Not for the first time, Brexit is stuck in a doldrum period. There really isn’t that much going on, at least in public. Perhaps the most notable development since my previous post is the way that Canada’s newly elected leader Mark Carney compared the damage Trump is inflicting on the US with what Britain had done to itself with Brexit. It was notable not because it was contentious but, on the contrary, because it showed how Brexit has become the internationally-recognized standard measure of economic self-harm. The only real talking point is whether it is premature to apply it to Trump.
Meanwhile, in the UK, political attention has been focused on yesterday’s various elections, whilst whatever form any ‘reset’ of UK-EU relations is going to take is shrouded in uncertainty, awaiting the Summit meeting later this month. However, with the results of those elections beginning to be known, there are good reasons to link them, at least in part, to precisely the uncertainty about the reset. In particular, the continuing Farage insurgency can be read as being in part a consequence of Labour’s attempts to de-politicise Brexit. This means that the Summit presents an opportunity not just to reset UK-EU relations, but to reset the way Brexit is, and is not, talked about within domestic politics. For until the failure of Brexit is as openly acknowledged in the UK as it is in the rest of the world, domestic politics remains stuck in its post-Brexit cul-de-sac.
The framing and scope of the Summit
The current uncertainty about the Summit is, perhaps inevitably, about the detailed provisions, about which there are many hints but, as yet, no clarity. It is also about the more symbolic issue of how its overall purpose is framed. On one account, what will be announced will be a “new strategic partnership”, encompassing trade and security, and more or less explicitly configured as a response to Donald Trump. On another account, the accent will be on defence and security, with something more like a roadmap for discussion of economic issues, although some reports suggest an extension to the existing fisheries agreement will be announced.
The first framing would suggest an explicit shift of geo-political strategy, the second a more ambiguous and less ambitious moment, defining future processes more than providing a statement of intent. Or, to put it another way, one would be a bold and dramatic event, the other a rather boring technocratic adjustment. The issue not just a matter of symbolism, however. The detailed provisions will matter, not so much in terms of immediate agreements but in terms of the scale and scope of what is identified to be within the ambit of mutually desired agreements. Thus there is a matrix of possibilities according to whether the framing is dramatic and strategic, or dull and technocratic; and whether the scope of possible agreements is extensive or limited.
In terms of the kinds of things likely to feature in the scope of possible agreements, it continues to seem likely that the government will manage to achieve what has always been its main reset ambition, a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement. What will be more interesting is what the Summit will have to say about other, perhaps less widely trailed, issues. If media reports are correct, we already know that the EU have refused a UK request to discuss mutual recognition of conformity assessment bodies [1], but the fact that the request was made, and discussed at high level, suggests that the government might have a more maximalist agenda than has been publicly articulated.
Might that include seeking to join the Pan-Euro-Mediterranean (PEM) Convention, something the EU has been reported as being willing to consider? Might it include linking REACH systems of chemicals regulation? An agreement on financial services? An agreement on irregular migration? An agreement to link carbon emissions trading systems? For that matter, there is a whole possible agenda of cooperation on energy and climate change, as set out in a new report last week by the Independent Commission on UK-EU relations.
What now seems highly likely to be within scope is some form of Youth Mobility Scheme (YMS), though probably not called by this name, and there have recently been strong hints that this will happen. It is not surprising, because some agreement on this was the main EU requirement. It was therefore a folly on the government’s part that it did not embrace it positively from the outset. Indeed even now, when it is being briefed that it will happen, it is also being denied by the government.
The folly lies in losing the opportunity to demonstrate to the EU that, under Labour, the Brexity mindset has changed and, equally, in failing to challenge that mindset at home. As a result, even the limited scheme which seems likely to emerge is being described in the Brexiter media as a “migration bombshell”, and will no doubt also be presented as having been inflicted upon the UK by the EU rather than being in the mutual interests of both. More generally, the reset as a whole is already being decried in the pro-Brexit media as carrying “the stench of betrayal”, as the “backlash” against it, which I discussed last December, gathers force.
The ‘make Brexit boring’ tactic
There’s little the government could do to prevent such attacks, but it could do far more to spike the batteries of their attackers by setting out its European policy in a more positive, inspiring, way. That is especially so in the run-up to the Summit, which is going to bring the Brexiters’ full guns out, but there is little sign of it happening.
