That was the reset that was

I’m not quite sure when ‘the reset’ became used as a noun to denote a definite moment within UK-EU relations. The notion of ‘resetting’ as a verb was certainly floating around before the election, but the first record I can find of it being as a noun was at the European Political Community Summit hosted in the UK last July. As for the reset being tied to a specific event, namely the UK-EU Summit that was held this week, that only began in February of this year, in the context of Keir Starmer’s attendance at a meeting with EU leaders at a defence and security summit, and the wider context of the dramatic re-arrival of Donald Trump in the White House.

I remarked at the time that it was unclear how realistic this timescale was, given the scope of things which would need to be agreed for the Summit to produce a reset worthy of the name. Now the UK-EU Summit has been held and, after all the speculation, we know the details of what has been agreed which are set out in the Joint Statement, the Renewed Agenda for Cooperation and the text of a political agreement for a Security and Defence Partnership, along with a Q&A document relating to these.

These have been widely reported, and there are several summaries, including from the BBC and Politico, as well as some excellent analyses including, from a legal perspective, that of Professor Steve Peers on his EU Law Analysis blog and, from a more political perspective, that of Anton Spisak of the Centre for European Reform on his personal Substack newsletter. Given that there is so much already written, I won’t provide another summary here. Instead, I will seek to evaluate what was agreed, taking in some but not all of the details, and how it relates to the wider Brexit saga.

Evaluating the reset Summit

In a recent post I set out some parameters which can be used for that evaluation:

“On one account, what will be announced will be a “new strategic partnership”, encompassing trade and security, and more or less explicitly configured as a response to Donald Trump. On another account, the accent will be on defence and security, with something more like a roadmap for discussion of economic issues, although some reports suggest an extension to the existing fisheries agreement will be announced. The first framing would suggest an explicit shift of geo-political strategy, the second a more ambiguous and less ambitious moment, defining future processes more than providing a statement of intent. Or, to put it another way, one would be a bold and dramatic event, the other a rather boring technocratic adjustment. The issue is not just a matter of symbolism, however. The detailed provisions will matter, not so much in terms of immediate agreements but in terms of the scale and scope of what is identified to be within the ambit of mutually desired agreements. Thus there is a matrix of possibilities according to whether the framing is dramatic and strategic, or dull and technocratic; and whether the scope of possible agreements is extensive or limited.”

Judged in these terms, the agreement falls somewhat between the two framings. The phrase “new strategic partnership” does feature centrally in the Joint Statement that followed the Summit. However, in content terms, what has been agreed is much more like the second framing. As expected, the central part of what was agreed was the Security and Defence Partnership (although there are many details to be worked out). That is important but not unexpected, and Anton Spisak points out that is not the bespoke “security package” Labour had originally sought but a fairly typical EU-third country partnership.

In the non-defence sphere, it was indeed true that there was an extension of the current fisheries agreement contained within the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which was due to be re-negotiated in 2026, through until 2038. There was also an agreement to extend the TCA energy provisions, which were due to expire in 2026, until 2027 and to do so on an annual basis thereafter. Since these were both consolidations of the existing agreement, they cannot be described in terms of a new strategic framing; indeed, they scarcely warrant the term ‘reset’. Nothing else within the non-defence sphere was definitively agreed, but a long list of possibilities and aspirations was identified.

In terms of the scale and scope of these, most of the things expected were mentioned. An extensive Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement seems to be the most definite, although (again as expected) details and timescale remain under negotiation. One thing which is now explicit is that the government will agree to dynamic alignment of SPS regulations, with a role for the ECJ. It’s true that everyone who knew anything about it knew that was going to happen (if there was to be an SPS agreement at all) but the government had never overtly recognized that. There is also a commitment to work towards a Youth Experience Scheme (meaning some version of a Youth Mobility Scheme), which was expected, but the mention of also working towards the UK participating in Erasmus+ was more surprising (given previous negative comments from the government).

