We now know
the conditions under which, for the second time in a fortnight, the EU-27 are
willing to allow us to avoid, for now, the catastrophe of a no-deal Brexit. The
British Prime Minister was sent out of the room whilst the other countries,
each of whom had a veto, argued for hours over our fate and now they have decided.
Brexiters
often talk of EU discussions ‘going to the wire’, imagining this to mean that
at the last minute Britain will be given its unicorn cake. But these early
morning talks were about whether to give the thin gruel of a short extension or
the humble pie of a long extension with onerous conditions attached. In the
event, the outcome was somewhere in the middle. Thus Britain has been granted
an extension until the end of October, with a progress review in
June. The offer comes with a pointed reminder that, as a departing member, the
UK must not behave in an obstructive manner, and that the Withdrawal Agreement
will not be reopened.
There is
much talk of the humiliation
of the UK having to ‘go
cap in hand’ to the EU in search of an extension. This captures a certain
truth – and one which
I first wrote about on this blog in October 2017 – although it’s
important to understand that it is a self-inflicted humiliation, visited on the
UK by Brexiters rather than the EU.
But it also
conceals a deeper and more shaming truth which is revealed by the conversations
around the decision, and in particular concerns over how a lingering British
membership might, intentionally or not, damage the EU. As Georgina
Wright of the Institute for Government put it, the “EU gave up pressing UK
for a ‘plan’ and focussed instead on making sure Brexit does not hamper EU work
elsewhere”.
There are at
least four dimensions to this, and as well as informing the EU’s decision
making on the extension they also explain why an extension is needed at all.
Dishonesty
The most
obvious is dishonesty. The entire Brexiter prospectus was a
dishonest one, as becomes clearer each day, both about Britain’s
membership of the EU and about what would await it afterwards. That dishonesty
has spread from a small coterie of fanatics to infect the entire body politic
of the UK. Thus even those who know it to be nonsense must ritualistically
incant their ‘respect for the will of the people’. So in a general way there’s
an understandable desire for the EU to place a kind of fire break between
itself and this outbreak
of pathological, incontinent lying.
This general
sense of the danger of Brexiter dishonesty is personified in Boris Johnson.
Perhaps more than anyone else he is rightly seen in the EU as the figure who,
for years before the referendum, deliberately promulgated lies. Thus there is a
specific sense in which the EU is concerned to protect itself from the
possibility of a Johnson premiership (£) during the extension and
(if it comes to that) transition periods. There is probably no politician in
modern times who has done such comprehensive damage to British national
reputation.
Untrustworthiness
But even if
it were not Boris Johnson who became the next Prime Minister, many of the other
likely candidates present a similarly distasteful prospect precisely because of
the spread of the Brexit toxin within British politics. Even those ERG-ers who
have belatedly come round to May’s deal are open in saying that they expect it
to be ripped up once she is gone.
As regards
the extension, comments from prominent Brexiter politicians – even those with
few leadership credentials – compound the sense that the EU needs to protect
itself. Jacob
Rees-Mogg’s call for the extension to be used to wreck EU decision
making might be seen as the worst example were it not for the onanistic Mark
Francois making even more bellicose remarks. Apparently, we in the
UK have to accept these ludicrous mediocrities playing a part in our public
life. It’s not hard to understand why the EU are not enthusiastic about doing
the same.
These people
probably neither know nor care what terrible damage they are doing to the
reputation of the UK as a trustworthy partner. And, in fairness, they only play
a bit part in that. Far more damage was done, in a single sentence, when the
then Brexit Secretary David Davis opined, after the conclusion of phase 1 of
the Brexit talks, that what
had been agreed was not binding. Perhaps more than anything else
that poisoned trust in the negotiations.
It was
compounded by Theresa May who, for all that she may appear more ‘reasonable’,
followed Davis in disowning what had been agreed about the backstop at that
time, saying
that no British Prime Minister could agree to … what she had just agreed
to. Indeed, the Article 50 talks never really progressed to phase 2 as a result,
because the Conservative Party fell into a bitter internal battle about the
backstop that ended up with the repeated rejection of May’s deal.
Incompetence
That was not
the only reason why there was no substantive phase 2 (and, as a result, such an
anaemic Political Declaration). It was also because the government couldn’t
agree what it wanted from phase 2, and at the first attempt to do so, the
Chequers’ Proposal, fell apart and has never recovered. This is the third
strand which underlies how the EU have approached the extension. Britain is now
seen, almost
universally, as having descended into political chaos and
incompetence.