For example, writing recently in the Guardian, Europe Minister Nick Thomas-Symonds seemed at pains to make the government’s plans sound as dull and uninspiring as they could possibly be, telling us, not for the first time, that they will be guided only by “ruthless pragmatism”. At one level, this is understandable, and it would be hypocritical of me to criticize it. In July 2022 I argued for the merits of Labour taking an approach of “making Brexit boring”, and in July 2021 for a “pragmatic ‘better deal for Britain’ policy”. (I’m not suggesting that Labour’s strategists based their thinking on my blog, but if they had done then it wouldn’t look much different to what they have done in government.)
Nevertheless, the world has changed very considerably since 2021 and 2022, and even since the election last year, and that mandates, if not demands, some recalibration on policy. I don’t mean revisiting the ‘red lines’ – there is no way that doing so would be politically viable for Labour in this parliament – but rather the provision of a more upbeat and less apologetic framing. This is obviously partly justified because of the new world created by Trump, and all that means, both economically and geo-politically. It is also justified by public support for closer relations with the EU being strong. And it is further justified because it is now abundantly clear, not least from the emerging results of yesterday’s elections, that new and better ways of countering Nigel Farage’s insurgency need to be found.
As regards the latter, Thomas-Symonds misses the point when he rehearses the government’s standard line that its European policy “isn’t about politics – it’s about pragmatism” and that Britain under Labour “won’t be defined by debates and arguments of the past”. The idea, obviously, is to present the reset as series of technical fixes, free of the toxicity of Brexit. But Farage and his admirers in the Tory Party and the pro-Brexit parts of the media are still engaged in those debates and arguments.
Thus, however much the government insists it is being ‘pragmatic’ about Brexit, the Brexiters still operate within the terrain of sabotage and betrayal. And that is open to them in part because the government treats it as too politically dangerous to say what is just common knowledge around the world: that Brexit was neither sabotaged nor betrayed, it was just a terrible idea, and that is why it went so horribly wrong. The very attempt to ‘leave behind’ the politics of Brexit has the consequence of leaving them in place.
Taking on Farage
The result, and this is the key point, is that Brexit going horribly wrong has not reduced the appeal of a politics which ignores what is pragmatically possible, and indeed trades on doing so. Brexit has not discredited Farage, despite its failure, a failure which he openly acknowledges but has been allowed to slough off as the fault and responsibility of others. This leaves him free to espouse, and to garner considerable electoral support for, policies which are equally unrealistic. There are several of these, but the most obvious is the policy to leave the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which, as he recently repeated, is literally the first thing he would do if he became Prime Minister. It is also, of course, a policy with much appeal in the Tory Party, and it is not at all inconceivable that, whether led by Kemi Badenoch or someone else, this will also be their policy at the next election.
Obviously there are many arguments of principle against such a policy, but, equally importantly, there are many pragmatic reasons which would make it an unworkable one, the implications for Northern Ireland and the Good Friday Agreement being only the first of them. And there is clearly a direct parallel here with Brexit, because whereas its implications for Northern Ireland were either ignored or dismissed by the Brexiters in 2016, in practice they proved to be absolutely central to the practicalities of ‘getting Brexit done’ and, to the Brexiters’ chagrin, were a major reason why, in their terms, Brexit was not done properly. It is all too easy to imagine Farage in the future, with ECHR derogation achieved and wreaking havoc, blithely dismissing the consequences as someone else’s fault.
Thus, with Brexit having neither silenced nor sidelined Farage, one important way to challenge him now is to refuse to allow him to evade responsibility for the policy he spent most of his political life advocating, and to refuse to allow him, as with the ECHR, to continue to advocate flawed, impractical policies without being reminded of that history every single time he does so. The same applies to his anti-immigration policy, given that the levels of legal migration he now complains about are the result of the post-Brexit “Aussie-style points system” he once advocated, and that the levels of irregular migration are in part the result of his advocacy of the UK’s departure from EU agreements.
From this perspective, the government’s approach, as articulated by Thomas-Symonds, is counter-productive. The politics that brought us Brexit have not disappeared with Brexit. And whilst it is true that pragmatism is needed, that is not as an alternative to a political framing but ought to be the political framing: a politics which thrives on promising what cannot pragmatically be delivered as policy is the basis for a bad politics. Bad morally, because it is dishonest; but, because it is dishonest, also bad politically, as it corrodes trust and, ultimately, corrodes democratic politics itself.
