The main Brexit news since my last post is the announcement of an agreement about Gibraltar made between the EU, UK, Spain, and Gibraltar. Although at this stage only a political agreement, which still needs to be put into legal text and ratified, this marks a certain kind of milestone in the Brexit process, for it is the last part of the negotiations which began under the aegis of Article 50. So, combined with the recent announcements at the ‘reset Summit’, it can be seen as the end of one phase and the beginning of another.
The Rock took ages
It’s worth pausing just to reflect on that, given that it is over eight years since Article 50 was triggered by Theresa May, five and a half years since the UK left the EU, and just a few days from now it will be the ninth anniversary of the referendum itself. I am not sure who first said it (possibly Rafael Behr), but the biggest lie about Brexit, a title for which there is much competition, was that it would be quick and easy.
It is somehow fitting that Gibraltar should be the last of the ‘withdrawal issues’ to be resolved since, at the very beginning for the Article 50 process, it gave rise to a strong candidate for another much-competed for title, the maddest moment of Brexit. I am referring to the time, in April 2017, when senior Tories, including Michael Howard, talked of the possibility of going to war with Spain. This followed the publication, immediately after the UK sent the Article 50 letter, of the EU Council’s draft negotiating guidelines. As I wrote at the time, and elaborated in more detail in April 2024, when it seemed as if a deal was in the offing, this episode contained within it many lessons which have run through the entirety of the Brexit saga, like words through a stick of rock (that is the last ‘rock’ pun).
I won’t repeat that discussion here. But it is relevant to say that the terms of what have been agreed are pretty much as trailed in 2024, and not very different to the ad hoc arrangements created in 2018 and semi-formalized at the end of the transition period. So it hardly needed to take so long to deal with, because the reality is that something like what has been agreed was the only credible option, and certainly the best option for the people who live and/or work in Gibraltar.
What has been agreed?
On the central issue of contention, there will be no passport or other checks on goods and people crossing the land border between Gibraltar and Spain, but there will be dual passport controls at Gibraltar’s airport and sea port (most arrivals at the latter are from cruise ships, with passengers pre-cleared for landing).
This means that the UK/Gibraltar authorities will operate one set of checks, and the Spanish authorities will operate another set, and these latter will also be checks for Schengen Area entry/ exit. It is a situation which has been compared with the kind of dual controls operated on Eurostar services between London and Paris/ Brussels (although the mechanics will be slightly different). This means in effect, although not, according to Foreign Secretary David Lammy, in formal terms, Gibraltar will be within the Schengen travel area.
One aspect of what has been agreed is that it will be Spanish, and not EU Frontex, border staff who will be policing the Schengen checks. This had been the subject of dispute during the negotiations, and appears to be a negotiating ‘victory’ for Spain, as, under the Tory government, the UK had apparently wanted Frontex to police the controls. It is hard to see why, though. It is no different to the way that the French authorities police Schengen for Eurostar travel, and one might have thought that Tory Brexiters would prefer a national agency to an EU agency, but it may be that, on this issue, their concern was more about any implication of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar. In practical terms, it seems irrelevant either way.
Much of the detail of this, and the rest of the agreement, including the precise arrangements for the UK RAF and military base on Gibraltar, has yet to be disclosed (although Lammy has said there will be “zero change” as regards the military base). There will also be a ‘level playing field’ agreement, encompassing state aid, taxation, labour, environment, trade and sustainable development, anti-money laundering, transport, the rights of frontier workers and social security coordination, presumably along the lines of what is in the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA).
Those things aside, perhaps the most significant provision is that there will be an EU-Gibraltar customs union, with implications for the harmonization of duties, including on alcohol and tobacco. It is an interesting development, since, Gibraltar was not a part of the EU customs union when the UK was a member state (and therefore customs union member), so in this respect Gibraltar, uniquely amongst British territories, will become closer to the EU as a result of Brexit [1]. That is perhaps some recompense for having to endure, with Brexit, something which 96% of Gibraltarians voted against.
Sovereignty betrayed, part 94
All of this led to predictable cries of betrayal and loss of sovereignty from Brexiters, although it’s worth saying that the Conservative frontbenchers, perhaps mindful that their party was gearing up to agree something very similar last year, have so far been fairly muted in opposing it. No such constraints exist for Tory backbenchers like Mark ‘D-Day’ Francois, or for the Reform blowhards who denounced the agreement as a “surrender”, but on this occasion their position is even more convoluted than usual since they seem unsure whether what is at issue is their usual bleat about ‘surrender’ to the EU or whether it is a ‘surrender’ to Spain.
There has been some of the former, mainly in relation to the tax harmonization and eventual customs union plan. However, the main focus of Brexiter complaint has been the fact that Spain will police the airport controls, with the possibility that British citizens could be refused entry by Spanish border guards (they would, of course, have been equally, or more, outraged had the deal put EU Frontex staff in charge: we know this, because they were outraged when it was under discussion).
Actually, one thing which the official statement of the agreement makes abundantly clear is that it exists “without prejudice to the respective legal positions of Spain and the United Kingdom with regard to sovereignty and jurisdiction”. But if the Brexiters believe otherwise, then they should acknowledge that it is yet another example of how they misled British voters before the referendum.
For in May 2016 the then Foreign Secretary Philip Hammond said: “I genuinely believe that the threat of leaving the European Union is as big a threat to Gibraltar's future security and Gibraltar's future sovereignty as the more traditional threats that we routinely talk about.” The reaction from Brexiters was furious, with Liam Fox enraged that the possibility should even have been mentioned, saying: “I think there are limits to what you can and cannot say in any campaign that goes way beyond acceptable limits” [sic]. All this was reported in the Daily Express under an inevitable headline about ‘Project Fear’.
So now, in 2025, if the Brexiters are really saying that Gibraltar’s sovereignty has been undermined by Brexit, they should surely admit that Hammond was right and Fox was wrong. Alternatively, they might reflect on the way that their ideological counterparts in Spain have also reviled this week’s deal as an abject surrender of sovereignty, but on their telling it is the Spanish government which has made the surrender!
Brexitism and the Beeb
But this is to ask for consistency and self-awareness from those who can barely muster a coherent argument, or even basic knowledge of the facts. To take one example, David Bannerman, one of the most hardcore of Brexiters, fulminated that the deal violated the sovereign rights of British passport holders to live in Gibraltar all year round (since Schengen rules would not allow this). It fell to Fabian Picardo, Gibraltar’s Chief Minister, to school the Tory ex-MEP that such rights had never existed. It was a reminder of the way that, even now, after all these years, some of those most committed to Brexit have so little understanding of the practicalities of what being in the EU meant.
Equally illuminating was the way that former Brexit Party MEP Lucy Harris [2] spluttered about the deal having “sold off” Gibraltar and being “anti-British” before eventually settling on it being “anti-democratic”. This, she argued, was because the people of Gibraltar hadn’t been consulted, and because it “insulted” them and also “Brexit voters, northern voters of this country” (the country she presumably meant, in a rather ‘anti-British’ usage, being England). That was a strange juxtaposition, since it is not obvious how something can insult both those who voted to remain and those who voted to leave, and of course the deal is very much what Gibraltarians have been wanting for years (and was negotiated, and will be subject to ratification, by their elected representatives).
Harris’s comments would hardly be worth dwelling on – and, like her fellow Brexiters, she does not have any practical alternatives to the agreement – except that they illustrate how, even as the last part of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU is laid to rest, the ‘Brexitism’ it spawned is more vibrant than ever. There is now an almost literally endless supply of Brexiters – low-grade, if you like, but, still, as in this example, appearing on flagship current affairs shows on the BBC and other major news outlets – who are able to do little more than spout slogans.
In the case of the BBC, especially, I suspect it is because they have been so cowed by populist attacks that they feel obliged to give representation to a position that has so few elected representatives that they have to fall back on people like Harris. This forces others (including BBC journalists themselves) to respond as if engaging with serious comment, and as a consequence political discourse as a whole becomes framed by Brexitist talking points. And whilst the BBC is not the only culprit, it is, by virtue of its position, undoubtedly the key media institution influencing that discursive framing.
A new phase in the Brexit process
Whilst the Gibraltar announcement can be seen as the last moment of the Article 50 process, it can also be understood as part of the beginning of the reset process. As I mentioned in a recent post, there had been reports that a deal over Gibraltar would be a precondition for any reset deal to be announced at the UK-EU Summit in May. As it turned out, the Summit produced an agreement (of sorts) in advance of the Gibraltar announcement, but it is hard to believe there was no linkage between the two. That is to say, the Gibraltar agreement was almost certainly anticipated at the time of the Summit and/or had it subsequently failed the materialize then the potential deals envisaged by the Summit would have been unlikely to progress.
Indeed there is a wider point here. The first substantive paragraph of the Joint Statement of the Summit affirmed that in announcing their new “strategic partnership” the UK and the EU “agreed this would build on the stable foundation for our relationship set by the Withdrawal Agreement, including the Windsor Framework, and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and reaffirmed our commitment to their full, timely and faithful implementation.” In other words, there is a clear sense, and a clear expectation, that the reset is contingent upon delivering the original withdrawal terms. That should now be taken to include the belated completion of those terms by the finalisation of the Gibraltar agreement.
This presumably has the potential to be at least a background feature of negotiations about the various potential reset deals, such as an SPS deal, in that they would be likely to be jeopardised by any actual or perceived failure of the UK to implement the existing agreements. That might include issues such as failing to honour the level playing field commitments of the TCA, for example over state aid, failing to fully implement the Windsor Framework version of the Northern Ireland Protocol, or failing to operate the EU Settled Status Scheme arising from the Withdrawal Agreement in an effective and equitable manner. In short, we may be moving to a new phase in UK-EU relations, but it is still anchored in the previous phases, and the new phase creates a negotiating ratchet (for both the UK and the EU, but most obviously for the EU, as the UK is the demandeur) to ensure compliance with the previous agreements [3].
What the new phase will look like
Whether or not that turns out to play a part in ongoing reset negotiations, what certainly will be an issue is the extent to which the UK has already passively or actively diverged from EU regulations. It is true that, in fact, there has been relatively little regulatory divergence since Brexit, and once the Product Regulation and Metrology Bill becomes law (as it is about to) it will be easier to avoid passive divergence. However, there have been some potentially significant active divergences already, most obviously those relevant to a future SPS agreement.
One important example is the divergence in gene-editing regulations. As I discussed in a post in February 2022, when the legislation was being developed, this is a regulatory area which, although not without its critics, could justifiably be thought of as a Brexit opportunity. That legislation, which only applies to England, has now been passed, as the Genetic Technology (Precision Breeding) Act 2023 and was welcomed as “game-changing” by the John Innes Centre, a leading research centre in the area (and, somewhat less enthusiastically, by Peter Mills of the Nuffield Council on Bioethics).
This legislation explicitly moves away from the EU’s approach to Genetically Modified Organisms regulation but an additional complexity is that the EU’s approach, too, is in flux. This means that it is not, at present, knowable exactly how the UK and EU approaches will differ at the point of any SPS deal which may be done. This situation does not present insurmountable obstacles to such a deal, and Jiyeong Go and Emily Lydgate of the Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy have recently set out a much more detailed explanation of the issues, including some possible resolutions. But it is illustrative of the kind of detailed, technical practicalities which will have to be thrashed out, presumably behind closed doors, in the coming months (or even years).
A second example is animal welfare where, again, Brexit has enabled what some see as positive developments, most notably the Animal Welfare (Livestock Exports) Act 2024, banning the export of live animals (although other promised post-Brexit legislation, such as the Animal Welfare (Kept Animals) Bill 2021, was shelved). Brexiters and some animal welfare campaigners have already begun to raise concerns that such divergences from EU regulations will not survive an SPS deal. Again, this need not be an insurmountable obstacle to an SPS deal, but it shows that the negotiations will take time, and may involve political difficulties within both the UK and the EU because of the powerful interest and lobby groups with a stake in the issues. It is not just about Brexiters blindly insisting that all divergence from the EU is good, it is also about interest groups who genuinely see particular divergences as desirable.
Whilst these examples both relate to a possible SPS agreement, the underlying issue of dealing with such divergence as has already occurred will feature in any area which entails dynamic alignment of UK and EU regulations. The Summit documents suggested that these might include linking Emissions Trading Systems, and UK participation in the EU internal energy market. Although not mentioned, another area which I understand to still be on the UK government’s agenda is a linkage of the UK and EU REACH systems for chemical regulation. That has always been a sensible idea, since in substantive terms they are very similar, but it would pose, amongst other things, issues of passive divergence, for example in terms of different approaches to ‘forever chemicals’. In an interesting assessment of how the reset might now progress, former senior civil servant Sir Martin Donnelly has identified other areas where dynamic alignment might open up new cooperation. These include medical devices and pharmaceuticals and even, in what would be a rather different vein, VAT harmonization.
Whatever the scope of what is pursued, the overall point is that this emerging Brexit ‘phase’ is going to be characterised by a whole series of highly technical negotiations in various, often discrete, policy areas. Of course that was also true in previous times, but the difference now is that they will not be held within a single, even if complex, process. No doubt there will be some overall political coordination, in both the UK and the EU, but it won’t be like the Article 50 process. Nor is there likely to be the same level of media interest, and there certainly won’t be the kind of parliamentary attention (one of the criticisms, even from those who welcome it in principle, of the Gibraltar agreement is that, like post-Brexit trade deals, it will be subject to almost no parliamentary scrutiny).
So I suspect that it is going to be quite difficult to keep track of developments. It will probably require paying attention to the specialist trade media in particular sectors, and perhaps to periodic howls of rage from Brexiters when they realize what is happening (such howls should be a reminder, to ‘remainers’, that there is a genuine, if limited, anti-Brexit agenda within Labour’s policy). There will also be some specific public moments, such as future summits, meetings of the various bodies set up by the Withdrawal Agreement and the TCA, and, as regards the TCA specifically, its own scheduled operational review in 2026.