At first, the
EU thought that Britain had some ‘cunning plan’ about Brexit but
this quickly evaporated. It was visually
symbolised by the photo, at the beginning of the Article 50 negotiations,
of the EU side having folders full of documents and the UK side nothing but David
Davis’ inane grin. Symbolism aside, the substance told the same story. Throughout
the process, the repeated EU call to the UK has been to ‘tell us what you want’
and to put forward a coherent plan. But, as the
leaked conversation of her talks with Angela Merkel revealed, May’s
approach has been to ‘ask for an offer’ which was revealing of a bigger truth:
that the UK expected the EU to provide the answers to Brexit.
The
incompetence inherent in Brexit was starkly illustrated this week by the comments
of Geoffrey Cox, the Attorney-General and a committed Brexiter: “I
feel we have under-estimated its complexity. We are unpicking 45 years of in-depth
integration. This needed to be done with very great care, in a phased and
graduated way. It needs a hard-headed understanding of realities”. True enough
– but, to say the least, it’s a bit late in the day to be realising that.
Incompetence
is not the same as dishonesty, but in this case it arises from it. For the
biggest lie of the Leave campaign was precisely that it would be quick and
easy, and that the UK held all the cards. That the EU now see a longer than
requested extension as necessary is, in effect, saying that the UK needs to
have time to deal with its internal political chaos, recognize the complexity
of Brexit, and develop a competent approach to it. The diagnosis is right, but
thinking that six months is enough to reach that state calls for a degree of
optimism that not only cynics might think misplaced.
Delusionary
thinking
Alongside
dishonesty and incompetence, and closely related to them, is something slightly
different: persistent delusionary thinking. The ‘quick, easy deal’ fantasy is a
part of that (remember when Boris
Johnson said that eighteen months were more than enough to get the
entire deal, including future terms, agreed, and David
Davis said that the UK was “not really interested” in a transition
period but might agree one to “be kind” the EU), but it runs much deeper.
It would
take far too much space to catalogue the delusions – many posts on this blog
have done just that – but in recent times an obvious example is the repeated nonsense
of the Malthouse Compromise and (relatedly) ‘managed no deal’. The minimal
version is that the EU would agree to rip the backstop out of the Withdrawal
Agreement (WA) and substitute it with acceptance of non-existent ‘alternative
arrangements’. The maximal version is that the UK could ditch
the WA altogether, but still have a transitional period and also
proceed to negotiating a future terms deal without any WA.
None of this
is realistic at the most basic level of understanding. It’s not just that the
EU will not agree to it, but that they could not agree to it. But – reflecting
the general point about how Brexiter poison has infected British politics –
this idea is persistently floated not just by maverick figures but by leading
politicians. In the last week or so ‘Malthouse’
was put forward yet again, whilst Andrea
Leadsom combined the non-starter of taking the backstop out of the
WA with the longstanding myth that Angela Merkel alone could and would set the
terms of Brexit in Britain’s favour.
A slender
lifeline for the UK
So the
humiliation for Britain is not, primarily, in having had to ask the EU for an
extension. It is that both the need for the extension and the way the EU
approached the decision to grant it reflect the fact that Brexiters have made
Britain dishonest, untrustworthy, chaotic, incompetent, and delusional.
But it’s
actually even more humiliating than that. The ultimate truth of what the EU
have decided is that – far from needing to ‘punish’ us – they are willing to be
kind to us. We have been given the
chance – carefully managed, in case we abuse it – to get our act together and
to drop all the lies and fantasies.
It remains
to be seen whether we are able to take that chance. Even today, the morning
after the extension was agreed with the reaffirmation that the WA is closed,
David Davis was on Radio 4 fantasising that with the right leader Britain could
simply go back to the EU and renegotiate the WA and if not that no-deal is just
fine. There will undoubtedly be plenty of other Tory MPs
who will think that pursuing this fantasy will be the best use of the next six
months.
Nevertheless,
this new, longer delay presents
remainers with a real opportunity and they should plan
for the possibilities created. Assuming the European Parliament elections
go ahead, there is a chance for anti-Brexit candidates to flourish on higher
than usual turnout. The campaign
for another referendum or for revocation will surely intensify, the more so
precisely if the Tory Party decides to waste the time by intensifying its civil
war. And, despite everything, there are still
many in the EU who hope for and would welcome Britain
deciding to reject (£) the course Brexiters have set for us and so
conspicuously failed to deliver to deliver upon.