Expected, but with less confidence, was a commitment to work towards linking Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM) and Emission Trading Schemes (ETS), which has been discussed by commentators for some years but hadn’t featured very explicitly in Labour’s plans. Perhaps less expected, although the idea has certainly been floating around, was a commitment to explore the possibility of the UK participating in the EU’s internal electricity market. In all these areas, as with SPS, if there are agreements then they will entail dynamic alignment of regulations and a role for the ECJ.

The presence of the latter possible agreements takes the reset above the minimal level of what might have been contained (although they also grow out of possibilities contained within the TCA). But there was no mention of participation in the REACH chemicals regulation system  (something once touted as a possibility by Rachel Reeves) nor of accession to the PEM Convention on rules of origin (something called for by Stella Creasy, chair of the Labour Movement for Europe). It is also of note that of the three specific goals for the reset which have been Labour’s stated aims since before the election, SPS is the only one which looks likely to come to fruition. The other two (mutual recognition of professional qualifications, and a mobility agreement for touring artists), which were always unlikely to be agreed, were mentioned but only in vague terms.

So, overall, in terms of the evaluative parameters I proposed, on the framing criterion, it was closer to the technocratic than the strategic, and was mostly a roadmap for discussion of possible agreements. In terms of the scale and scope of what that roadmap contained, it was towards the middle of what might reasonably have been expected, although it should again be stressed that it was minimal in terms of the announcement of actual agreements (as opposed to possible agreements). Moreover, there is a distinct lack of precise timescales or even defined processes for reaching these agreements and, as a result, very little sense of urgency. In that sense, whilst somewhere in the middle, it is closer to the minimal than the maximal end on the ‘scale and scope’ criterion.

A step forward?

If that seems rather underwhelming, it doesn’t mean that the reset was unimportant, for two reasons. One is that it does set in train ongoing negotiations, so that ‘resetting’ will continue. In a way, that was always going to happen, in the sense that the UK-EU relationship is bound to be the subject of ongoing negotiation, but what is distinctive about ‘resetting’ is that the direction of travel, even if very slow, is, for now, towards closer integration.

The other reason it matters is that a Tory government could never have hosted an event like this Summit. That is despite that fact that, at least under Sunak, the direction of travel was similar. That’s shown by the Windsor Framework, what ended up being the very limited scrapping of Retained EU Law, the agreement with Frontex, and the return to Horizon and Copernicus. But Sunak (or any other Tory leader) would have baulked at the concept of a reset and the symbolism and language of this Summit.

In this way, the reset is a step forward of sorts. Along with the different tone that has been evident since the election, it does mark a break with the highly antagonistic years since the referendum. It accepts, overtly, the reality that the EU is a regulatory hegemon, and in the process discards the Brexiters’ taboo against dynamic alignment. Similarly, it demonstrates a recognition of one of the basic flaws of Brexit, namely its failure to grasp the realities of geography. Assuming they happen, both the SPS agreement and the CBAM/ETS linkage will, in terms of the much-discussed choice between the EU and the US, be a choice for the EU.

But – and with Brexit there is always a ‘but’ – what is equally striking is that, as well as being relatively modest in framing and scope, the government has presented the reset in distinctly ‘Brexity’ terms. In particular, Starmer presented it, alongside the recent deals with the US and India, in terms of Britain being “an independent, sovereign nation” which “is back on the world stage”, whilst Reeves talked of the reset meaning that (again in conjunction with trade deals with other countries) Britain is in a better position on trade “than any other country in the world”.

No doubt, tactically, this is meant to spike the attacks on the reset made by Brexiters. In a similar way, the language of “ruthless pragmatism” that Nick Thomas-Symonds has been using for some time can be read as an attempt to position the Brexiter attacks as ‘ideological’ rather than practical. And, indeed, the other general way the reset has been presented by the government is in terms of the practical ways that it will make life better for British people.

Political reaction

All that is fair enough, in a tactical sense, but it doesn’t fundamentally challenge the validity of the Brexiter attacks, which have indeed been ferocious as well as wholly predictable. So, whilst Starmer spoke of the deal “releasing us from the tired arguments of the past” it has done no such thing.