Equally, there is now much less at stake than there was. That shouldn’t be misunderstood. Things like the Gibraltar agreement certainly matter for those affected, and the various reset deals will (or might) make a real difference to those within the relevant areas. But the basic architecture of Brexit is quite clearly not going to change under this government, which will presumably last until 2028 or 2029, and the EU has no particular interest in effecting more than marginal changes. As I argued in a recent post, there won’t be another ‘reset’, just some ongoing resetting of Brexit which may see (at best) a sanding off of some its rougher edges.
Nine years on
So, with that, I am going to sign off for the summer since I don’t anticipate there being much Brexit news of note. That may turn out to be one of those predictions that looks stupid in retrospect, in which case I will post. Otherwise, I plan to resume at the beginning of September. If I am right in what I have written here about the nature of the Brexit process in this ‘new phase’ then I suspect the focus of this blog is increasingly going to become not so much Brexit – the UK leaving the EU – as the Brexitism which is one of its most significant and, in some ways, most surprising legacies.
Meanwhile, one reasonably safe prediction is that next week, when, as mentioned above, the ninth anniversary of the Brexit referendum falls, there will be a spike of commentary. Most of it will be predictable, and some of it will also be intensely irritating. I would simply suggest reading Daniel Hannan’s risible essay, penned two days before the referendum, depicting what Brexit would seem like when we reached 24 June 2025.
That, if anything, exemplifies a prediction that has turned out to look stupid. But it’s more than that. It was a prediction which was never going to come true. So my other suggestion for the anniversary is to read, if you haven’t already done so, my book Brexit Unfolded. How no one got what they wanted (and why they were never going to), the second, updated, edition of which was published in September 2023. It tells the story of what happened, starting the day after the 2016 referendum. I’m biased, of course, but I’m not entirely alone in thinking it is about the best book about Brexit.
Have a good summer, and many thanks to the many tens of thousands of you who continue to read this blog regularly. I appreciate it, especially now that there are so many other ‘content creators’ competing for your attention.
Notes
[1] For those who may be wondering, Gibraltar does not participate in any of the Free Trade Agreements made by the UK since Brexit, so it forming a customs union with the EU will not imply any revision to those Agreements.
[2] Harris was elected as a Brexit Party MEP in May 2019. She subsequently resigned the party Whip in December 2019 and, in January 2020, sat as a Conservative MEP until the UK left the EU at the end of that month. No doubt she has many qualities, but I don’t think it is unreasonable to say that she is not a major political figure.
[3] In case it is not obvious, I am not really suggesting that there have simply been two, neat, phases of Brexit. It would be possible to divide what has happened since 2016 into several phases, or none. But the combination of a) the Gibraltar agreement being the last of the original, Article 50, withdrawal issues; b) the near-contemporaneous announcements made at the reset Summit; and c) the way that the reset Summit formally marked how the Labour government’s approach to Brexit differs from its predecessors does constitute one way of periodizing the Brexit process to date, if only for heuristic purposes.
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Friday, 20 June 2025
Friday, 6 June 2025
After the Brexit reset, how about a Brexit review?
Very much as anticipated in my previous post, the ‘reset Summit’ has come and gone as if it were simply a passing event. There has certainly been little political or media follow-up to what was announced, once the flurry of Brexiter fury had died down. Perhaps that is in part because, as John Elledge points out in the New Statesman, that fury, and the screaming headlines it gave rise to in the pro-Brexit press, simply isn’t matched by public opinion. The same seems to be true of attempts to whip up fears of Brexit ‘sabotage’ over the Product Regulation and Metrology Bill, which passed its third reading this week.
That’s partly because, as Elledge says, in general terms the public tends to support closer ties with the EU, but I suspect it’s also because the public don’t really care that much either way. It is striking that every poll on the reset, whether conducted before the Summit or afterwards, shows high numbers of ‘don’t knows’, usually about 30% of respondents. Moreover, the YouGov post-summit poll shows that as well as 30% who ‘don’t know’, another 16% think that ‘the deal’ agreed is neither good nor bad. I also suspect that even those who oppose it struggle to muster the angry energy of the headline writers.
Actually, in this case at least, a ‘don’t know’ response is not necessarily a reflection of the public’s disinclination to be acquainted with the facts. It would be a perfectly reasonable response from even the most assiduous and well-informed voter. For, as I highlighted in that previous post, all that has really been announced of ‘the deal’ is a whole series of discrete potential agreements between the UK and the EU, but without almost any announced processes or timetables for their negotiation, let alone for their completion.
An SPS agreement?
The most important of the possible economic agreements, at least from the perspective of the Labour government’s explicitly stated reset aims, is a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement. On that, my assumption that the government would take the possibility of its completion to justify the further postponement of full import controls on goods coming from the EU has been proved correct. Thus it was announced this week that the next phase of controls, which after several delays was meant to be implemented in July, has been paused, in effect indefinitely although the government press release stated they are deferred until January 2027 [1].
It's worth standing back from this latest announcement to recall just how ridiculous the situation is. Successive British governments, having embarked on Brexit with a referendum held almost nine years ago, and having fairly soon decided that this meant ‘hard Brexit’, went on to delude themselves and to mislead the public about the fact that this was going to entail import controls. Indeed it was not until February 2020 that any Cabinet Minister, specifically Michael Gove, formally and publicly stated that import controls would have to be introduced. By that time, Britain had already left the EU and was in the transition period, a transition period which the government had previously resisted and which it refused, despite the pandemic, to extend.
Since Gove’s announcement, there have been years of preparations, with huge costs for both government and businesses, and so many delays and multiple phasings, with different delays to the different phasings, that it is all but impossible to catalogue them in their entirety (see my post of April 2024 and the links within it for some of the detail). Meanwhile, the EU was ready to introduce controls on imports from Great Britain on the day after the transition period ended (to complaints from Gove about EU ‘over-rigidity’).
SPS controls, or even import controls generally, are not, in themselves, amongst the biggest costs or consequences of Brexit (an SPS deal is estimated to be worth less than 0.1% of UK GDP per annum) although they have proved to be one of the costs the UK has been most unwilling to pay. But the whole saga, and the fact that it is still playing out with this new supposed deadline being set for well into the next parliament, is a potent symbol of the utter ignorance, incompetence and dishonesty that has characterised Brexit as a whole. It certainly, in various ways, makes a mockery of the slogan about ‘taking back control of our money, our borders, and our laws’ if, indeed, anything more than the slogan itself were needed to induce mockery.
Risks and reactions
Coming back to the specific issue of the latest postponement, a few points stand out. One is the now familiar one that the lack of full import controls constitutes a risk which will now continue for even longer. As I noted in my last post, it will certainly be months, and very possibly years, before an SPS deal is both agreed and implemented and, meanwhile, Great Britain (but not Northern Ireland) risks importing shoddy or dangerous goods. For reasons I’ve discussed before, that isn’t because EU products have ‘ceased to be safe’. It is because the UK no longer has full access to the ‘eco-system’ relevant databases, and as a result is more vulnerable to accidental or criminal introductions of, for example, animal diseases, African Swine Fever being the most high-profile example.
From this point of view, reported food industry concerns that an SPS deal would increase those risks, because it would ultimately enable the UK to remove those phases of the post-Brexit import controls which have been introduced, are wide of the mark. If and when any such deal is done, it would, according to paragraph 31 of the statement released after the reset Summit, include full database access and thereby return risks to pre-Brexit levels (or to the same level as for member states of the EU which, of course, can never be zero). The real concern is that, meanwhile, the remainder of the necessary import controls will remain unimplemented.
If some have misunderstood the implications of an SPS deal, others have been wrong-footed by it. A particularly delicious example is an article in the rabidly pro-Brexit Express. Those who only read the headline, “‘Brexit reset deal’ to hit grocery bills next month – how it affects your pockets”, could be forgiven for thinking that Starmer’s craven betrayal of the Brexit dream was about to hit hard-pressed consumers in their wallets. But - what’s this? – the report goes on to explain that it will reduce business costs by £200 million a year, which will “gradually work its way down to consumers” who will see lower prices and greater availability of produce. Some “hit” [2].
All this aside, there was something decidedly odd about the announcement. The fact that the government is not going to continue to develop full border controls, and may even start selling off some of the ‘white elephant’ border facilities, seems to suggest either that it is completely confident of reaching an SPS agreement with the EU (which is exactly how the press release reads) and/or that it is determined to do whatever is necessary to reach such an agreement. Much of the media discussion certainly talks as if the deal already exists or is at least a fait accompli.
In fact, as things stand there is no agreement and, although I think it is very highly likely that there will be, it is impossible to be certain or to know how long it will take. If there is no agreement, and in the meantime there has been no further development of import controls, then there will be an even longer period until full controls are operational. They certainly aren’t going to spring into action in January 2027, the supposed new deadline. But even if there is an agreement, the longer it takes to be made and implemented the greater the chance that the risks involved will eventuate and that, in turn, carries a political risk for the government [3].
A detour into Brexitology
One thing which can be said about an SPS agreement, if it happens, or any of the others identified at the reset Summit, is that neither it nor they will constitute ‘cherry-picking’. I’m returning to this point reluctantly since, as I said when I last discussed it, my original passing remark about it, in a footnote to an earlier post, led to much critical, and some hostile, comment on social media.
My basic argument is that this term has now ceased to have analytical value because, now that the UK is a third country to the EU, any agreements made will simply be between those two polities, in the light of their own interests. Some seemed to think this showed my supposed ‘UK-centrism’, and perhaps even my own hidden Brexity nature, or was just some inexplicable lapse from cogency on my part. All of which seems rather strange given that for almost ten years I’ve been writing about cherry-picking (and related concepts like ‘cakeism’), repeatedly using it as a concept to analyse Brexit and to criticise the UK’s conduct.
I only return to this now because last week no less a person than the EU Ambassador to the UK, Pedro Serrano, described the term as being “no longer helpful” and went on to say of the reset that “this is not about cherry-picking or not cherry-picking. We have identified a number of issues that are of mutual interest.” The report of these remarks, by Jon Stone in Politico, goes on to say that “in the Berlaymont, too, the [cherry-picking] line is seen as passé”, although gives no specific evidence of that and it’s not clear to me that, as the report claims, this term has been “officially retired” by the EU (or what form ‘official retirement’ would take). Nevertheless, it is clearly significant that someone of Serrano’s stature said what he did and, unless the suggestion is that his posting to London has made him fall prey to ‘UK-centrism’, it suggests that my own observation was an accurate one.
Moreover, the report goes on to quote Charles Grant, the widely-respected Director of the Centre for European Reform, saying that the cherry-picking line had been “a product of the strained relationship that followed the referendum, and the EU’s concern that other countries should not follow the UK’s example.” That is exactly my point, or part of it: not just the word, but the concept, relate to a time which legally and institutionally has ceased to exist, namely the period during which the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement were being negotiated.
This isn’t (or isn’t simply) an ‘I told you so’ on my part (and, even if it were, there are plenty of things, often more important than this, which I’ve been wrong about over the years). Actually, it’s a fairly minor issue which I never expected to cause so much fuss. Nevertheless, it does have a wider significance which is worth mentioning.
It has become almost a truism of ‘Brexitology’ (for there is such a thing) that Brexit is a ‘process not an event’, an observation only ever necessary to make because of the bone-headed inability of most Brexiters to grasp that simple fact. But that doesn’t mean that the process ‘unfolds’ in the sense of going in a particular direction, like the unrolling of a carpet to reveal a recurring pattern. For whilst it is undoubtedly true that there are endless recurrences and repetitions – to a degree that is sometimes almost soul-destroying – it is also the case that the direction and content of the process modulates over time, and will continue to do so. As that happens, anyone who is serious about understanding Brexit needs to be attuned to both the continuities and the changes.
I think that most readers of this blog would have no difficulty agreeing with the suggestion that those Brexiters who are still, for example, droning on about ‘alternative arrangements’ for the Irish border are simply stuck in a groove whereby not just the terminology but the entire situation it relates to have been superseded. What may be less palatable is that the same can apply to some of the idées fixes of those on the ‘remain’, ‘rejoin’, ‘FBPE’ (or whatever term we want to use for it) side.
The Strategic Defence Review
One important reason why the Brexit process does not have a single fixed direction, mandating a fixed repertoire of analytical terms, is that this process does not take place in isolation from the wider world. The most obvious example is the Ukraine War, which has had a profound impact on UK-EU post-Brexit relations ever since its outbreak in 2022. That impact continues to develop, and is itself one of the things impacted by the other most obvious example, Trump’s second presidency. The EU-UK Security and Defence Partnership, announced at the reset Summit, is the most tangible consequence of these two developments.
The Ukraine War had already prompted the 2023 ‘refreshed’ Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR23). As I discussed at the time, this represented something of a retreat from the hubris of the original Integrated Review of 2021 (IR21) with its puffed-up post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’ framing, and put more emphasis on the centrality of European-Atlantic security. Now, just two years later, the government has published its Strategic Defence Review (SDR).
I’m not qualified to discuss the military details of the SDR, for which see Professor Lawrence Freedman’s expert analysis, but, on my reading of its geo-political framing, it does not really continue the direction of travel from IR21 to IR23. It is true that, as Freedman explains, the SDR is very much informed by the threat from Russia and by the military lessons of the Ukraine War. It is also true that it does not explicitly replicate the ‘Global Britain’ language of IR21. Nevertheless, it retains a strong emphasis on the UK as a global military power, centrally anchored in its relationship with the US and its membership of NATO.