The growing
confusion surrounding Brexit is partly because of the pace and scale of events.
Things which would normally be big stories, dominating the news for days, are
forgotten within hours as some new development occurs. But beyond that pace and
scale, the confusion arises because Brexit has ceased to be a single political
process and now has multiple interconnected strands, some parliamentary and
some governmental, some of which are quite unusual in their form.
Moreover,
there are now multiple open factional splits amongst MPs and, of course, the
wider public. All of this serves to make events both fluid and shapeless.
Making any sense at all of them requires unravelling the separate strands,
although the constant developments mean that some of what is written here may
be out of date within a few days if not hours.
Indicative
Votes
One strand
was the continuation of the parliamentary process of Indicative Votes (IV),
which had its second
stage on Monday. As before, no proposition was supported. Here the
split, which has been growing for a while, between what we now call Common
Market 2.0 (CM2) advocates and People’s Vote (PV) advocates was a defining
feature.
CM2 could be
seen as a Brexiter proposition (were it not for the fact that most high-profile
Brexiter now regard it as ‘betraying Brexit’) but it is also a place where some
remainers now position themselves, on the basis that it is the least-worst form
of Brexit. For at least some PV advocates this makes it a ‘betrayal of remain’.
Thus, even though the IV process allowed for multiple choices to be made,
insufficient numbers were willing to vote for both propositions.
It was, as
a scathing analysis by Ian Dunt put it, a “self-inflicted defeat”
placing “puritanism over pragmatism” in a way that mirrored the same division
within the ERG. The latter, too, are now bitterly split between the self-styled
‘Spartans’
(or, as Martha Gill has amusingly dubbed them, the
‘Brincels’) who held out against May’s deal and those we might
appropriately call the ‘Bellocites’*.
That aside,
there were two noteworthy aspects of IV2. First, that it saw Labour officially
supporting both CM2 and PV propositions, perhaps indicating a clearer position
than hitherto been. Second, the failure of CM2 to be approved further shook the
now rickety edifice of the Tory Party and government, with Nick
Boles crossing the aisle in despair.
I do not
understand why – as had at one time been mooted – this second stage of IV was
not conducted using some sort of transferable vote system, which could have got
round the problem of tribalism and created some form of consensus, perhaps
alongside, or followed by, compositing of propositions. Perhaps this would have
happened at the third stage but that, now, is off the agenda following the
dramatic tie and hence (on the Speaker’s casting vote) defeat
of the Benn amendment that would have seen it take place next
Monday.
The Cooper
Bill
The end of
parliament’s IV process came as part of the second main strand of this week’s
events. For reasons which are not entirely clear to me (perhaps just to ensure
that they would not stand or fall together, or perhaps for some procedural
reason) the proposal to continue them was tagged as an amendment to the
business motion vote on whether to debate the Cooper Bill. This vote was, by a
margin of one, carried.
The Cooper
Bill – proposed by Labour MP Yvette Cooper, who has emerged as one of the
parliamentary stars of Brexit - requires the Prime Minister, within a day of it
passing, to seek MPs’ approval to apply to the EU for an extension to the
Article 50 period. The length of extension proposed would be of the Prime Minister’s
choosing, but could be amended by MPs. Although Theresa May had already said
she would be applying for an extension, the difference is that under this
legislation parliament would control the application and its period.
The Bill was
passed
by the Commons on third reading by, again, just one vote. The
following day it went to the House of Lords where it was subject to extensive
and shameless filibustering from Brexiter peers. It is ironic to recall that
the wrecking tactics of the unelected House of Lords were cited
by Theresa May as one reason for calling her ill-fated snap election
in 2017.
It could
only delay matters until Monday, but that delay mattered because in the
meantime Theresa
May has submitted her request for an extension – until 30 June. This seems
to be an attempt to avoid being subject to the putative Cooper Act, perhaps
simply for the symbolic reason of wanting it to seem to be the government
rather parliament is driving events. That would be a fairly typical piece of
May game-playing. I am not clear what, if anything, now happens when the Bill
is passed (or, even, whether it will now be pulled). But on the substantive
issue of extension and its length the decision rests with the EU in any case
(more of which below).