Back to the reset
In terms of the reset, then, this would mean not so much a different policy but a very different, and much more honest, articulation of that policy (perhaps including dropping the rather dull terminology of ‘the reset’). It would acknowledge, in explicit terms, as it does implicitly already, that Brexit was a mistake. Most people think that anyway, and few can doubt that Starmer does. It would also acknowledge that it is a mistake that cannot simply be reversed, at least until there is a durable cross-party consensus sufficient to give the EU confidence in a joining process, and a genuine public enthusiasm for EU membership (which isn’t just a matter of thinking Brexit damaged the economy). And it would be unapologetic that a substantially improved and deepened UK-EU relationship is the best, and currently the only, position in the face of those two realities.
Articulated in this way, other things which are currently only implicit would also fall into place. Most obvious of these is the already fairly explicit fact that the UK’s primary defence and security theatre is European. The Global Britain of the 2021 Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy which, as I discussed at the time, sought to deny that, has already been substantially discarded by the 2023 Integrated Review Refresh, in large part because of the Ukraine War.
Now, the impact of Trump 2.0 has been to make even that largely obsolete, which will presumably be reflected in the Strategic Defence Review and the National Security Strategy, both to be published soon. Given the timing of the Summit, there is now a perfect opportunity to tie together European policy and defence policy. That is already the clear direction of travel, but the more overt it is the more strategic clarity there will be, whilst politically creating a challenge to Reform and the Tories to publicly prioritise their Brexit obsessions above the UK’s defence interests.
Less explicit, but increasingly obvious, is that the UK will prioritise its economic relationship with the EU above that with the US. That will be all the more obvious if there is a UK-EU SPS deal, which would all but certainly preclude a comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with the US. Making this more explicit need not mean abandoning any attempt at an ‘economic deal’ with the US to avoid some of Trump’s tariffs, but would show where the UK’s priorities lay.
Rachel Reeves came close to doing just this last week, saying “actually our trading relationship with Europe is arguably even more important, because they're our nearest neighbours and trading partners" but, apart from the fact that there is no ‘arguably’ about it, she was immediately undermined when “Downing Street” refused to endorse her comment (£). It’s ridiculous, but it is also politically maladroit, because it leaves the Brexiters free to present Reeves’ comments as ‘sparking outrage’, and of having led to her being “scolded” for making them, and thereby to continue to insist that a US trade deal is a great prize and should be the main priority.
Of course, they would do that anyway but (as with YMS) their attack lines land far more easily because of the government’s lack of consistency and clarity (although they are made all the more absurd by Trump’s own consistent inconsistency about doing a deal with the UK, displayed again this week). Again, this can’t be separated from Brexit, and the politics of impractical promises. A Free Trade Agreement with the US was never very likely, remains unlikely under Trump and, in any case, would be of very little economic value. If it ever did happen, it would also come with very unpopular consequences, including possibly for food standards and the NHS. It was, after all, the Brexiters who, in 2016, held up the then mooted US-EU TTIP deal as one of the reasons to leave the EU, albeit that their claims about it were largely fallacious.
So here again the refusal to ‘revisit the politics of the past’ now hamstrings Labour’s ability to engage in the politics of the present, a politics in which the present nonsense being talked about a US trade deal by Kemi Badenoch and Nigel Farage ought to be challenged in part by pointing to their past record of being utterly wrong about it.
The forthcoming Summit represents the perfect moment for the government to shift to this much more full-throated articulation of its post-Brexit strategy. Indeed, if this opportunity is not taken it is hard to see the shift ever happening. In the terms I put it earlier, that would mean framing the Summit as a moment of dramatic, strategic choice, accompanied by as extensive an agenda for new agreements as will be entertained by the EU.
The alternative would be to continue with the current approach, which in my previous post I compared with that of the spivish, dodgy businessman Arthur Daley. The unsurprising consequence of that approach is to give the impression that the government has something to hide, or to apologize for, or of which it is ashamed. That impression does not just damage the government’s credibility internationally, it also does so with voters. This necessarily assists the Brexiters, who want to make precisely the charge that the government is hiding its true agenda (i.e. rejoining by stealth). At the same time, it alienates the majority of Labour supporters (and other voters) who are all too well aware that there is no such agenda, but might find that easier to swallow if the government was less mealy-mouthed about the improvements it is pursuing.