Of course, that is not a surprise, any more than it is a surprise that it is only very gently hinted at that the reliability of the US as a defence partner has been compromised by Trump, and may well never recover. But it is, if not surprising then at least of note, that the partnership with the EU is given so little emphasis, and even that in rather muted tones (see especially p.75). In the process, what had seemed in IR23 to be the beginning of a recognition that the UK is primarily a regional power has been diluted. It’s difficult to be sure, precisely as so much is about tone and emphasis, and thus very much open to different interpretations, but, at the very least, I don’t think it is suggestive of the kind of Europe-first foreign policy which Foreign Secretary David Lammy talked about in Opposition.
A different review?
That rather tentative analysis aside, the SDR prompts the thought that, whatever it does or does not imply about the UK-EU defence partnership, there is literally nothing in it which could not, and probably would not, have been written had Brexit not happened. AUKUS, which features extensively in the review, is sometimes trumpeted by Brexiters as a ‘Brexit benefit’, but the fact that France, an EU member, was originally to have been the US and Australia’s partner gives the lie to that. But if Brexit has brought no defence and security benefits, what costs and disbenefits might it have brought?
In particular, whilst, like the other recent reviews, the SDR rightly identifies the threat Russia poses to the UK, and the very wide-ranging forms it takes, the entire question about how Brexit relates to this threat remains one of the major unventilated issues of recent history. I’ve never been one of those who ascribes the referendum result to Russian interference and, in some ways, I think doing so serves to deflect responsibility from those, including the voters, with whom it lies. But it is undeniable that Brexit was in line with Russian interests, and we know the pro-Putin views of many of its leading advocates, including Nigel Farage.
At issue here is not so much the failure to investigate what role Russia played in 2016, it is how, right now, in 2025, and in the future, Brexit continues to serve those interests. We are told that the SDR puts the UK on a “wartime footing” in the face of the “immediate and pressing threat” from Russia. A country which was really serious about that would be conducting a review not just of defence strategy but of why it is persisting with an entire national strategy which may not have been chosen for it by Russia but is exactly what Russia would have chosen for it. Whilst we are at it, we might also undertake a comprehensive official review of all the economic and political consequences of Brexit.
After all, if the dramatic changes in the world are such as to require three defence reviews in the five years since Britain formally left the EU, then it surely isn’t unreasonable to think that Brexit itself warrants at least one.
Notes
[1] Apart from at least recognizing that an SPS deal may not be done, the reason a date is stated is very likely in order to forestall any action against the UK at the WTO. As things stand, the UK is discriminating against non-EU countries, whose imports face SPS controls. But for so long as the UK can claim to be in the process of introducing controls on the EU and negotiating a deal with the EU, it is unlikely that any other WTO member will bother to start raising a complaint.
[2] In another article, even the Express couldn’t find a negative spin to put on one aspect of the potential SPS deal, namely that it would make it easier to take pets to and from the EU by a “reversal to Brexit rules”. This possible return to the pet passport scheme shouldn’t be confused with another development this week, introducing the Pet Travel Document to simplify taking pets between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. That is nothing to do with the reset or any SPS agreement, but is part of the ongoing implementation of the Windsor Framework.
[3] Of course there are political risks either way. If the government continued to roll out import controls which, along with those already developed, were subsequently rendered redundant by an SPS agreement then it could be accused of wasting money. Even so, that would be considerably less damaging (both politically and economically) than if, prior to an agreement, the absence of full controls led to, say, foot and mouth disease being imported.
That’s partly because, as Elledge says, in general terms the public tends to support closer ties with the EU, but I suspect it’s also because the public don’t really care that much either way. It is striking that every poll on the reset, whether conducted before the Summit or afterwards, shows high numbers of ‘don’t knows’, usually about 30% of respondents. Moreover, the YouGov post-summit poll shows that as well as 30% who ‘don’t know’, another 16% think that ‘the deal’ agreed is neither good nor bad. I also suspect that even those who oppose it struggle to muster the angry energy of the headline writers.
Actually, in this case at least, a ‘don’t know’ response is not necessarily a reflection of the public’s disinclination to be acquainted with the facts. It would be a perfectly reasonable response from even the most assiduous and well-informed voter. For, as I highlighted in that previous post, all that has really been announced of ‘the deal’ is a whole series of discrete potential agreements between the UK and the EU, but without almost any announced processes or timetables for their negotiation, let alone for their completion.
An SPS agreement?
The most important of the possible economic agreements, at least from the perspective of the Labour government’s explicitly stated reset aims, is a Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement. On that, my assumption that the government would take the possibility of its completion to justify the further postponement of full import controls on goods coming from the EU has been proved correct. Thus it was announced this week that the next phase of controls, which after several delays was meant to be implemented in July, has been paused, in effect indefinitely although the government press release stated they are deferred until January 2027 [1].
It's worth standing back from this latest announcement to recall just how ridiculous the situation is. Successive British governments, having embarked on Brexit with a referendum held almost nine years ago, and having fairly soon decided that this meant ‘hard Brexit’, went on to delude themselves and to mislead the public about the fact that this was going to entail import controls. Indeed it was not until February 2020 that any Cabinet Minister, specifically Michael Gove, formally and publicly stated that import controls would have to be introduced. By that time, Britain had already left the EU and was in the transition period, a transition period which the government had previously resisted and which it refused, despite the pandemic, to extend.
Since Gove’s announcement, there have been years of preparations, with huge costs for both government and businesses, and so many delays and multiple phasings, with different delays to the different phasings, that it is all but impossible to catalogue them in their entirety (see my post of April 2024 and the links within it for some of the detail). Meanwhile, the EU was ready to introduce controls on imports from Great Britain on the day after the transition period ended (to complaints from Gove about EU ‘over-rigidity’).
SPS controls, or even import controls generally, are not, in themselves, amongst the biggest costs or consequences of Brexit (an SPS deal is estimated to be worth less than 0.1% of UK GDP per annum) although they have proved to be one of the costs the UK has been most unwilling to pay. But the whole saga, and the fact that it is still playing out with this new supposed deadline being set for well into the next parliament, is a potent symbol of the utter ignorance, incompetence and dishonesty that has characterised Brexit as a whole. It certainly, in various ways, makes a mockery of the slogan about ‘taking back control of our money, our borders, and our laws’ if, indeed, anything more than the slogan itself were needed to induce mockery.
Risks and reactions
Coming back to the specific issue of the latest postponement, a few points stand out. One is the now familiar one that the lack of full import controls constitutes a risk which will now continue for even longer. As I noted in my last post, it will certainly be months, and very possibly years, before an SPS deal is both agreed and implemented and, meanwhile, Great Britain (but not Northern Ireland) risks importing shoddy or dangerous goods. For reasons I’ve discussed before, that isn’t because EU products have ‘ceased to be safe’. It is because the UK no longer has full access to the ‘eco-system’ relevant databases, and as a result is more vulnerable to accidental or criminal introductions of, for example, animal diseases, African Swine Fever being the most high-profile example.
From this point of view, reported food industry concerns that an SPS deal would increase those risks, because it would ultimately enable the UK to remove those phases of the post-Brexit import controls which have been introduced, are wide of the mark. If and when any such deal is done, it would, according to paragraph 31 of the statement released after the reset Summit, include full database access and thereby return risks to pre-Brexit levels (or to the same level as for member states of the EU which, of course, can never be zero). The real concern is that, meanwhile, the remainder of the necessary import controls will remain unimplemented.
If some have misunderstood the implications of an SPS deal, others have been wrong-footed by it. A particularly delicious example is an article in the rabidly pro-Brexit Express. Those who only read the headline, “‘Brexit reset deal’ to hit grocery bills next month – how it affects your pockets”, could be forgiven for thinking that Starmer’s craven betrayal of the Brexit dream was about to hit hard-pressed consumers in their wallets. But - what’s this? – the report goes on to explain that it will reduce business costs by £200 million a year, which will “gradually work its way down to consumers” who will see lower prices and greater availability of produce. Some “hit” [2].
All this aside, there was something decidedly odd about the announcement. The fact that the government is not going to continue to develop full border controls, and may even start selling off some of the ‘white elephant’ border facilities, seems to suggest either that it is completely confident of reaching an SPS agreement with the EU (which is exactly how the press release reads) and/or that it is determined to do whatever is necessary to reach such an agreement. Much of the media discussion certainly talks as if the deal already exists or is at least a fait accompli.
In fact, as things stand there is no agreement and, although I think it is very highly likely that there will be, it is impossible to be certain or to know how long it will take. If there is no agreement, and in the meantime there has been no further development of import controls, then there will be an even longer period until full controls are operational. They certainly aren’t going to spring into action in January 2027, the supposed new deadline. But even if there is an agreement, the longer it takes to be made and implemented the greater the chance that the risks involved will eventuate and that, in turn, carries a political risk for the government [3].
A detour into Brexitology
One thing which can be said about an SPS agreement, if it happens, or any of the others identified at the reset Summit, is that neither it nor they will constitute ‘cherry-picking’. I’m returning to this point reluctantly since, as I said when I last discussed it, my original passing remark about it, in a footnote to an earlier post, led to much critical, and some hostile, comment on social media.
My basic argument is that this term has now ceased to have analytical value because, now that the UK is a third country to the EU, any agreements made will simply be between those two polities, in the light of their own interests. Some seemed to think this showed my supposed ‘UK-centrism’, and perhaps even my own hidden Brexity nature, or was just some inexplicable lapse from cogency on my part. All of which seems rather strange given that for almost ten years I’ve been writing about cherry-picking (and related concepts like ‘cakeism’), repeatedly using it as a concept to analyse Brexit and to criticise the UK’s conduct.
I only return to this now because last week no less a person than the EU Ambassador to the UK, Pedro Serrano, described the term as being “no longer helpful” and went on to say of the reset that “this is not about cherry-picking or not cherry-picking. We have identified a number of issues that are of mutual interest.” The report of these remarks, by Jon Stone in Politico, goes on to say that “in the Berlaymont, too, the [cherry-picking] line is seen as passé”, although gives no specific evidence of that and it’s not clear to me that, as the report claims, this term has been “officially retired” by the EU (or what form ‘official retirement’ would take). Nevertheless, it is clearly significant that someone of Serrano’s stature said what he did and, unless the suggestion is that his posting to London has made him fall prey to ‘UK-centrism’, it suggests that my own observation was an accurate one.
Moreover, the report goes on to quote Charles Grant, the widely-respected Director of the Centre for European Reform, saying that the cherry-picking line had been “a product of the strained relationship that followed the referendum, and the EU’s concern that other countries should not follow the UK’s example.” That is exactly my point, or part of it: not just the word, but the concept, relate to a time which legally and institutionally has ceased to exist, namely the period during which the Withdrawal Agreement and the Trade and Cooperation Agreement were being negotiated.
This isn’t (or isn’t simply) an ‘I told you so’ on my part (and, even if it were, there are plenty of things, often more important than this, which I’ve been wrong about over the years). Actually, it’s a fairly minor issue which I never expected to cause so much fuss. Nevertheless, it does have a wider significance which is worth mentioning.
It has become almost a truism of ‘Brexitology’ (for there is such a thing) that Brexit is a ‘process not an event’, an observation only ever necessary to make because of the bone-headed inability of most Brexiters to grasp that simple fact. But that doesn’t mean that the process ‘unfolds’ in the sense of going in a particular direction, like the unrolling of a carpet to reveal a recurring pattern. For whilst it is undoubtedly true that there are endless recurrences and repetitions – to a degree that is sometimes almost soul-destroying – it is also the case that the direction and content of the process modulates over time, and will continue to do so. As that happens, anyone who is serious about understanding Brexit needs to be attuned to both the continuities and the changes.
I think that most readers of this blog would have no difficulty agreeing with the suggestion that those Brexiters who are still, for example, droning on about ‘alternative arrangements’ for the Irish border are simply stuck in a groove whereby not just the terminology but the entire situation it relates to have been superseded. What may be less palatable is that the same can apply to some of the idées fixes of those on the ‘remain’, ‘rejoin’, ‘FBPE’ (or whatever term we want to use for it) side.
The Strategic Defence Review
One important reason why the Brexit process does not have a single fixed direction, mandating a fixed repertoire of analytical terms, is that this process does not take place in isolation from the wider world. The most obvious example is the Ukraine War, which has had a profound impact on UK-EU post-Brexit relations ever since its outbreak in 2022. That impact continues to develop, and is itself one of the things impacted by the other most obvious example, Trump’s second presidency. The EU-UK Security and Defence Partnership, announced at the reset Summit, is the most tangible consequence of these two developments.
The Ukraine War had already prompted the 2023 ‘refreshed’ Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy (IR23). As I discussed at the time, this represented something of a retreat from the hubris of the original Integrated Review of 2021 (IR21) with its puffed-up post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’ framing, and put more emphasis on the centrality of European-Atlantic security. Now, just two years later, the government has published its Strategic Defence Review (SDR).
I’m not qualified to discuss the military details of the SDR, for which see Professor Lawrence Freedman’s expert analysis, but, on my reading of its geo-political framing, it does not really continue the direction of travel from IR21 to IR23. It is true that, as Freedman explains, the SDR is very much informed by the threat from Russia and by the military lessons of the Ukraine War. It is also true that it does not explicitly replicate the ‘Global Britain’ language of IR21. Nevertheless, it retains a strong emphasis on the UK as a global military power, centrally anchored in its relationship with the US and its membership of NATO.
Of course, that is not a surprise, any more than it is a surprise that it is only very gently hinted at that the reliability of the US as a defence partner has been compromised by Trump, and may well never recover. But it is, if not surprising then at least of note, that the partnership with the EU is given so little emphasis, and even that in rather muted tones (see especially p.75). In the process, what had seemed in IR23 to be the beginning of a recognition that the UK is primarily a regional power has been diluted. It’s difficult to be sure, precisely as so much is about tone and emphasis, and thus very much open to different interpretations, but, at the very least, I don’t think it is suggestive of the kind of Europe-first foreign policy which Foreign Secretary David Lammy talked about in Opposition.