Instead, once again, the airwaves have been full of the obnoxious, clichéd language of “surrender”, “betrayal”, and violation of “the will of the people”. And, once again, any semblance of honesty has disappeared (examples include claims that 80 million people will come to the UK under the Youth Experience Scheme, or that the UK would have had complete control of its fishing waters in 2026 - both made by Boris Johnson, amongst others). It has come from all the usual people (including not just Johnson, but Nigel Farage, David Frost, and Kemi Badenoch) and in all the usual places (including the Telegraph, Express, Mail, and GB News). And, just as in the past, they have set the agenda for the ‘non-partisan media’ such as the BBC, Sky, and ITV (yes, of course I know the questions that begs but, still, they are not partisan in the way of the Brexiter outlets I just mentioned).

It's tempting to think that this is just the last gasp of the Brexit dinosaurs, and that, as Adam Bienkov puts it, their “screaming” is so loud because they know “the public has changed its mind”. After all, 66% of the public support a closer relationship with the EU without rejoining it (or the single market or customs union), which is exactly Labour’s policy, and business groups are very positive. I’m not so sure, if only because public responses to questions about ‘a closer relationship’ may be quite fluid when that is re-presented as ‘betrayal’ and ‘surrender’ [1]. At all events, whether or not that is the reason, polling since the Summit shows only 29% think it is a good deal, and 23% think it is a bad deal (the largest group, 30%, don’t know).

That is hardly a ringing endorsement of the policy, and one big problem is that, for all the government talk of the agreement making life better for ordinary people, it will be a long time before there is any tangible benefit. This, I think, has been an under-appreciated point in much of the media discussion this week, partly because the government focussed on having ‘done’ a deal and its opponents on it being a betrayal. But, to be ‘ruthlessly pragmatic’, the reality is that it will certainly be months, and very probably years, before it is both fully agreed and fully implemented.

For the SPS agreement, in particular, this means it will be a long time before businesses find trading easier (and for some it will be, or already is, too late) and before consumers see benefits in terms of price and choice. Meanwhile there will presumably be no further implementation of import controls (there are already reported plans to sell off border facilities), and so the heightened risks of dangerous or sub-standard goods entering Britain will continue. Moreover, SPS aside, even if all the possible agreements come to be made, they will each happen within their own timescales and come into operation piecemeal. Thus, in practical terms, the reset will not take place in a single moment, and will come long after public opinion of it as ‘an event’ has been established.

Brexiters are still shaping the debate

So, in that context, it really does matter how it is talked about now, and in the coming days, and the fact is that, so far, the Brexiters have shaped the main media ‘talking point’ of whether or not the reset was a ‘betrayal’. That has partly been facilitated by the fact that the only major definitive economic agreement of the Summit was the extension of the fisheries deal (negotiated by Frost and Johnson) for twelve years. This isn’t some terrible thing, not least because it gives fishers some certainty for planning and, anyway, they will benefit from an SPS agreement, when it comes. But whilst government ministers have tried to make those points, by having to do so they necessarily cede pivotal position to the ‘debate’ about betrayal, and have allowed the emotive and, for Brexiters, talismanic issue of fishing to be the pivotal policy area within that debate.

But even leaving aside the fisheries issue, the government’s approach has a more general problem. Responding to, or trying to pre-empt, the accusation of betrayal in terms of Britain’s world standing, or even its pragmatic interests, talks past the underlying meaning of that accusation. The first response accepts that betrayal of Brexit might, in principle, be possible, even if the reset is not, in fact, evidence of it. The second response implies that pragmatism can over-ride principles, leaving intact the possibility that a betrayal has occurred but justifying it on the grounds of practical exigencies.

Moreover, the way the Summit was talked about by the government remained primarily transactional and apprehended in terms of ‘tough negotiations’ which ‘went right down to the wire’. It is all very similar to the way the Brexit negotiations were presented and, for that matter, the way that relations with the EU were reported in the years when the UK was still a member state. And of course, as a result, it means that terms like ‘surrender’ continue to have currency, since they are the logically-entailed flip-side of the boasts of tough negotiations to ‘get the best deal for Britain’.