This strand
of events is significant in two ways. First, it is remarkable in terms of
political process. It is highly unusual (possibly, though I am not sure,
unique) for parliament rather than the government to propose legislation. It is
also highly unusual (but not, I believe, unique) for legislation to be passed
so quickly. Months of normal parliamentary process were telescoped into hours.
This, along with all the breathtakingly close votes, the defections, and the
resignations, is a reminder of just how desperate a crisis Brexit has created.
The second
significance is for Brexit itself. Some commentary
misleadingly suggested that the Bill would kill off no-deal. This is not true
precisely because the EU has to agree to any extension. Moreover, an extension
of any length does not prevent no-deal, it simply defers that possibility which
remains the default if nothing else is agreed.
What can be
said is that it shows the unlikelihood of parliament ever allowing UK to pursue
no-deal as a matter of its own choice. With the growing volume of Brexit Ultras
calling for just that – with gross irresponsibility massively downplaying
the catastrophic risks associated with it, and with gross dishonesty
claiming it was what
people voted for – this makes the Cooper Bill an important moment.
Whilst in recent days May seems to have clearly signalled that she would not
countenance pursuing no-deal, there’s no real reason to believe she won’t
flip-flop on that. The Bill, and the manner of its passing in the Commons,
emphasises that she has little scope to do so and that parliament has powerful
weapons to prevent it.
The
May-Corbyn talks
Alongside
these parliamentary strands runs a third, governmental, one. This emerged following
a very lengthy cabinet meeting in which Theresa May did indeed, it
would seem, reject
the no-dealers’ argument (£). Instead, she ‘reached out’ to Labour
to seek a consensus. As has been widely pointed out, the time for her to have
done this has long past. It should have happened when she first became Prime
Minister or at least after she failed to win the 2017 election.
It is,
again, a sign of the quite extraordinary crisis we are in that this
rapprochement should be sought. The personal and political dislike between May
and Corbyn is visceral, probably greater than there has ever been, at least in
my lifetime, between the leaders of the two main parties. Apparently despite
that, but actually compounding it, are their resemblances. As I
have written before, they are “remarkably similar in their grotesque
rigidity and their slightly tetchy muleishness born of a mediocrity of
character, intellect and judgement”. Both, moreover, are instinctively tribal.
But the
issues here go well beyond the personalities. Both parties are deeply troubled
by these talks. Tory Brexiters, especially, are outraged, leading to new
additions to what has become an epidemic
of ministerial resignations. One was Chris Heaton-Harris, who
infamously sought
information on the names of every UK academic teaching about Brexit
and what they taught. At the time it was said that it was research for a book
he was writing. It has never appeared, but perhaps now he will have time to
write it.
There is
great unease on the Labour side, too, about whether Corbyn is about to give in
to his pro-Brexit inclinations and, in the process, to make a huge tactical
error by taking a share of responsibility for Brexit and for rescuing May.
Moreover, anything that gets agreed between them would not in any substantive
way be enforceable under a future Tory Prime Minister and/or a new parliament.
The central
issue, though, is that the minimum that Corbyn can credibly seek would be a
permanent customs union. That would be far too much to be acceptable not just
to the ERG but also to plenty of other Tory
backbenchers and ministers. Yet that minimum demand would be far too
little for many Labour backbenchers (and members), for whom another referendum
is vital, whilst a sizeable
minority of them are adamantly opposed to Corbyn making such a
demand, and another segment only want a referendum on a ‘Tory’ Brexit. Equally,
the fragile formula of single market ‘alignment’ or ‘access’ that can hold
together those who want single market membership and those who don’t want free
movement of people. In a sense, the issue is to what extent Labour support for
CM2 and PV in the IV represented anything (other than a proliferation of
acronyms).
In short,
the talks lay bare the splits within each party and thus, even if they produce
anything, it is far from clear it would be something
for which there was a parliamentary majority (£). At the time of
writing the talks are set to continue. I would be surprised if they yield
anything more than, perhaps, some propositions to be voted on by the Commons -
but something more substantive obviously can’t be ruled out.
Where next?
That
question is no easier to answer than it has been for months. May’s request for
an extension only until the end of June is an absurdity, and as Green MP Caroline
Lucas pointed out “at odds with reality”. The current signs are that the
EU-27 will propose a one year extension with the possibility of it being ended
earlier if the UK is ready. Thus, as if we needed it, there is now a new piece
of Brexit jargon: flextension.