A different review?
That rather tentative analysis aside, the SDR prompts the thought that, whatever it does or does not imply about the UK-EU defence partnership, there is literally nothing in it which could not, and probably would not, have been written had Brexit not happened. AUKUS, which features extensively in the review, is sometimes trumpeted by Brexiters as a ‘Brexit benefit’, but the fact that France, an EU member, was originally to have been the US and Australia’s partner gives the lie to that. But if Brexit has brought no defence and security benefits, what costs and disbenefits might it have brought?
In particular, whilst, like the other recent reviews, the SDR rightly identifies the threat Russia poses to the UK, and the very wide-ranging forms it takes, the entire question about how Brexit relates to this threat remains one of the major unventilated issues of recent history. I’ve never been one of those who ascribes the referendum result to Russian interference and, in some ways, I think doing so serves to deflect responsibility from those, including the voters, with whom it lies. But it is undeniable that Brexit was in line with Russian interests, and we know the pro-Putin views of many of its leading advocates, including Nigel Farage.
At issue here is not so much the failure to investigate what role Russia played in 2016, it is how, right now, in 2025, and in the future, Brexit continues to serve those interests. We are told that the SDR puts the UK on a “wartime footing” in the face of the “immediate and pressing threat” from Russia. A country which was really serious about that would be conducting a review not just of defence strategy but of why it is persisting with an entire national strategy which may not have been chosen for it by Russia but is exactly what Russia would have chosen for it. Whilst we are at it, we might also undertake a comprehensive official review of all the economic and political consequences of Brexit.
After all, if the dramatic changes in the world are such as to require three defence reviews in the five years since Britain formally left the EU, then it surely isn’t unreasonable to think that Brexit itself warrants at least one.
Notes
[1] Apart from at least recognizing that an SPS deal may not be done, the reason a date is stated is very likely in order to forestall any action against the UK at the WTO. As things stand, the UK is discriminating against non-EU countries, whose imports face SPS controls. But for so long as the UK can claim to be in the process of introducing controls on the EU and negotiating a deal with the EU, it is unlikely that any other WTO member will bother to start raising a complaint.
[2] In another article, even the Express couldn’t find a negative spin to put on one aspect of the potential SPS deal, namely that it would make it easier to take pets to and from the EU by a “reversal to Brexit rules”. This possible return to the pet passport scheme shouldn’t be confused with another development this week, introducing the Pet Travel Document to simplify taking pets between Great Britain and Northern Ireland. That is nothing to do with the reset or any SPS agreement, but is part of the ongoing implementation of the Windsor Framework.
[3] Of course there are political risks either way. If the government continued to roll out import controls which, along with those already developed, were subsequently rendered redundant by an SPS agreement then it could be accused of wasting money. Even so, that would be considerably less damaging (both politically and economically) than if, prior to an agreement, the absence of full controls led to, say, foot and mouth disease being imported.
Friday, 23 May 2025
That was the reset that was
I’m not quite sure when ‘the reset’ became used as a noun to denote a definite moment within UK-EU relations. The notion of ‘resetting’ as a verb was certainly floating around before the election, but the first record I can find of it being as a noun was at the European Political Community Summit hosted in the UK last July. As for the reset being tied to a specific event, namely the UK-EU Summit that was held this week, that only began in February of this year, in the context of Keir Starmer’s attendance at a meeting with EU leaders at a defence and security summit, and the wider context of the dramatic re-arrival of Donald Trump in the White House.
I remarked at the time that it was unclear how realistic this timescale was, given the scope of things which would need to be agreed for the Summit to produce a reset worthy of the name. Now the UK-EU Summit has been held and, after all the speculation, we know the details of what has been agreed which are set out in the Joint Statement, the Renewed Agenda for Cooperation and the text of a political agreement for a Security and Defence Partnership, along with a Q&A document relating to these.
These have been widely reported, and there are several summaries, including from the BBC and Politico, as well as some excellent analyses including, from a legal perspective, that of Professor Steve Peers on his EU Law Analysis blog and, from a more political perspective, that of Anton Spisak of the Centre for European Reform on his personal Substack newsletter. Given that there is so much already written, I won’t provide another summary here. Instead, I will seek to evaluate what was agreed, taking in some but not all of the details, and how it relates to the wider Brexit saga.
Evaluating the reset Summit
In a recent post I set out some parameters which can be used for that evaluation:
“On one account, what will be announced will be a “new strategic partnership”, encompassing trade and security, and more or less explicitly configured as a response to Donald Trump. On another account, the accent will be on defence and security, with something more like a roadmap for discussion of economic issues, although some reports suggest an extension to the existing fisheries agreement will be announced. The first framing would suggest an explicit shift of geo-political strategy, the second a more ambiguous and less ambitious moment, defining future processes more than providing a statement of intent. Or, to put it another way, one would be a bold and dramatic event, the other a rather boring technocratic adjustment. The issue is not just a matter of symbolism, however. The detailed provisions will matter, not so much in terms of immediate agreements but in terms of the scale and scope of what is identified to be within the ambit of mutually desired agreements. Thus there is a matrix of possibilities according to whether the framing is dramatic and strategic, or dull and technocratic; and whether the scope of possible agreements is extensive or limited.”
Judged in these terms, the agreement falls somewhat between the two framings. The phrase “new strategic partnership” does feature centrally in the Joint Statement that followed the Summit. However, in content terms, what has been agreed is much more like the second framing. As expected, the central part of what was agreed was the Security and Defence Partnership (although there are many details to be worked out). That is important but not unexpected, and Anton Spisak points out that is not the bespoke “security package” Labour had originally sought but a fairly typical EU-third country partnership.
In the non-defence sphere, it was indeed true that there was an extension of the current fisheries agreement contained within the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which was due to be re-negotiated in 2026, through until 2038. There was also an agreement to extend the TCA energy provisions, which were due to expire in 2026, until 2027 and to do so on an annual basis thereafter. Since these were both consolidations of the existing agreement, they cannot be described in terms of a new strategic framing; indeed, they scarcely warrant the term ‘reset’. Nothing else within the non-defence sphere was definitively agreed, but a long list of possibilities and aspirations was identified.
In terms of the scale and scope of these, most of the things expected were mentioned. An extensive Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement seems to be the most definite, although (again as expected) details and timescale remain under negotiation. One thing which is now explicit is that the government will agree to dynamic alignment of SPS regulations, with a role for the ECJ. It’s true that everyone who knew anything about it knew that was going to happen (if there was to be an SPS agreement at all) but the government had never overtly recognized that. There is also a commitment to work towards a Youth Experience Scheme (meaning some version of a Youth Mobility Scheme), which was expected, but the mention of also working towards the UK participating in Erasmus+ was more surprising (given previous negative comments from the government).
Expected, but with less confidence, was a commitment to work towards linking Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM) and Emission Trading Schemes (ETS), which has been discussed by commentators for some years but hadn’t featured very explicitly in Labour’s plans. Perhaps less expected, although the idea has certainly been floating around, was a commitment to explore the possibility of the UK participating in the EU’s internal electricity market. In all these areas, as with SPS, if there are agreements then they will entail dynamic alignment of regulations and a role for the ECJ.
The presence of the latter possible agreements takes the reset above the minimal level of what might have been contained (although they also grow out of possibilities contained within the TCA). But there was no mention of participation in the REACH chemicals regulation system (something once touted as a possibility by Rachel Reeves) nor of accession to the PEM Convention on rules of origin (something called for by Stella Creasy, chair of the Labour Movement for Europe). It is also of note that of the three specific goals for the reset which have been Labour’s stated aims since before the election, SPS is the only one which looks likely to come to fruition. The other two (mutual recognition of professional qualifications, and a mobility agreement for touring artists), which were always unlikely to be agreed, were mentioned but only in vague terms.
So, overall, in terms of the evaluative parameters I proposed, on the framing criterion, it was closer to the technocratic than the strategic, and was mostly a roadmap for discussion of possible agreements. In terms of the scale and scope of what that roadmap contained, it was towards the middle of what might reasonably have been expected, although it should again be stressed that it was minimal in terms of the announcement of actual agreements (as opposed to possible agreements). Moreover, there is a distinct lack of precise timescales or even defined processes for reaching these agreements and, as a result, very little sense of urgency. In that sense, whilst somewhere in the middle, it is closer to the minimal than the maximal end on the ‘scale and scope’ criterion.
A step forward?
If that seems rather underwhelming, it doesn’t mean that the reset was unimportant, for two reasons. One is that it does set in train ongoing negotiations, so that ‘resetting’ will continue. In a way, that was always going to happen, in the sense that the UK-EU relationship is bound to be the subject of ongoing negotiation, but what is distinctive about ‘resetting’ is that the direction of travel, even if very slow, is, for now, towards closer integration.
The other reason it matters is that a Tory government could never have hosted an event like this Summit. That is despite that fact that, at least under Sunak, the direction of travel was similar. That’s shown by the Windsor Framework, what ended up being the very limited scrapping of Retained EU Law, the agreement with Frontex, and the return to Horizon and Copernicus. But Sunak (or any other Tory leader) would have baulked at the concept of a reset and the symbolism and language of this Summit.
In this way, the reset is a step forward of sorts. Along with the different tone that has been evident since the election, it does mark a break with the highly antagonistic years since the referendum. It accepts, overtly, the reality that the EU is a regulatory hegemon, and in the process discards the Brexiters’ taboo against dynamic alignment. Similarly, it demonstrates a recognition of one of the basic flaws of Brexit, namely its failure to grasp the realities of geography. Assuming they happen, both the SPS agreement and the CBAM/ETS linkage will, in terms of the much-discussed choice between the EU and the US, be a choice for the EU.
But – and with Brexit there is always a ‘but’ – what is equally striking is that, as well as being relatively modest in framing and scope, the government has presented the reset in distinctly ‘Brexity’ terms. In particular, Starmer presented it, alongside the recent deals with the US and India, in terms of Britain being “an independent, sovereign nation” which “is back on the world stage”, whilst Reeves talked of the reset meaning that (again in conjunction with trade deals with other countries) Britain is in a better position on trade “than any other country in the world”.
No doubt, tactically, this is meant to spike the attacks on the reset made by Brexiters. In a similar way, the language of “ruthless pragmatism” that Nick Thomas-Symonds has been using for some time can be read as an attempt to position the Brexiter attacks as ‘ideological’ rather than practical. And, indeed, the other general way the reset has been presented by the government is in terms of the practical ways that it will make life better for British people.
Political reaction
All that is fair enough, in a tactical sense, but it doesn’t fundamentally challenge the validity of the Brexiter attacks, which have indeed been ferocious as well as wholly predictable. So, whilst Starmer spoke of the deal “releasing us from the tired arguments of the past” it has done no such thing.
Instead, once again, the airwaves have been full of the obnoxious, clichéd language of “surrender”, “betrayal”, and violation of “the will of the people”. And, once again, any semblance of honesty has disappeared (examples include claims that 80 million people will come to the UK under the Youth Experience Scheme, or that the UK would have had complete control of its fishing waters in 2026 - both made by Boris Johnson, amongst others). It has come from all the usual people (including not just Johnson, but Nigel Farage, David Frost, and Kemi Badenoch) and in all the usual places (including the Telegraph, Express, Mail, and GB News). And, just as in the past, they have set the agenda for the ‘non-partisan media’ such as the BBC, Sky, and ITV (yes, of course I know the questions that begs but, still, they are not partisan in the way of the Brexiter outlets I just mentioned).
It's tempting to think that this is just the last gasp of the Brexit dinosaurs, and that, as Adam Bienkov puts it, their “screaming” is so loud because they know “the public has changed its mind”. After all, 66% of the public support a closer relationship with the EU without rejoining it (or the single market or customs union), which is exactly Labour’s policy, and business groups are very positive. I’m not so sure, if only because public responses to questions about ‘a closer relationship’ may be quite fluid when that is re-presented as ‘betrayal’ and ‘surrender’ [1]. At all events, whether or not that is the reason, polling since the Summit shows only 29% think it is a good deal, and 23% think it is a bad deal (the largest group, 30%, don’t know).
That is hardly a ringing endorsement of the policy, and one big problem is that, for all the government talk of the agreement making life better for ordinary people, it will be a long time before there is any tangible benefit. This, I think, has been an under-appreciated point in much of the media discussion this week, partly because the government focussed on having ‘done’ a deal and its opponents on it being a betrayal. But, to be ‘ruthlessly pragmatic’, the reality is that it will certainly be months, and very probably years, before it is both fully agreed and fully implemented.
For the SPS agreement, in particular, this means it will be a long time before businesses find trading easier (and for some it will be, or already is, too late) and before consumers see benefits in terms of price and choice. Meanwhile there will presumably be no further implementation of import controls (there are already reported plans to sell off border facilities), and so the heightened risks of dangerous or sub-standard goods entering Britain will continue. Moreover, SPS aside, even if all the possible agreements come to be made, they will each happen within their own timescales and come into operation piecemeal. Thus, in practical terms, the reset will not take place in a single moment, and will come long after public opinion of it as ‘an event’ has been established.
Brexiters are still shaping the debate
So, in that context, it really does matter how it is talked about now, and in the coming days, and the fact is that, so far, the Brexiters have shaped the main media ‘talking point’ of whether or not the reset was a ‘betrayal’. That has partly been facilitated by the fact that the only major definitive economic agreement of the Summit was the extension of the fisheries deal (negotiated by Frost and Johnson) for twelve years. This isn’t some terrible thing, not least because it gives fishers some certainty for planning and, anyway, they will benefit from an SPS agreement, when it comes. But whilst government ministers have tried to make those points, by having to do so they necessarily cede pivotal position to the ‘debate’ about betrayal, and have allowed the emotive and, for Brexiters, talismanic issue of fishing to be the pivotal policy area within that debate.