The day before yesterday
The truism that generals always fight yesterday’s battles applies here. The decision to be fairly muted about Brexit, and to make it as dull and technocratic as possible, made tactical sense in the run-up to the 2024 election, and, at least arguably, was vindicated by the result. But it makes much less sense now, especially with the growing threat of Reform UK, as illustrated by the latest elections, because it entails silence about Farage’s ‘signature policy’. Or, more accurately, it entails silence about Farage’s political modus operandi of advocating superficially plausible and, to some, appealing policies without regard for the practicality of their implementation or the reality of their consequences.
Similarly, just as Labour are happy to keep reminding voters that the Truss mini-budget shattered the Tories’ claims to economic competence, it would be equally valid to keep alive the memory of how Brexit unmoored their claims to pragmatic government. Or, again to be more accurate, how ‘Brexitism’ did so. And, whether aimed at Reform or the Tories, the fundamental message that populist policies lead to chaos and failure is now all the easier to deliver given what is happening in Trump’s America. But it can’t be rammed home to British voters without talking about Brexit.
For Labour, now, continuing with their previous tactic amounts to fighting with one hand tied behind their back. Paradoxically, that is because whilst that tactic belongs to yesterday’s battle, its redundancy is because it ignores the past of the day before yesterday. Yet for decades Labour have been attacked for ‘having gone cap in hand to the IMF’ in 1976, and the spectre of ‘rubbish piling up in the streets’ during the Winter of Discontent is still being summoned up by their opponents. Less specifically, Labour are attacked for ‘always putting up taxes’ or ‘always borrowing too much’. They are even attacked for the policies they advocated in the ‘longest suicide note in history’ manifesto of 1983, despite not being elected. This vicious weaponization of past history has sometimes, perhaps mostly, been unjust. It has also been effective and, though without any need for injustice, Labour could learn from it by hanging Brexit around the necks of its advocates.
Once all the current election results are in there will be much analysis and agonizing about what they mean for the Labour government and for politics in general. At the same time, the coming UK-EU Summit will be a big moment in defining the nation’s post-Brexit strategy. It may, as Thomas-Symonds puts it, be guided by “ruthless pragmatism” but it could also be a ruthlessly political response to the legacy of the 2016 referendum. Being explicit about that response, including being honest about its limitations and the reasons for those limitations, might well be Labour’s best chance of seeing off Farage. It might even help to shore up Labour’s other flank, where they are vulnerable at least in part because of the constipated timidity with which the government presents its European policy.
Note
[1] This is not the mutual recognition of standards proposal I discussed in a recent post, but, as mentioned in passing there, the different issue of mutual recognition of conformity assessment. Sam Lowe’s Most Favoured Nation Substack newsletter provides an excellent account of this complex topic, and the reasons why the idea has been rejected by the EU. It also provides what I think is a well-founded criticism of the all-too-common tendency amongst some, usually anti-Brexit, social media commenters (including, occasionally, commenters on this blog) to automatically dismiss almost any ‘reset’ proposal as ‘cakeism’, ‘cherry-picking’, or ‘more British exceptionalism’.
Labour are fantastic at pursuing policies that please nobody at all... always sitting between two chairs and hence falling on their face. Take negotiating with the EU under red lines. The brexiteers will hate any kind of negotiations, red lines or not. The rejoiners deeply resent flaccid negotiations. Same with cutting benefits for the weakest and hiking insurance for companies. nobody is happy. Labour has succeeded in splitting its own progressive electoral alliance because it doesn't understand that in a majoritarian system you need to divide and conquer. You don't try to make every person happy. You need to make sure you have 50% + 1 and keep it that way. Labour must learn that the majority of the electorate are rejoiners and to pursue growth and prosperity with that political project, rather than being reform lite.
ReplyDeletetotal agree , falling between two stools is a losers game.
DeleteI wish we could get out of calling all this Brexit, I understand it’s hard but rebrand would make it less polarising
ReplyDeleteMy frustration levels are rising to a level which threatens to explode my brain. This government seems determined to turn its huge election win into a one term defeat. Unforced error after unforced error. I believed that Starmer’s steadiness and discipline would bring in an effective government after 14 years of Tory misrule. How wrong I was! Prof. Grey points out clearly what the government should do, but I suspect that Labour came into government with a strategy to win power and nothing else. Starmer’s colourless personality seems to be matched by his lack of any ideology or vision about where he wants to take the country.
