at reconciling divergent interests to one of shared partnership based on the recognition of mutual interests. That won’t happen if the government talks from one side of the mouth to the EU and from the other to the British public.

Secondly, if there is no publicly articulated strategy for a maximalist relationship, there will be little possibility of building a domestic political and public consensus for such an approach. Any cooperation that happens will have been achieved by stealth, and played out in public in terms of ‘winning battles’ or ‘making concessions’. That relates to the previous point, as if that is what happened then it will do little to build trust with the EU and, in particular, to build trust that whatever is agreed with the EU is durably rooted in public consent. That failure will in turn limit the depth and extent of what the EU is likely to agree.

To put this another way, a post-Brexit ‘re-set’ is needed not just in the tone of UK-EU relations but in the tone of domestic discussion of those relations. Of course, that will encounter the hostility of the Tories and much of the media. But if it is to be done, it would be better started whilst the Tories are distracted and in disarray, and when the government’s newness gives it the most power it will ever have to influence and defy the media. In any case, as is already happening, every move Labour make in this domain will be denounced by Brexiters as betrayal of Brexit, so the government might as well be clear about its strategy and try to build support for it. Moreover, beyond politics, such strategic clarity would enable businesses and other organizations to understand and anticipate developments since the broad direction of travel would be known.

Thirdly, there is a party management, and ultimately electoral, issue. Many within the parliamentary party, the party membership, and the Labour movement more widely, not to mention many Labour voters, are deeply disappointed by the timidity and limitations of the government’s approach. That would apply even if that approach really is the maximalist one I’ve discussed here because, of course, for many the fundamental objection is to the red lines which define the ceiling of its ambitions. Even so, if those ambitions were publicly and unashamedly proclaimed as the government’s strategy it would at least offer something to all those who want much more, and a reassurance that, indeed, the maximum within those red lines would be done.

Again, this can be illustrated by the YMS proposal. Just as Labour’s reaction to that squandered an opportunity with the EU over something that will quite probably be agreed anyway, so too did it squander an opportunity to give Labour’s pro-EU supporters some reason to have faith in the new government’s approach. Conversely, it gave them a reason to feel highly pessimistic. Whereas if, on this and other issues, the government openly pursued a maximalist strategy, building trust and cooperation with the EU and domestic public support for that, it would provide the necessary basis for their hopes eventually to be realised. In that sense Labour’s maximalism would meet the minimum threshold of rejoiners. There would always be a tension, but not an unmanageable one.

Silence is not a strategy

Brexit nerds may recognize this sub-title, as it was the title of a very early post on this blog, in September 2016, and was taken from the sub-title of an Institute for Government report written at that time, when we were still in the ‘Brexit means Brexit’ period. I’m stressing this because there has been a sense ever since the referendum, and perhaps even more since we left the EU, that Brexit is something best not talked about. Former diplomat Simon Pease, writing in East Anglia Bylines last week, made this exact point with great eloquence.

That has certainly been the case for the Labour Party under Starmer, with any kind of post-Brexit policy discussion having to be virtually prised out of him. That eventually happened in July 2022 and, remarkably, his proposals then were almost identical to Labour’s present policy, and, as I discussed at the time, contained exactly the same ambiguities. At that time, I gave a qualified welcome to it, but it’s depressing that there’s been literally no development of it at all, at least in public.

The general political silence continued during the recent election, though some party manifestos, most notably that of the SNP, broke it. The question now is how much longer can it persist? Brexit surely can’t be a permanently taboo topic. The new government has an opportunity and, more than that, a need to break it, by publicly articulating its post-Brexit strategy. It doesn’t even have to be called that. If the ‘B’ word is still so toxic, just call it a Continental or a Regional strategy.

Will it happen? Given the newness of the government it’s still possible, but Starmer had the perfect moment to do so in his Rose Garden speech this week. He could, with justification, have rolled dealing with the legacy of Brexit in with the other ‘tough choices’ which he talked about making in order to clear up what his government has inherited from the Tories, but chose not to. So for now, the country will continue to muddle along, despite all the damage, hoping that, somehow, if we don’t talk about it, Brexit will resolve itself or simply go away as an issue. It’s not a strategy, except in the perverse sense of a strategy of having no strategy.

Correction (made 31/8/24, 11.32): The 'calendar time' the government has been in power is of course (approximately) two months, not three as stated in the post! 

Many thanks once again for all the feedback, much of it extremely kind, in response to my question about the future format of this blog. I’ve decided to experiment with moving to a fortnightly post, still on a Friday morning. I will also write additional posts if anything important happens between the regular ones. Depending how that goes, I may change approach but for now it will be fortnightly. Thus the next post will be on Friday 13 September.