But even leaving aside the fisheries issue, the government’s approach has a more general problem. Responding to, or trying to pre-empt, the accusation of betrayal in terms of Britain’s world standing, or even its pragmatic interests, talks past the underlying meaning of that accusation. The first response accepts that betrayal of Brexit might, in principle, be possible, even if the reset is not, in fact, evidence of it. The second response implies that pragmatism can over-ride principles, leaving intact the possibility that a betrayal has occurred but justifying it on the grounds of practical exigencies.
Moreover, the way the Summit was talked about by the government remained primarily transactional and apprehended in terms of ‘tough negotiations’ which ‘went right down to the wire’. It is all very similar to the way the Brexit negotiations were presented and, for that matter, the way that relations with the EU were reported in the years when the UK was still a member state. And of course, as a result, it means that terms like ‘surrender’ continue to have currency, since they are the logically-entailed flip-side of the boasts of tough negotiations to ‘get the best deal for Britain’.
Stale, failed arguments
Yet the Brexiters really do not have a leg to stand on. Invocations of the ‘will of the people’, referencing the 2016 referendum, were always grotesque but are now utterly redundant. If it ever had any substance, the will of the people was satisfied when the UK left the EU, and any mandate the referendum had was fully and finally discharged at that point. It is simply dishonest to pretend that it provides some democratic hold over the form of UK-EU relations now and forever more. By contrast, Labour won the last election on its very limited reset policy, and has a mandate for that.
Beyond that, all the talk of betrayal and surrender is fatuous. Coming from Reform and some of the Tory Ultras that fatuity is obvious not least because they had already denounced the Johnson-Frost Brexit as a betrayal and a surrender. Just how often can something be betrayed before the accusation ceases to have any meaning at all?
Coming from Tories, like Badenoch, who formed the last government it is fatuous because they know full well that, when in power, they barely diverged from EU regulations at all, including SPS regulations, and so in practice Britain was already a ‘rule-taker’ (and, to be fair, Starmer made this point very clearly in the Commons debate). They also know that, as mentioned above, their own government was set on its own slow path towards closer relations with the EU. Now, out of government, they are free to join Farage et al. in all the old delusions of an undeliverable ‘true’ or ‘pure’ Brexit, including, on fisheries specifically, the false promise of complete control of fishing waters.
There won’t be another reset
Of course, all of this nonsense would be trotted out by the usual suspects whatever the Labour government did or said. This could be seen as a justification for the timidity of the reset, since it shows just how much vitriol even the most minimal changes attract. Some may argue that, given this is so, Labour might just as well be much bolder. That’s a reasonable argument if it means seeking the most maximal reset compatible with the Labour ‘red lines’. But if it means abandoning those red lines, that would be politically naïve. For doing that would provide the Brexiters with ‘a leg to stand on’, given how clearly and repeatedly Labour pledged to hold to them. And, yes, the next response would be to say that Labour was foolish to do so – but the reasons at the time were well-known and widely-discussed and, now, we are where we are.
In setting Labour’s red lines, Starmer accepted the basic parameters of the Conservatives' Brexit, but that doesn’t mean the Brexiters have accepted that acceptance, and the reality is that they never will. The reason for that is because actually, as has been obvious since 2016, the Brexiters will never accept any version of Brexit. Nothing will ever satisfy them, partly because what they want is not practically possible but mainly because they don’t want to be satisfied, they want to be outraged; and Brexit will always be a betrayal for them because they want to be betrayed.
From this perspective, this reset Summit reveals that Starmer’s approach to Brexit, whatever tactical rationale it may have, is strategically incoherent. It recognizes the geographical, economic and regulatory realities which doom Brexit to failure, and yet it places major constraints on what can be done to address them. Equally, it seeks to neutralize the attacks of Brexiters by accepting their basic parameters, and yet by doing so allows the basis for those attacks to flourish unchallenged. In this way, as foreshadowed at the end of last week’s post, the (naïve) possibility I expressed in the post before that, of the reset with the EU being used to reset the domestic politics of Brexit, has evaporated.
Much of this was already obvious. But once resetting relations with the EU became configured as ‘the reset’, and then tied to this week’s Summit, it became a specific ‘moment’ which would tell us, definitively, what Labour’s European policy will be. What is on (and not on) the agenda for UK-EU relations for the next few years will not, now, change. There will be more summits, and ‘resetting’ will continue, but, at least for the present government, there can only be one ‘reset’ moment. And now it’s over.
Note
[1] I think this reflects an underlying problem with many opinion polls about Brexit. Even after all these years when it has been such a huge issue, almost no one in the public (and fewer than might be expected in the media) actually understand even the most basic things about what membership and non-membership of the EU mean, right down to what a single market, let alone a customs union, means. As a result, public opinion is very easily manipulated by, and vulnerable to, political dishonesty (e.g. ‘closer relations’ can readily be rearticulated as ‘subjugation’), making opinion poll results rather unreliable.
Because of the Summit being held this week, this post comes only one week after my last one. Unless something unexpected happens, I will now revert to the usual fortnightly timetable i.e. the next post will be on Friday 6 June.
I remarked at the time that it was unclear how realistic this timescale was, given the scope of things which would need to be agreed for the Summit to produce a reset worthy of the name. Now the UK-EU Summit has been held and, after all the speculation, we know the details of what has been agreed which are set out in the Joint Statement, the Renewed Agenda for Cooperation and the text of a political agreement for a Security and Defence Partnership, along with a Q&A document relating to these.
These have been widely reported, and there are several summaries, including from the BBC and Politico, as well as some excellent analyses including, from a legal perspective, that of Professor Steve Peers on his EU Law Analysis blog and, from a more political perspective, that of Anton Spisak of the Centre for European Reform on his personal Substack newsletter. Given that there is so much already written, I won’t provide another summary here. Instead, I will seek to evaluate what was agreed, taking in some but not all of the details, and how it relates to the wider Brexit saga.
Evaluating the reset Summit
In a recent post I set out some parameters which can be used for that evaluation:
“On one account, what will be announced will be a “new strategic partnership”, encompassing trade and security, and more or less explicitly configured as a response to Donald Trump. On another account, the accent will be on defence and security, with something more like a roadmap for discussion of economic issues, although some reports suggest an extension to the existing fisheries agreement will be announced. The first framing would suggest an explicit shift of geo-political strategy, the second a more ambiguous and less ambitious moment, defining future processes more than providing a statement of intent. Or, to put it another way, one would be a bold and dramatic event, the other a rather boring technocratic adjustment. The issue is not just a matter of symbolism, however. The detailed provisions will matter, not so much in terms of immediate agreements but in terms of the scale and scope of what is identified to be within the ambit of mutually desired agreements. Thus there is a matrix of possibilities according to whether the framing is dramatic and strategic, or dull and technocratic; and whether the scope of possible agreements is extensive or limited.”
Judged in these terms, the agreement falls somewhat between the two framings. The phrase “new strategic partnership” does feature centrally in the Joint Statement that followed the Summit. However, in content terms, what has been agreed is much more like the second framing. As expected, the central part of what was agreed was the Security and Defence Partnership (although there are many details to be worked out). That is important but not unexpected, and Anton Spisak points out that is not the bespoke “security package” Labour had originally sought but a fairly typical EU-third country partnership.
In the non-defence sphere, it was indeed true that there was an extension of the current fisheries agreement contained within the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA), which was due to be re-negotiated in 2026, through until 2038. There was also an agreement to extend the TCA energy provisions, which were due to expire in 2026, until 2027 and to do so on an annual basis thereafter. Since these were both consolidations of the existing agreement, they cannot be described in terms of a new strategic framing; indeed, they scarcely warrant the term ‘reset’. Nothing else within the non-defence sphere was definitively agreed, but a long list of possibilities and aspirations was identified.
In terms of the scale and scope of these, most of the things expected were mentioned. An extensive Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) agreement seems to be the most definite, although (again as expected) details and timescale remain under negotiation. One thing which is now explicit is that the government will agree to dynamic alignment of SPS regulations, with a role for the ECJ. It’s true that everyone who knew anything about it knew that was going to happen (if there was to be an SPS agreement at all) but the government had never overtly recognized that. There is also a commitment to work towards a Youth Experience Scheme (meaning some version of a Youth Mobility Scheme), which was expected, but the mention of also working towards the UK participating in Erasmus+ was more surprising (given previous negative comments from the government).
Expected, but with less confidence, was a commitment to work towards linking Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM) and Emission Trading Schemes (ETS), which has been discussed by commentators for some years but hadn’t featured very explicitly in Labour’s plans. Perhaps less expected, although the idea has certainly been floating around, was a commitment to explore the possibility of the UK participating in the EU’s internal electricity market. In all these areas, as with SPS, if there are agreements then they will entail dynamic alignment of regulations and a role for the ECJ.
The presence of the latter possible agreements takes the reset above the minimal level of what might have been contained (although they also grow out of possibilities contained within the TCA). But there was no mention of participation in the REACH chemicals regulation system (something once touted as a possibility by Rachel Reeves) nor of accession to the PEM Convention on rules of origin (something called for by Stella Creasy, chair of the Labour Movement for Europe). It is also of note that of the three specific goals for the reset which have been Labour’s stated aims since before the election, SPS is the only one which looks likely to come to fruition. The other two (mutual recognition of professional qualifications, and a mobility agreement for touring artists), which were always unlikely to be agreed, were mentioned but only in vague terms.
So, overall, in terms of the evaluative parameters I proposed, on the framing criterion, it was closer to the technocratic than the strategic, and was mostly a roadmap for discussion of possible agreements. In terms of the scale and scope of what that roadmap contained, it was towards the middle of what might reasonably have been expected, although it should again be stressed that it was minimal in terms of the announcement of actual agreements (as opposed to possible agreements). Moreover, there is a distinct lack of precise timescales or even defined processes for reaching these agreements and, as a result, very little sense of urgency. In that sense, whilst somewhere in the middle, it is closer to the minimal than the maximal end on the ‘scale and scope’ criterion.
A step forward?
If that seems rather underwhelming, it doesn’t mean that the reset was unimportant, for two reasons. One is that it does set in train ongoing negotiations, so that ‘resetting’ will continue. In a way, that was always going to happen, in the sense that the UK-EU relationship is bound to be the subject of ongoing negotiation, but what is distinctive about ‘resetting’ is that the direction of travel, even if very slow, is, for now, towards closer integration.
The other reason it matters is that a Tory government could never have hosted an event like this Summit. That is despite that fact that, at least under Sunak, the direction of travel was similar. That’s shown by the Windsor Framework, what ended up being the very limited scrapping of Retained EU Law, the agreement with Frontex, and the return to Horizon and Copernicus. But Sunak (or any other Tory leader) would have baulked at the concept of a reset and the symbolism and language of this Summit.
In this way, the reset is a step forward of sorts. Along with the different tone that has been evident since the election, it does mark a break with the highly antagonistic years since the referendum. It accepts, overtly, the reality that the EU is a regulatory hegemon, and in the process discards the Brexiters’ taboo against dynamic alignment. Similarly, it demonstrates a recognition of one of the basic flaws of Brexit, namely its failure to grasp the realities of geography. Assuming they happen, both the SPS agreement and the CBAM/ETS linkage will, in terms of the much-discussed choice between the EU and the US, be a choice for the EU.
But – and with Brexit there is always a ‘but’ – what is equally striking is that, as well as being relatively modest in framing and scope, the government has presented the reset in distinctly ‘Brexity’ terms. In particular, Starmer presented it, alongside the recent deals with the US and India, in terms of Britain being “an independent, sovereign nation” which “is back on the world stage”, whilst Reeves talked of the reset meaning that (again in conjunction with trade deals with other countries) Britain is in a better position on trade “than any other country in the world”.
No doubt, tactically, this is meant to spike the attacks on the reset made by Brexiters. In a similar way, the language of “ruthless pragmatism” that Nick Thomas-Symonds has been using for some time can be read as an attempt to position the Brexiter attacks as ‘ideological’ rather than practical. And, indeed, the other general way the reset has been presented by the government is in terms of the practical ways that it will make life better for British people.
Political reaction
All that is fair enough, in a tactical sense, but it doesn’t fundamentally challenge the validity of the Brexiter attacks, which have indeed been ferocious as well as wholly predictable. So, whilst Starmer spoke of the deal “releasing us from the tired arguments of the past” it has done no such thing.
Instead, once again, the airwaves have been full of the obnoxious, clichéd language of “surrender”, “betrayal”, and violation of “the will of the people”. And, once again, any semblance of honesty has disappeared (examples include claims that 80 million people will come to the UK under the Youth Experience Scheme, or that the UK would have had complete control of its fishing waters in 2026 - both made by Boris Johnson, amongst others). It has come from all the usual people (including not just Johnson, but Nigel Farage, David Frost, and Kemi Badenoch) and in all the usual places (including the Telegraph, Express, Mail, and GB News). And, just as in the past, they have set the agenda for the ‘non-partisan media’ such as the BBC, Sky, and ITV (yes, of course I know the questions that begs but, still, they are not partisan in the way of the Brexiter outlets I just mentioned).
It's tempting to think that this is just the last gasp of the Brexit dinosaurs, and that, as Adam Bienkov puts it, their “screaming” is so loud because they know “the public has changed its mind”. After all, 66% of the public support a closer relationship with the EU without rejoining it (or the single market or customs union), which is exactly Labour’s policy, and business groups are very positive. I’m not so sure, if only because public responses to questions about ‘a closer relationship’ may be quite fluid when that is re-presented as ‘betrayal’ and ‘surrender’ [1]. At all events, whether or not that is the reason, polling since the Summit shows only 29% think it is a good deal, and 23% think it is a bad deal (the largest group, 30%, don’t know).