Stale, failed arguments

Yet the Brexiters really do not have a leg to stand on. Invocations of the ‘will of the people’, referencing the 2016 referendum, were always grotesque but are now utterly redundant. If it ever had any substance, the will of the people was satisfied when the UK left the EU, and any mandate the referendum had was fully and finally discharged at that point. It is simply dishonest to pretend that it provides some democratic hold over the form of UK-EU relations now and forever more. By contrast, Labour won the last election on its very limited reset policy, and has a mandate for that.

Beyond that, all the talk of betrayal and surrender is fatuous. Coming from Reform and some of the Tory Ultras that fatuity is obvious not least because they had already denounced the Johnson-Frost Brexit as a betrayal and a surrender. Just how often can something be betrayed before the accusation ceases to have any meaning at all?

Coming from Tories, like Badenoch, who formed the last government it is fatuous because they know full well that, when in power, they barely diverged from EU regulations at all, including SPS regulations, and so in practice Britain was already a ‘rule-taker’ (and, to be fair, Starmer made this point very clearly in the Commons debate). They also know that, as mentioned above, their own government was set on its own slow path towards closer relations with the EU. Now, out of government, they are free to join Farage et al. in all the old delusions of an undeliverable ‘true’ or ‘pure’ Brexit, including, on fisheries specifically, the false promise of complete control of fishing waters.

There won’t be another reset

Of course, all of this nonsense would be trotted out by the usual suspects whatever the Labour government did or said. This could be seen as a justification for the timidity of the reset, since it shows just how much vitriol even the most minimal changes attract. Some may argue that, given this is so, Labour might just as well be much bolder. That’s a reasonable argument if it means seeking the most maximal reset compatible with the Labour ‘red lines’. But if it means abandoning those red lines, that would be politically naïve. For doing that would provide the Brexiters with ‘a leg to stand on’, given how clearly and repeatedly Labour pledged to hold to them. And, yes, the next response would be to say that Labour was foolish to do so – but the reasons at the time were well-known and widely-discussed and, now, we are where we are.

In setting Labour’s red lines, Starmer accepted the basic parameters of the Conservatives' Brexit, but that doesn’t mean the Brexiters have accepted that acceptance, and the reality is that they never will. The reason for that is because actually, as has been obvious since 2016, the Brexiters will never accept any version of Brexit. Nothing will ever satisfy them, partly because what they want is not practically possible but mainly because they don’t want to be satisfied, they want to be outraged; and Brexit will always be a betrayal for them because they want to be betrayed.

From this perspective, this reset Summit reveals that Starmer’s approach to Brexit, whatever tactical rationale it may have, is strategically incoherent. It recognizes the geographical, economic and regulatory realities which doom Brexit to failure, and yet it places major constraints on what can be done to address them. Equally, it seeks to neutralize the attacks of Brexiters by accepting their basic parameters, and yet by doing so allows the basis for those attacks to flourish unchallenged. In this way, as foreshadowed at the end of last week’s post, the (naïve) possibility I expressed in the post before that, of the reset with the EU being used to reset the domestic politics of Brexit, has evaporated.

Much of this was already obvious. But once resetting relations with the EU became configured as ‘the reset’, and then tied to this week’s Summit, it became a specific ‘moment’ which would tell us, definitively, what Labour’s European policy will be. What is on (and not on) the agenda for UK-EU relations for the next few years will not, now, change. There will be more summits, and ‘resetting’ will continue, but, at least for the present government, there can only be one ‘reset’ moment. And now it’s over.

 

Note

[1] I think this reflects an underlying problem with many opinion polls about Brexit. Even after all these years when it has been such a huge issue, almost no one in the public (and fewer than might be expected in the media) actually understand even the most basic things about what membership and non-membership of the EU mean, right down to what a single market, let alone a customs union, means. As a result, public opinion is very easily manipulated by, and vulnerable to, political dishonesty (e.g. ‘closer relations’ can readily be rearticulated as ‘subjugation’), making opinion poll results rather unreliable.

Because of the Summit being held this week, this post comes only one week after my last one. Unless something unexpected happens, I will now revert to the usual fortnightly timetable i.e. the next post will be on Friday 6 June.