ReplyDeleteIt seems that there are also anti-ECHR MPs in the Labour Party: Jonathan Hinder being an obvious one >>
ReplyDeletehttps://labourlist.org/2025/04/hinder-blue-labour-immigration-debate/
Every MP who tries this Brexit2.0 debate focussing on the migration aspect only without a proper discussion on ALL the articles should immediately called out by journalists!
Not long before I left the UK, I had a chat with a Reform supporter and put it to her that her party's policies were populist nonsense.
ReplyDeleteShe said, true, but so are the others.
Which was quite a fair answer and stopped me in my tracks. On balance, it probably fair to say that the Conservative and Labour parties are slightly less populist but I can't really say there is much in it when you look at the actual substance.
I do also get the sense that senior Labour people don't actually believe in the worst of their policies, it's much more something they have said to be elected. But is that really better?
Perhaps if the UK is to be governed by a hard Brexit government with populist policies then it is as well to have a party that genuinely believes in them.
IMHO my preferred response to the lady's "so are the others" would have been (at least for Labour) a robust "rubbish".
DeleteWhat is populist about their policies on the WFA or the 2-child benefits cap? The fact that in the polls Labour are not popular rather demonstrates that they are not populist.
It's a very interesting question on whether a less populist Labour party would actually be more popular. Your comment prompted me to look at the polls and I see Labour are now down to 23% which is quite incredible.
DeleteThere's a substantial chunk of the population who don't want to vote for a populist party, and those that do already have the Conservatives and Reform.
If you look at the Scottish example, after losing the referendum, the SNP captured most of the Yes vote. If Labour were to capture most of the losing 48% from the Brexit referendum they could more than double their vote.
Today's hugely depressing council results render all the careful argument and logical constructions so clearly and sagely presented here as almost entirely obsolete. For with all this electoral wind in his sails, imagine the forces of Faragist fury the usual suspects would unleash if even the merest murmur of closer cooperation with those not to be named was uttered.
ReplyDeleteWell I don’t agree with that because the post was written in anticipation of the election results, which were coming in as I finalized it – hence the references to the results coming in and the continuing Farage insurgency. Of course it is true that he is on a roll now, and that he and his acolytes would fight back – but that is all the more reason to face up to him.
DeleteThe fact is that if Labour keeps allowing Reform to mark their agenda, oh surprise, they will be swallowed by the monster. It has been made clear yesterday. Time to make important changes and start defending the truth. If that means confronting Farage and Brexit, why not? Otherwise, Labour will be out of No 10 sooner than we think.
ReplyDeleteFighting or appeasement, that is now the question for Labour. Unless they manage to create an alternative and defend it, they have an uncertain future. The Tories have an even harder choice.
ReplyDeleteBrexit was never benevolent hope and nothing has changed about that since 2016.
ReplyDeleteI am wondering if the Labour Party believe that, with the Tories in disarray, the electoral FPTP system will save them. They can't see beyond the two big parties and certainly the history of British elections would lend credibility to that position.
ReplyDeleteSo the Labour strategy could be defined as DON'T CHOOSE.
Stay the safe middle course and perhaps that fits perfectly with Starmer's personality. I would be completely surprised if Labour choose the more 'daring and dramatic" approach as outlined by Chris. No, it will be pragmatic and boring attempting to sneak in under the radar of extreme criticism from the Brexiteers. Ditto with Trump.
It's not until Reform do a reverse takeover of the Tories or a formal pact is put in place that Labour will wake up. Maybe they believe that won't happen so why choose a more daring approach and therefore have decided to continue to rely on FPTP the do the heavy lifting. DONT CHOOSE is the name of the game.
But, as in business, failure to choose, especially in a changing world, has spelt the death knell of so many once very prosperous companies. They wither on the vine unable to let profitable parts of their business go that may be in jeopardy in favour of new but uncertain possibilities. It's never easy.
Like most contributors here, we believe it's time to choose the more daring approach. But, unfortunately, Labour and Starmer are not there yet and most worryingly, may never be.
I'm sorry, but
ReplyDelete"In particular, the continuing Farage insurgency can be read as being in part a consequence of Labour’s attempts to de-politicise Brexit."
What?