That is hardly a ringing endorsement of the policy, and one big problem is that, for all the government talk of the agreement making life better for ordinary people, it will be a long time before there is any tangible benefit. This, I think, has been an under-appreciated point in much of the media discussion this week, partly because the government focussed on having ‘done’ a deal and its opponents on it being a betrayal. But, to be ‘ruthlessly pragmatic’, the reality is that it will certainly be months, and very probably years, before it is both fully agreed and fully implemented.
For the SPS agreement, in particular, this means it will be a long time before businesses find trading easier (and for some it will be, or already is, too late) and before consumers see benefits in terms of price and choice. Meanwhile there will presumably be no further implementation of import controls (there are already reported plans to sell off border facilities), and so the heightened risks of dangerous or sub-standard goods entering Britain will continue. Moreover, SPS aside, even if all the possible agreements come to be made, they will each happen within their own timescales and come into operation piecemeal. Thus, in practical terms, the reset will not take place in a single moment, and will come long after public opinion of it as ‘an event’ has been established.
Brexiters are still shaping the debate
So, in that context, it really does matter how it is talked about now, and in the coming days, and the fact is that, so far, the Brexiters have shaped the main media ‘talking point’ of whether or not the reset was a ‘betrayal’. That has partly been facilitated by the fact that the only major definitive economic agreement of the Summit was the extension of the fisheries deal (negotiated by Frost and Johnson) for twelve years. This isn’t some terrible thing, not least because it gives fishers some certainty for planning and, anyway, they will benefit from an SPS agreement, when it comes. But whilst government ministers have tried to make those points, by having to do so they necessarily cede pivotal position to the ‘debate’ about betrayal, and have allowed the emotive and, for Brexiters, talismanic issue of fishing to be the pivotal policy area within that debate.
But even leaving aside the fisheries issue, the government’s approach has a more general problem. Responding to, or trying to pre-empt, the accusation of betrayal in terms of Britain’s world standing, or even its pragmatic interests, talks past the underlying meaning of that accusation. The first response accepts that betrayal of Brexit might, in principle, be possible, even if the reset is not, in fact, evidence of it. The second response implies that pragmatism can over-ride principles, leaving intact the possibility that a betrayal has occurred but justifying it on the grounds of practical exigencies.
Moreover, the way the Summit was talked about by the government remained primarily transactional and apprehended in terms of ‘tough negotiations’ which ‘went right down to the wire’. It is all very similar to the way the Brexit negotiations were presented and, for that matter, the way that relations with the EU were reported in the years when the UK was still a member state. And of course, as a result, it means that terms like ‘surrender’ continue to have currency, since they are the logically-entailed flip-side of the boasts of tough negotiations to ‘get the best deal for Britain’.
Stale, failed arguments
Yet the Brexiters really do not have a leg to stand on. Invocations of the ‘will of the people’, referencing the 2016 referendum, were always grotesque but are now utterly redundant. If it ever had any substance, the will of the people was satisfied when the UK left the EU, and any mandate the referendum had was fully and finally discharged at that point. It is simply dishonest to pretend that it provides some democratic hold over the form of UK-EU relations now and forever more. By contrast, Labour won the last election on its very limited reset policy, and has a mandate for that.
Beyond that, all the talk of betrayal and surrender is fatuous. Coming from Reform and some of the Tory Ultras that fatuity is obvious not least because they had already denounced the Johnson-Frost Brexit as a betrayal and a surrender. Just how often can something be betrayed before the accusation ceases to have any meaning at all?
Coming from Tories, like Badenoch, who formed the last government it is fatuous because they know full well that, when in power, they barely diverged from EU regulations at all, including SPS regulations, and so in practice Britain was already a ‘rule-taker’ (and, to be fair, Starmer made this point very clearly in the Commons debate). They also know that, as mentioned above, their own government was set on its own slow path towards closer relations with the EU. Now, out of government, they are free to join Farage et al. in all the old delusions of an undeliverable ‘true’ or ‘pure’ Brexit, including, on fisheries specifically, the false promise of complete control of fishing waters.
There won’t be another reset
Of course, all of this nonsense would be trotted out by the usual suspects whatever the Labour government did or said. This could be seen as a justification for the timidity of the reset, since it shows just how much vitriol even the most minimal changes attract. Some may argue that, given this is so, Labour might just as well be much bolder. That’s a reasonable argument if it means seeking the most maximal reset compatible with the Labour ‘red lines’. But if it means abandoning those red lines, that would be politically naïve. For doing that would provide the Brexiters with ‘a leg to stand on’, given how clearly and repeatedly Labour pledged to hold to them. And, yes, the next response would be to say that Labour was foolish to do so – but the reasons at the time were well-known and widely-discussed and, now, we are where we are.
In setting Labour’s red lines, Starmer accepted the basic parameters of the Conservatives' Brexit, but that doesn’t mean the Brexiters have accepted that acceptance, and the reality is that they never will. The reason for that is because actually, as has been obvious since 2016, the Brexiters will never accept any version of Brexit. Nothing will ever satisfy them, partly because what they want is not practically possible but mainly because they don’t want to be satisfied, they want to be outraged; and Brexit will always be a betrayal for them because they want to be betrayed.
From this perspective, this reset Summit reveals that Starmer’s approach to Brexit, whatever tactical rationale it may have, is strategically incoherent. It recognizes the geographical, economic and regulatory realities which doom Brexit to failure, and yet it places major constraints on what can be done to address them. Equally, it seeks to neutralize the attacks of Brexiters by accepting their basic parameters, and yet by doing so allows the basis for those attacks to flourish unchallenged. In this way, as foreshadowed at the end of last week’s post, the (naïve) possibility I expressed in the post before that, of the reset with the EU being used to reset the domestic politics of Brexit, has evaporated.
Much of this was already obvious. But once resetting relations with the EU became configured as ‘the reset’, and then tied to this week’s Summit, it became a specific ‘moment’ which would tell us, definitively, what Labour’s European policy will be. What is on (and not on) the agenda for UK-EU relations for the next few years will not, now, change. There will be more summits, and ‘resetting’ will continue, but, at least for the present government, there can only be one ‘reset’ moment. And now it’s over.
Note
[1] I think this reflects an underlying problem with many opinion polls about Brexit. Even after all these years when it has been such a huge issue, almost no one in the public (and fewer than might be expected in the media) actually understand even the most basic things about what membership and non-membership of the EU mean, right down to what a single market, let alone a customs union, means. As a result, public opinion is very easily manipulated by, and vulnerable to, political dishonesty (e.g. ‘closer relations’ can readily be rearticulated as ‘subjugation’), making opinion poll results rather unreliable.
Because of the Summit being held this week, this post comes only one week after my last one. Unless something unexpected happens, I will now revert to the usual fortnightly timetable i.e. the next post will be on Friday 6 June.
Friday, 16 May 2025
Not dealing with Brexitism
It’s hard to keep up with what is happening in the world of trade, even just considering those aspects which have a direct or indirect Brexit connection. Since my last post, there has been a flurry of activity, including a deal, of sorts, between the US and China which, for now at least, seems to mark a truce in their trade war. That, along with some other developments, suggests that Trump is now desperate to row back on the chaos that his ‘Liberation Day tariffs’ unleashed. On the other hand, there are signs that he proposes to double down on his hostility to the EU.
The recently announced UK-US ‘trade deal’ is one, relatively minor, aspect of these developments. It, too, is evidence of Trump’s backtracking, and it could be read as part of an attempt by him to increase divisions between the UK and the EU. At all events, along with the UK-India deal, it forms the background to next week’s UK-EU Summit. The outcome of that may, whether in what it does or what it does not achieve, mark a new phase in the Brexit saga, but there is little sign of Britain dealing with 'Brexitism'.
The UK-US ‘trade deal’
As always with anything Brexit-related, it’s a big task just to strip away the lies, half-truths and misunderstandings, and that becomes even more difficult when Donald Trump is involved. When the deal was announced, both Trump and Keir Starmer talked as if it was a historic breakthrough, and suggested that it was the long-touted post-Brexit Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It was nothing of the sort, and nor was it ever going to be. As I explained in a post last November, when Trump’s tariffs had not been announced but were in prospect, if it was going to be anything it would be an ‘exemption deal’, meaning that it would exempt the UK from some, if not all, of Trump’s new tariffs.
The difference is significant, not least because it means that the best it could achieve would be a return to the status quo ante. That is, it might avoid Trump’s new tariffs but not improve the terms of trade that had already existed. To an extent, at least, that is what has happened. In headline terms, the new blanket 10% ‘reciprocal tariff’ remains on all goods, but the 25% tariff on cars has been removed up to a quota of 100,000 vehicles sold per year (but these will still be liable to the 10% tariff). The 25% tariff on steel and aluminium has also been scrapped, but it seems there will also be some quota limit on that (the details are not clear). In return, the UK has agreed to scrap tariffs on an increased quota of US beef (with some reciprocal increase in access to the US beef market), and to scrap tariffs on US ethanol within a high quota.
So, a very limited deal. But, as quickly emerged when the text was published, it is not even a deal, in the sense that it is (explicitly) not a legally binding agreement and that many details are still to be agreed, most glaringly, perhaps, in relation to pharmaceuticals trade. As Alison Morrow of CNN Business put it, it is not so much as deal as “a concept of a deal”. That isn’t to say that none of it will come into effect, because there is evidently some political commitment to it. So at least some of it very probably will. But given Trump’s proven unreliability to stick to the terms even of legally binding deals, it is even harder to be confident that he will honour, or even continue to recognize, any political commitments.
That it happened at all reflects the weakness and neediness of both sides. Unlike the EU or China, the UK is simply not strong enough to take on the US in a trade war. The UK also has a pressing political and economic need to shield its car and steel industries from Trump’s tariffs. But the US is weak too. Trump’s tariff policy has backfired on him very badly, and, as I suggested recently, that has made him keen to start ‘doing deals’ with his victims so as to give the impression that this had been his strategy all along, and to reverse some of the damage he has inflicted on himself and the US economy. Thus, as many commentators noted once it had been announced, Trump needed a deal, and quickly.
The timing may also have reflected a desire to make an announcement on VE Day so as to get in some sanctimonious references to the wartime alliance and the ‘special relationship’ or at least, since Trump’s ego is considerably greater than his grasp of detail, to ‘historic’ events. Timing aside, the terms of this trade non-deal also reflected the neediness of both parties. The UK has not had to make any of the concessions that had been speculated about on tech firm regulation and taxation, or on food standards (there will be cheaper US beef, but it will not be ‘hormone-treated’), a point I’ll come back to. The UK also resisted demands to reduce pork tariffs. To that extent, the reported jubilation in the Starmer government is understandable. The UK gave surprisingly little for what, at least in political terms, was quite helpful to the government.
Nevertheless, to repeat, the overall effect is to leave the UK worse off than it was before Trump launched his tariff offensive. Starmer shouldn’t be blamed for that, as it’s highly unlikely any other outcome could have been agreed on remotely viable terms, and what was achieved is worthwhile for the car and steel industries, but in a normal world it wouldn’t be seen as a triumph. There is also a more complex issue, identified by the UK Trade Policy Observatory’s (UCTPO) analysis of the deal. Referring to an aspect which I have not mentioned so far, namely what the agreement says about supply chain security, UKTPO warn that, depending on exactly what it comes to mean in practice, it may well push the UK towards provisions which will be unpopular with China, with retaliation possible. It’s a specific illustration of another point I made in an earlier post, about how post-Brexit Britain is obliged to duck and dive between not just the US and the EU but, also, China.
Brexit dimensions
What of Brexit more generally in all this? It’s true by definition that the UK could not have agreed such a deal had it still been a member of the EU, or even if simply in a customs union with the EU. Whether it proves ‘better’ than whatever the EU agrees or doesn’t agree with the US remains to be seen. What is certainly striking is that it has wrong-footed the Brexiters (as shown, rather deliciously, by a disagreement between the Tice-Oakeshott Reform power couple). Some, at least initially, hailed it, in the way Trump did, as the post-Brexit trade deal he had always promised, although they quickly latched on to the implicit criticism of the Tories contained in that, as well as the explicit lie it entailed.
Very soon, Kemi Badenoch was complaining that the deal had “shafted” the UK (£), bemoaning that it was, indeed, not a comprehensive FTA. In short, we had the unedifying spectacle of Labour at least implying that it had delivered the key trade promise of the Brexiters, and Conservative Brexiters criticizing the government for not delivering what is simply not available for agreement with Trump, any more than it was with Biden, but pretending otherwise. It was yet another small illustration of the fundamental dishonesty Brexit has brought to British politics.
Beyond domestic politics, there’s a deeper issue in play with this deal. Again, I’ve gestured towards it in a previous post (I’m sorry to keep doing this self-referencing, but the various discussions obviously connect together, and linking to where points were previously made means I don’t have to repeat explanations or background). That issue is what all this means for ‘WTO rules’.
It’s not just that the Brexiters used to sloganize ‘Let’s Go WTO’ as a supposed alternative to any trade deal at all with the EU, or that ‘regaining our seat at the WTO’ was supposed to be some great prize, it is that their whole economic vision of post-Brexit Britain was predicated on the existence of a global trade order. Trump is now ripping that up, and both Alan Beattie, the Financial Times’ trade expert (£), and the UKTPO analysis suggest that the UK-US deal, specifically, flouts WTO principles and undermines the multi-lateral trading system.