This has
been floated by Donald Tusk, but it cannot
be assumed that it is what the 27 will agree, as recent noises
from President Macron underscore. It does, after all, require
unanimous agreement. Moreover, the rationale for extension offered in terms of
the ongoing talks with Labour plus a plan for more Commons votes seems to fall
somewhat short of a robust process. And with Brexit Ultras like Jacob
Rees-Mogg already talking grotesquely of using the extension period to be
as obstructive as possible it’s not hard to see why some countries might not be
eager to extend.
If no extension
were agreed then the next huge debate is going to be whether the UK, without a
further referendum, chooses to revoke Article 50 notification. MPs did not
endorse this idea in the IV process: if no-deal becomes imminent that might
well change.
May’s ‘short’
request is probably best understood as a signal to the Brexiters that she tried
her best to minimise delay, but the EU insisted otherwise. But the text of the
letter, which refers to making preparations of the European Parliament
elections is also a signal that she is ready for, and probably expecting, the
extension to be longer. There is also a clear signal to the Brexiters in her
acceptance that the Withdrawal Amendment will not be re-opened: they cannot
hope for a renegotiation of the backstop. That is significant since even this
week, ludicrously, they are still
flogging the ‘Malthouse’ dead horse (this time as an attempted amendment to
the Cooper Bill) which would require such a renegotiation.
Participation
in the European Parliament elections would not be the terrible calamity that
May and others claim it to be. But it will be a very important moment, bitterly
contested between pro- and anti-Brexit parties and candidates. It will be the
latest of the Brexit ironies if the UK for once approaches European elections
in a highly engaged way with a huge turnout. And if it should end up that we
stay in the EU, it is an opportunity to send more decent and sensible MEPs in
place of the UKIP wreckers.
A long
extension will surely change the political dynamic. Even if May’s deal is still
potentially in play the disappearance into the long grass of an actual exit day
will fuel a sense amongst leavers that it is never going to happen. That is no
bad thing – better to release the pressure of the ‘betrayal’ narrative slowly.
For the time
being the talks with Labour will continue and, should they fail, the government
itself, rather than parliament, is set begin another IV process. The results of
that are unpredictable – and will depend in part upon what options the
government table, something already
causing concern to the MPs who created parliament’s original IV
process - but seem likely to soften Brexit and/or to see support for a
referendum. There are reports
that the latter is to be offered as one of the propositions that will be put
for consideration.
On that
basis, it’s tempting to think that the Ultras have, through their own
intransigence, let the chances of Brexit slip. Yet, even if this proves true,
they will be happy enough to hunker down for years of victimhood and betrayal
talk. It’s win-win for them. It’s tempting, too, to think that, despite the
inconclusive results of Monday’s IVs, another referendum is now more in
prospect than before, possibly via
a Kyle-Wilson arrangement whereby May’s deal is accepted by
parliament in toto on condition of a
confirmatory public vote.
A mirror to
the nation
It’s also
tempting – and no doubt many succumb – to think that all the political drama
shows parliament in a bad light. I don’t think so. There is, in a way,
something admirable about the way that parliament has come so centrally into
focus, with so many people now tuning in watch debates and votes. With it we
have also discovered outstanding parliamentary commentators in Ruth Fox
and Mark d’Arcy.
Despite what the Brexiters told us, the British parliament is sovereign, and
what it does matters.
What
parliament is in fact doing is precisely what it should: representing the
nation. But that holds up a depressing and deeply worrying mirror to all of us.
For it reveals a country deeply, toxically and perhaps irredeemably divided,
facing choices all of which are bad, and with no agreement whatsoever what to
do about an entirely self-created mess. Semi-naked
protestors and a flood of
water or, on one early account,
sewage (this turned out not to be true)
in the Commons chamber just add some all too piquant, if unsubtle, metaphors to
the picture.
To repeat an
obvious point, the root of all the chaos we see is having offered the country
the opportunity to choose as its entire economic and geo-political strategy
something with multiple, contradictory and hotly-contested definitions and,
when voters took that opportunity, to enter into a time-limited process before
settling on a definition. It was never going to end well, and it’s not.
*“And always keep a-hold of Nurse/ For fear of
finding something worse” Jim (1907) by Hilaire Belloc