Across the Channel the message from these elections is loud and clear: The Brexit sickness is still rampant in the UK. The British electorate hasn't learned a thing from Brexit, therefore all interactions with the UK should be at arm's length distance. There is no way to further integration, never mind joining the Single Market or other unattainable goals.
This Brexit sickness first has to run its full course before the UK becomes an acceptable partner in Europe again.
I don't really see the contradiction. The Brexit sickness is still rampant is shown by the continuing Farage insurgency and this is in part because Labour have tried to depoliticise Brexit rather than challenge it.
DeleteAustralia and Canada were able to distance themselves from their Trump-lite candidates. Apparently the UK voters didn't get the message. This is why the EU will never let the UK back in. We (French poster writing) might tinker with some of deals, but that's all. You simply cannot be trusted.
ReplyDeleteI hope Canada joins the EU. Would France support that? I hope so.
DeleteThree elections in the past week. Canada and Australia voted against Trumpism, while the UK voted for it. One can't help ask why the UK is the one out of sync. Is the main difference - the UK has Brexit in its history?
ReplyDeleteHello from an Italian reader. Seen from here, one wonders what Starmer will do at this summit. Is he with the EU? No, because Fatage increases consensus. Is he with Trump? We already have Poles and Romanians with anti-EU parties to manage, a third country that comes to bother with the cherry picking, can not participate. Neither with the EU nor with Trump? Ok, so what do you want?
ReplyDeleteGood Post - thank you. I wish Labour had from the start, at least partly justified why they could pursue all the "good Labour" policies that they "really wanted to pursue" because of the Brexit -induced financial constraints and point out at every opportunity that it was brought to us by the Farage and the Tories.
ReplyDeleteThen having firmly blamed Brexit for the funding difficulties,
to campaign against Reform, they could have borrowed from JFK's successful campaign against Richard Nixon (aka. Tricky Dicky). This had as an attack line a maximally unsalubrious photo of Nixon with the caption "Would You Buy A Used Car From This Man???). They could make it "Another Used Car" and add the sentence "Since The Wheels Fell Off The Last One".
Another good one would be an adaptation of a slogan with which an advertising agency in the early 1970's wanted (in jest) to introduce Japanese cars to the US market - "And now from those wonderful folks who brought you Pearl Harbour"
Excellent blog.
ReplyDeleteDuring the Brexit process (2015 - 21) I blogged extensively on the topic. My aim was to highlight the legal aspects rather than the disastrous economic effects of the whole flawed enterprise. Here, if there ever was one, was a policy that ought to have been drowned at birth.
It is impossible to forget many things.
How Cameron instigated Brexit and thought he could secure better terms even though the UK had, over the years, carved out a truly beneficial deal including not taking on the Euro etc.
How the referendum was held without voters having in front of them any clearly set out policy as to what form Brexit might take. It was only after May's Lancaster House speech that the "hard" Brexit strategy came to the fore.
How the referendum failed to require a majority in each part of the UK, how the referendum was held without there being any clear way forward if the vote was leave
How politicians - including Labour's leader Corbyn - would have triggered Art 50 the day after the referendum result
All the legal shenanigans in the Miller cases - which would not ever have got to court but for the persistence of Gina Miller
How the "thin gruel" TCA was ultimately cobbled together by Frost / Johnson - the former being rewarded with a peerage
How the particular problem of Northern Ireland was mishandled. Despite the later Windsor Framework, problems still remain.
How we saw refugee camps near Calais and how they disappeared soon after the referendum result. Played well into the hands of the Brexiters.
How Cameron supported Turkish accession to the EU which of course ended with Erdogan's regime. Yet again, Cameron played into the hands of the Brexiters.
Just some of the highlights of the catastrophe!
The mess continues with Labour - with a huge majority - failing to get a proper grip and acknowledge the mess and set out clear aims for the future relationship with the EU - (our nearest neighbours after all). One could be forgiven for thinking that Labour is scared of Farage. Even if that is wrong, they are failing to tackle his populism with all its misrepresentations (perhaps lies). The nation will come to regret having a government which, so far as EU policy goes, lacks backbone.
I'm sure that much more is to come as Brexit continues to unfold. It is unrealistic to press for a rejoin (Art 49) but government ought to pursue the best possible "reset" and a much better TCA (soon due for review). It ought not to be shy and apologetic for doing so.
Please keep up your blog. Great work.