The UK-India deal
All this came in the wake of the announcement of a UK-India trade deal. The two stories are, as BBC Economics Editor Faisal Islam argues, very likely to be related. That is, the general mayhem Trump is causing to international trade may have provided an incentive to complete what has hitherto been regarded as an “elusive” deal. However, the two deals are very different. For the UK-India deal is a trade deal, both in the sense of being a genuine FTA and of being (or at least being the basis of) a legally binding agreement. Moreover, it sits within, and does not undermine, the WTO framework. Indeed, the Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy suggests that “may be one of the biggest achievements of this agreement”.
Although the full details have yet to be published, reports based on the government’s summary of what has been agreed suggest there will be a fairly comprehensive removal of tariffs, with whisky and cars two of the UK sectors most likely to benefit, and garments and footwear amongst the benefitting Indian sectors. There’s less sign of liberalization of services trade, which some, especially in the financial services sector, had hoped for, although that is not surprising (lack of services coverage is one of the reasons why FTAs are so different to the EU single market). However, of potential importance to some UK firms, and potential controversy in India, UK access to the public procurement market should increase.
It was always anticipated that the block to this FTA would be an Indian requirement for a relaxation of UK immigration policy – something even less likely to be agreed by the present government, which is, if possible, even more obsessed with reducing immigration at whatever the economic cost than its Tory predecessors, something I will return to. That turned out not to be the case (although perhaps, had it been agreed, it might have enabled a deeper deal), and the only tangentially immigration-related issue was an agreement to exempt Indian workers on short-term visas from National Insurance Contributions (NICs).
Once again Brexiters were wrong-footed. This was a deal they had long-advocated as a Brexit prize, and Jacob Rees-Mogg greeted it as “exactly what Brexit promised”. But Kemi Badenoch latched onto the NIC provision (as, more unexpectedly, did the LibDems), either unaware of or ignoring the fact that such arrangements (which are reciprocal for UK workers) have been agreed with numerous countries in the past. Nigel Farage also weighed in, denouncing the deal as “truly appalling”, and as selling out British workers and farmers.
All this was, as with the US deal, pure opportunism (one senior Indian official was even quoted as saying that Badenoch had agreed the NIC provision in principle when she was Trade Secretary). There’s no doubt whatsoever that the Tories would have done the same deal. But the Brexiter reactions, especially Farage’s, also point to one of the biggest of the many contradictions which have run throughout the entire Brexit project, that between nativist protectionism and globalist free trade. Hence the idiotic situation that Brexiters can now regard the UK-India deal as both a vindication and a betrayal of Brexit.
A Brexit benefit?
To the extent that the deal is being claimed as a ‘Brexit benefit’, the usual arguments apply. Yes, it could only be made because the UK has left the EU. But according to official calculations its economic value, an estimated 0.1% increase to GDP after 15 years, whilst slightly greater than the FTAs with Australia (0.08%) and New Zealand (0.03%), is nugatory compared with the costs of Brexit (minus 4%). Given that Brexit has happened, there’s a case for doing such deals, but the idea that they in any way justify Brexit is absurd. In any case, it is reported in the Indian media that the ongoing EU-India trade negotiations are likely to be accelerated, again precisely because of the impetus injected by Trump’s trade mayhem.
Of course, whenever the economic deficiencies of their project are pointed out to Brexiters, they invariably fall back on some version of their ideas about sovereignty and democracy. In relation to trade deals, they used to make much of the idea that, with Brexit, the people’s representatives in parliament would ‘regain control’ over ratification of FTAs. That was always based on a false premise, because as an EU member the UK could have held parliamentary votes on FTAs made by the EU, potentially even blocking them, but it waived that right. As for the present situation, whilst it might fairly be said that the UK-US deal is so flimsy and indefinite it hardly warrants a vote, that is not true of the UK-India deal. Yet the government has stated that, in line with post-Brexit legislation and practice, there will be no vote. So that’s another supposed ‘Brexit benefit’ that has quietly been discredited.
Where does all this leave the UK-EU reset?
The short answer to that is that it leaves it exactly where it was before, except that we are now only a couple of days away from the EU Summit at which (perhaps) the tangible details of what the ‘reset’ is going to mean will be unveiled [1]. As such, most of what I wrote in my previous post still applies, but it is worth spelling out one particularly important issue. The fact that the UK-US deal explicitly affirmed that US products sold in the UK must meet UK SPS standards (i.e. no hormone-treated beef, chlorinated chicken etc.) means that there is no (new) obstacle to a UK-EU SPS agreement. This is the issue many commentators have identified as the key indication of whether the UK is going to ‘choose’ between aligning with the US or the EU. It seems to have chosen the EU (which is consistent with what the latest UKICE report shows to be the general direction of regulatory policy).
That should not be a surprise to readers of this blog, as I’ve repeatedly argued (in the face of some sceptical responses) that it was highly unlikely that the government would agree anything with the US, or anyone else, to prevent what has always been Labour’s central, most repeatedly stated, reset ambition. It obviously remains to be seen if there will be a UK-EU SPS agreement, but the possibility remains open. I don’t think that quite amounts to the UK-US deal being a “triumph for remainers”, as Adam Bienkov argues, but it does endorse their core economic proposition of the centrality of geography to trade. Certainly the deal doesn’t mean that (taken in conjunction with the India deal) “the Rejoiner dream [has] finally died”, as pro-Brexit commentator Ambrose Pritchard-Evans claims.
Assuming there will now be a UK-EU SPS deal (in principle, if not immediately in detail), the important question is what else, if anything, gets announced next week. Over and above the widely expected defence and security pact, there are several possibilities, as outlined in my previous post, and there’s not much point in reviewing the various rumours and speculations there have been since. We’ll know soon enough.
The recently announced UK-US ‘trade deal’ is one, relatively minor, aspect of these developments. It, too, is evidence of Trump’s backtracking, and it could be read as part of an attempt by him to increase divisions between the UK and the EU. At all events, along with the UK-India deal, it forms the background to next week’s UK-EU Summit. The outcome of that may, whether in what it does or what it does not achieve, mark a new phase in the Brexit saga, but there is little sign of Britain dealing with 'Brexitism'.
The UK-US ‘trade deal’
As always with anything Brexit-related, it’s a big task just to strip away the lies, half-truths and misunderstandings, and that becomes even more difficult when Donald Trump is involved. When the deal was announced, both Trump and Keir Starmer talked as if it was a historic breakthrough, and suggested that it was the long-touted post-Brexit Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It was nothing of the sort, and nor was it ever going to be. As I explained in a post last November, when Trump’s tariffs had not been announced but were in prospect, if it was going to be anything it would be an ‘exemption deal’, meaning that it would exempt the UK from some, if not all, of Trump’s new tariffs.
The difference is significant, not least because it means that the best it could achieve would be a return to the status quo ante. That is, it might avoid Trump’s new tariffs but not improve the terms of trade that had already existed. To an extent, at least, that is what has happened. In headline terms, the new blanket 10% ‘reciprocal tariff’ remains on all goods, but the 25% tariff on cars has been removed up to a quota of 100,000 vehicles sold per year (but these will still be liable to the 10% tariff). The 25% tariff on steel and aluminium has also been scrapped, but it seems there will also be some quota limit on that (the details are not clear). In return, the UK has agreed to scrap tariffs on an increased quota of US beef (with some reciprocal increase in access to the US beef market), and to scrap tariffs on US ethanol within a high quota.
So, a very limited deal. But, as quickly emerged when the text was published, it is not even a deal, in the sense that it is (explicitly) not a legally binding agreement and that many details are still to be agreed, most glaringly, perhaps, in relation to pharmaceuticals trade. As Alison Morrow of CNN Business put it, it is not so much as deal as “a concept of a deal”. That isn’t to say that none of it will come into effect, because there is evidently some political commitment to it. So at least some of it very probably will. But given Trump’s proven unreliability to stick to the terms even of legally binding deals, it is even harder to be confident that he will honour, or even continue to recognize, any political commitments.
That it happened at all reflects the weakness and neediness of both sides. Unlike the EU or China, the UK is simply not strong enough to take on the US in a trade war. The UK also has a pressing political and economic need to shield its car and steel industries from Trump’s tariffs. But the US is weak too. Trump’s tariff policy has backfired on him very badly, and, as I suggested recently, that has made him keen to start ‘doing deals’ with his victims so as to give the impression that this had been his strategy all along, and to reverse some of the damage he has inflicted on himself and the US economy. Thus, as many commentators noted once it had been announced, Trump needed a deal, and quickly.
The timing may also have reflected a desire to make an announcement on VE Day so as to get in some sanctimonious references to the wartime alliance and the ‘special relationship’ or at least, since Trump’s ego is considerably greater than his grasp of detail, to ‘historic’ events. Timing aside, the terms of this trade non-deal also reflected the neediness of both parties. The UK has not had to make any of the concessions that had been speculated about on tech firm regulation and taxation, or on food standards (there will be cheaper US beef, but it will not be ‘hormone-treated’), a point I’ll come back to. The UK also resisted demands to reduce pork tariffs. To that extent, the reported jubilation in the Starmer government is understandable. The UK gave surprisingly little for what, at least in political terms, was quite helpful to the government.
Nevertheless, to repeat, the overall effect is to leave the UK worse off than it was before Trump launched his tariff offensive. Starmer shouldn’t be blamed for that, as it’s highly unlikely any other outcome could have been agreed on remotely viable terms, and what was achieved is worthwhile for the car and steel industries, but in a normal world it wouldn’t be seen as a triumph. There is also a more complex issue, identified by the UK Trade Policy Observatory’s (UCTPO) analysis of the deal. Referring to an aspect which I have not mentioned so far, namely what the agreement says about supply chain security, UKTPO warn that, depending on exactly what it comes to mean in practice, it may well push the UK towards provisions which will be unpopular with China, with retaliation possible. It’s a specific illustration of another point I made in an earlier post, about how post-Brexit Britain is obliged to duck and dive between not just the US and the EU but, also, China.
Brexit dimensions
What of Brexit more generally in all this? It’s true by definition that the UK could not have agreed such a deal had it still been a member of the EU, or even if simply in a customs union with the EU. Whether it proves ‘better’ than whatever the EU agrees or doesn’t agree with the US remains to be seen. What is certainly striking is that it has wrong-footed the Brexiters (as shown, rather deliciously, by a disagreement between the Tice-Oakeshott Reform power couple). Some, at least initially, hailed it, in the way Trump did, as the post-Brexit trade deal he had always promised, although they quickly latched on to the implicit criticism of the Tories contained in that, as well as the explicit lie it entailed.
Very soon, Kemi Badenoch was complaining that the deal had “shafted” the UK (£), bemoaning that it was, indeed, not a comprehensive FTA. In short, we had the unedifying spectacle of Labour at least implying that it had delivered the key trade promise of the Brexiters, and Conservative Brexiters criticizing the government for not delivering what is simply not available for agreement with Trump, any more than it was with Biden, but pretending otherwise. It was yet another small illustration of the fundamental dishonesty Brexit has brought to British politics.
Beyond domestic politics, there’s a deeper issue in play with this deal. Again, I’ve gestured towards it in a previous post (I’m sorry to keep doing this self-referencing, but the various discussions obviously connect together, and linking to where points were previously made means I don’t have to repeat explanations or background). That issue is what all this means for ‘WTO rules’.
It’s not just that the Brexiters used to sloganize ‘Let’s Go WTO’ as a supposed alternative to any trade deal at all with the EU, or that ‘regaining our seat at the WTO’ was supposed to be some great prize, it is that their whole economic vision of post-Brexit Britain was predicated on the existence of a global trade order. Trump is now ripping that up, and both Alan Beattie, the Financial Times’ trade expert (£), and the UKTPO analysis suggest that the UK-US deal, specifically, flouts WTO principles and undermines the multi-lateral trading system.
The UK-India deal
All this came in the wake of the announcement of a UK-India trade deal. The two stories are, as BBC Economics Editor Faisal Islam argues, very likely to be related. That is, the general mayhem Trump is causing to international trade may have provided an incentive to complete what has hitherto been regarded as an “elusive” deal. However, the two deals are very different. For the UK-India deal is a trade deal, both in the sense of being a genuine FTA and of being (or at least being the basis of) a legally binding agreement. Moreover, it sits within, and does not undermine, the WTO framework. Indeed, the Centre for Inclusive Trade Policy suggests that “may be one of the biggest achievements of this agreement”.
Although the full details have yet to be published, reports based on the government’s summary of what has been agreed suggest there will be a fairly comprehensive removal of tariffs, with whisky and cars two of the UK sectors most likely to benefit, and garments and footwear amongst the benefitting Indian sectors. There’s less sign of liberalization of services trade, which some, especially in the financial services sector, had hoped for, although that is not surprising (lack of services coverage is one of the reasons why FTAs are so different to the EU single market). However, of potential importance to some UK firms, and potential controversy in India, UK access to the public procurement market should increase.
It was always anticipated that the block to this FTA would be an Indian requirement for a relaxation of UK immigration policy – something even less likely to be agreed by the present government, which is, if possible, even more obsessed with reducing immigration at whatever the economic cost than its Tory predecessors, something I will return to. That turned out not to be the case (although perhaps, had it been agreed, it might have enabled a deeper deal), and the only tangentially immigration-related issue was an agreement to exempt Indian workers on short-term visas from National Insurance Contributions (NICs).
Once again Brexiters were wrong-footed. This was a deal they had long-advocated as a Brexit prize, and Jacob Rees-Mogg greeted it as “exactly what Brexit promised”. But Kemi Badenoch latched onto the NIC provision (as, more unexpectedly, did the LibDems), either unaware of or ignoring the fact that such arrangements (which are reciprocal for UK workers) have been agreed with numerous countries in the past. Nigel Farage also weighed in, denouncing the deal as “truly appalling”, and as selling out British workers and farmers.
All this was, as with the US deal, pure opportunism (one senior Indian official was even quoted as saying that Badenoch had agreed the NIC provision in principle when she was Trade Secretary). There’s no doubt whatsoever that the Tories would have done the same deal. But the Brexiter reactions, especially Farage’s, also point to one of the biggest of the many contradictions which have run throughout the entire Brexit project, that between nativist protectionism and globalist free trade. Hence the idiotic situation that Brexiters can now regard the UK-India deal as both a vindication and a betrayal of Brexit.
A Brexit benefit?
To the extent that the deal is being claimed as a ‘Brexit benefit’, the usual arguments apply. Yes, it could only be made because the UK has left the EU. But according to official calculations its economic value, an estimated 0.1% increase to GDP after 15 years, whilst slightly greater than the FTAs with Australia (0.08%) and New Zealand (0.03%), is nugatory compared with the costs of Brexit (minus 4%). Given that Brexit has happened, there’s a case for doing such deals, but the idea that they in any way justify Brexit is absurd. In any case, it is reported in the Indian media that the ongoing EU-India trade negotiations are likely to be accelerated, again precisely because of the impetus injected by Trump’s trade mayhem.
Of course, whenever the economic deficiencies of their project are pointed out to Brexiters, they invariably fall back on some version of their ideas about sovereignty and democracy. In relation to trade deals, they used to make much of the idea that, with Brexit, the people’s representatives in parliament would ‘regain control’ over ratification of FTAs. That was always based on a false premise, because as an EU member the UK could have held parliamentary votes on FTAs made by the EU, potentially even blocking them, but it waived that right. As for the present situation, whilst it might fairly be said that the UK-US deal is so flimsy and indefinite it hardly warrants a vote, that is not true of the UK-India deal. Yet the government has stated that, in line with post-Brexit legislation and practice, there will be no vote. So that’s another supposed ‘Brexit benefit’ that has quietly been discredited.
Where does all this leave the UK-EU reset?
The short answer to that is that it leaves it exactly where it was before, except that we are now only a couple of days away from the EU Summit at which (perhaps) the tangible details of what the ‘reset’ is going to mean will be unveiled [1]. As such, most of what I wrote in my previous post still applies, but it is worth spelling out one particularly important issue. The fact that the UK-US deal explicitly affirmed that US products sold in the UK must meet UK SPS standards (i.e. no hormone-treated beef, chlorinated chicken etc.) means that there is no (new) obstacle to a UK-EU SPS agreement. This is the issue many commentators have identified as the key indication of whether the UK is going to ‘choose’ between aligning with the US or the EU. It seems to have chosen the EU (which is consistent with what the latest UKICE report shows to be the general direction of regulatory policy).
That should not be a surprise to readers of this blog, as I’ve repeatedly argued (in the face of some sceptical responses) that it was highly unlikely that the government would agree anything with the US, or anyone else, to prevent what has always been Labour’s central, most repeatedly stated, reset ambition. It obviously remains to be seen if there will be a UK-EU SPS agreement, but the possibility remains open. I don’t think that quite amounts to the UK-US deal being a “triumph for remainers”, as Adam Bienkov argues, but it does endorse their core economic proposition of the centrality of geography to trade. Certainly the deal doesn’t mean that (taken in conjunction with the India deal) “the Rejoiner dream [has] finally died”, as pro-Brexit commentator Ambrose Pritchard-Evans claims.
Assuming there will now be a UK-EU SPS deal (in principle, if not immediately in detail), the important question is what else, if anything, gets announced next week. Over and above the widely expected defence and security pact, there are several possibilities, as outlined in my previous post, and there’s not much point in reviewing the various rumours and speculations there have been since. We’ll know soon enough.
What resetting means
That previous post attracted a certain amount of negative comment on social media. In particular, one poster on Bluesky [2] repeatedly and aggressively criticized me for having said that Labour’s red lines are fixed which, they insisted, meant I was indulging in British ‘exceptionalism’ whereby the EU was expected to make all the compromises and to find the solutions for the problems Brexit has caused the UK. It was a slightly bizarre accusation given the number of times over the last nine years I have criticized such a position, which has indeed often been in evidence. More importantly, it was simply ignorant. It is a fact that the Labour red lines have not changed, and a fact that they necessarily put a massive restriction on what can be agreed by the EU. But that certainly does not mean that there is no space for agreeing anything beyond what was negotiated by Boris Johnson and David Frost (a view which, ironically, mirrors Frost’s own criticisms of the reset).
That is for two reasons. One is that the UK under Labour does seem to have dropped one of the Johnson-Frost (and May) red lines of doctrinaire objection to any role for the ECJ and European Law. Admittedly this has never been formally stated, but, for years now, it has been notably absent from Labour’s list of red lines. If that is indeed so, it potentially opens up new areas for agreement that had been closed down by the UK, including but not limited to an SPS agreement, without entailing any concession from the EU on the need for ECJ jurisdiction. The other is that, even within its red lines, the Johnson-Frost deal was in many respects minimalistic, because of their hang-up about sovereignty in a more diffuse sense (i.e. beyond even what those red lines of necessity betokened). This is one reason why the quite expansive possibilities – possibilities envisaged by the EU quite as much as the UK – in the (non-binding) Political Declaration, which accompanied the 2019 Withdrawal Agreement, were never brought to fruition. There is now at least the potential to revisit them.
Nor, to address another repeated, and related, criticism made of that post, does doing so automatically amount to UK attempts at ‘cherry-picking’ or ‘cakeism’. Those concepts, whilst certainly highly relevant at some stages of the Brexit process (and, again, I've exhaustively catalogued and criticized this) have been rendered largely redundant since the UK became a third country to the EU. There are no cherries to try to pick, because the UK has foregone the pie. Now, the only issue is whether both the UK and the EU see it as being in their own interests to make agreements over cooperation in specific areas or participation in specific programmes. Indeed, that began to happen under the Sunak government, with the UK-Frontex deal on tackling irregular migration and the admission of the UK to the Horizon Europe and Copernicus programmes.
Trust in Starmer’s Britain?
If cherry-picking is no longer of much, if any, relevance to understanding Brexit events, new considerations have emerged. One is whether, contrary to what I have said, the UK-US deal, whilst not in its provisions affecting what the EU and UK might agree, could do so by antagonizing EU leaders. As I said above, that could well have been part of Trump’s intentions in making the deal and, even if not, the agreement hardly showed the UK standing in solidarity with other targets of Trump’s aggression. Again, I discussed this in a recent post, pondering that, if such a deal happened, it might simply be regarded by other countries as understandable realpolitik. That remains an open question, but the positive reaction to the agreement from Germany’s new Chancellor Friederich Merz might at least suggest that this is possible.
The other issue is that of domestic politics. Here, Simon Nixon makes the interesting argument that the US and India deals have provided Starmer with political cover for a maximal reset, by presenting himself as having just delivered on the Brexiters’ key trade promises. That could be so, but what is quite clear is that the Brexiters’ attack on the reset is continuing to gather force, and Badenoch has already threatened (£) to reverse anything agreed that “betrays Brexit”. Such threats are now the most potent weapon in the Brexiters’ arsenal, and they (rather than previous concerns about cherry-picking) are the most obvious disincentive to the EU to agree to a substantive reset.
Equally, the sight of Keir Starmer not just rehashing Brexiter nonsense about trade deals but now invoking their ‘taking back control’ slogan when launching this week’s morally reprehensible, politically counter-productive, and economically illiterate anti-immigration crusade is hardly likely to inspire confidence and trust from the EU. It hardly matters whether Starmer really believes what he said, or whether it is dishonesty resulting from fear of the Reform Party. Either way, quite as much as Badenoch and Farage, he is showing that ‘Brexitism’ is entrenched and that he has no intention of trying to challenge it.
I’ve referred several times to my recent posts on this blog, including the last one, and sometimes mentioned occasions where my expectations have proved accurate, or defended what I’ve written against criticisms. However I will freely admit that one of the main arguments of the last post, to the effect that Starmer had the opportunity to challenge Farage head on, and ‘reset’ domestic politics away from Brexitism, has already been shown to be hopelessly naive. It is now clear that isn’t going to happen. Next week there should be a clearer sense of whether Labour’s approach to the reset with the EU is going to be another missed opportunity to start to deal with the damage of Brexit.
Notes
[1] It is always worth recalling that, any reset aside, the UK has still not implemented all of the provisions of the original Withdrawal Agreement, nor some parts of the Windsor Framework. Moreover, there is still no deal on Gibraltar, although reports this week (£) suggested (not for the first time) that one is imminent. Indeed, the resolution of outstanding issues, perhaps especially Gibraltar, may well be part of the conditions for a reset of any significance.
[2] In line with my normal practice of not ‘punching down’ by linking to individual social media accounts, except when they are those of public figures, I will not identify the poster in question. In any case, some others were almost equally unpleasant.
That previous post attracted a certain amount of negative comment on social media. In particular, one poster on Bluesky [2] repeatedly and aggressively criticized me for having said that Labour’s red lines are fixed which, they insisted, meant I was indulging in British ‘exceptionalism’ whereby the EU was expected to make all the compromises and to find the solutions for the problems Brexit has caused the UK. It was a slightly bizarre accusation given the number of times over the last nine years I have criticized such a position, which has indeed often been in evidence. More importantly, it was simply ignorant. It is a fact that the Labour red lines have not changed, and a fact that they necessarily put a massive restriction on what can be agreed by the EU. But that certainly does not mean that there is no space for agreeing anything beyond what was negotiated by Boris Johnson and David Frost (a view which, ironically, mirrors Frost’s own criticisms of the reset).
That is for two reasons. One is that the UK under Labour does seem to have dropped one of the Johnson-Frost (and May) red lines of doctrinaire objection to any role for the ECJ and European Law. Admittedly this has never been formally stated, but, for years now, it has been notably absent from Labour’s list of red lines. If that is indeed so, it potentially opens up new areas for agreement that had been closed down by the UK, including but not limited to an SPS agreement, without entailing any concession from the EU on the need for ECJ jurisdiction. The other is that, even within its red lines, the Johnson-Frost deal was in many respects minimalistic, because of their hang-up about sovereignty in a more diffuse sense (i.e. beyond even what those red lines of necessity betokened). This is one reason why the quite expansive possibilities – possibilities envisaged by the EU quite as much as the UK – in the (non-binding) Political Declaration, which accompanied the 2019 Withdrawal Agreement, were never brought to fruition. There is now at least the potential to revisit them.
Nor, to address another repeated, and related, criticism made of that post, does doing so automatically amount to UK attempts at ‘cherry-picking’ or ‘cakeism’. Those concepts, whilst certainly highly relevant at some stages of the Brexit process (and, again, I've exhaustively catalogued and criticized this) have been rendered largely redundant since the UK became a third country to the EU. There are no cherries to try to pick, because the UK has foregone the pie. Now, the only issue is whether both the UK and the EU see it as being in their own interests to make agreements over cooperation in specific areas or participation in specific programmes. Indeed, that began to happen under the Sunak government, with the UK-Frontex deal on tackling irregular migration and the admission of the UK to the Horizon Europe and Copernicus programmes.
Trust in Starmer’s Britain?
If cherry-picking is no longer of much, if any, relevance to understanding Brexit events, new considerations have emerged. One is whether, contrary to what I have said, the UK-US deal, whilst not in its provisions affecting what the EU and UK might agree, could do so by antagonizing EU leaders. As I said above, that could well have been part of Trump’s intentions in making the deal and, even if not, the agreement hardly showed the UK standing in solidarity with other targets of Trump’s aggression. Again, I discussed this in a recent post, pondering that, if such a deal happened, it might simply be regarded by other countries as understandable realpolitik. That remains an open question, but the positive reaction to the agreement from Germany’s new Chancellor Friederich Merz might at least suggest that this is possible.
The other issue is that of domestic politics. Here, Simon Nixon makes the interesting argument that the US and India deals have provided Starmer with political cover for a maximal reset, by presenting himself as having just delivered on the Brexiters’ key trade promises. That could be so, but what is quite clear is that the Brexiters’ attack on the reset is continuing to gather force, and Badenoch has already threatened (£) to reverse anything agreed that “betrays Brexit”. Such threats are now the most potent weapon in the Brexiters’ arsenal, and they (rather than previous concerns about cherry-picking) are the most obvious disincentive to the EU to agree to a substantive reset.
Equally, the sight of Keir Starmer not just rehashing Brexiter nonsense about trade deals but now invoking their ‘taking back control’ slogan when launching this week’s morally reprehensible, politically counter-productive, and economically illiterate anti-immigration crusade is hardly likely to inspire confidence and trust from the EU. It hardly matters whether Starmer really believes what he said, or whether it is dishonesty resulting from fear of the Reform Party. Either way, quite as much as Badenoch and Farage, he is showing that ‘Brexitism’ is entrenched and that he has no intention of trying to challenge it.
I’ve referred several times to my recent posts on this blog, including the last one, and sometimes mentioned occasions where my expectations have proved accurate, or defended what I’ve written against criticisms. However I will freely admit that one of the main arguments of the last post, to the effect that Starmer had the opportunity to challenge Farage head on, and ‘reset’ domestic politics away from Brexitism, has already been shown to be hopelessly naive. It is now clear that isn’t going to happen. Next week there should be a clearer sense of whether Labour’s approach to the reset with the EU is going to be another missed opportunity to start to deal with the damage of Brexit.
Notes
[1] It is always worth recalling that, any reset aside, the UK has still not implemented all of the provisions of the original Withdrawal Agreement, nor some parts of the Windsor Framework. Moreover, there is still no deal on Gibraltar, although reports this week (£) suggested (not for the first time) that one is imminent. Indeed, the resolution of outstanding issues, perhaps especially Gibraltar, may well be part of the conditions for a reset of any significance.
[2] In line with my normal practice of not ‘punching down’ by linking to individual social media accounts, except when they are those of public figures, I will not identify the poster in question. In any case, some others were almost equally unpleasant.
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