Of the many ways of expressing how British politics has changed in my lifetime, one is that during the first fifty or so years of it there were seven Prime Ministers and in the subsequent ten years there have been the same number. I also happen to be exactly the same age as Nigel Farage who, for about half our lives, since he became a founder-member of UKIP in 1993, has been a major figure in anti-EU and populist politics.
This week, the seventh of those more recent Prime Ministers was installed whilst Farage’s political career is facing perhaps its greatest threats. So this will be another very long post but, unless something particularly important or interesting happens, it will be my last until September.
Burnham’s government and Brexit
Andy Burnham’s political orientation is now becoming clearer and much has already been written about it, including good discussions of his ‘politics of place’ by the Observer’s editor Ceri Thomas and of the idea of ‘Manchesterism’ by the BBC’s Economics editor Faisal Islam. Especially interesting, and less widely discussed, is Burnham’s commitment to the Cooperative Party and movement, as explained by Professor Colin Talbot in Civil Service World.
His first words and decisions as Prime Minister have also begun to give a sense of the nature of the government he will lead, although inevitably much remains unknown. One important signal is the appointment of John Healey as Chancellor which, amongst other things, implies that there will a serious commitment to increasing defence spending. The importance of that was underlined by the latest aggression in Russia’s undeclared war with Britain, with its Navy undertaking live-fire exercises a few miles off the British coast on the very day Burnham came to office. Now would be a good time for the government to investigate the many pressing questions about Russian interference in British politics raised by the recent Open Britain report.
In terms of the focus of this blog, the key issue is what Burnham’s government means for Brexit and Brexitism. This can be considered in the narrow sense of how Burnham’s administration will approach UK-EU relations. On that, Joël Reland of UKICE has provided a good summary of how things look at present. In essence, he argues that Burnham will be less interested than was Starmer in closer trade relations with the EU, but also less interested in regulatory competition (e.g. as regards AI and technology generally), whilst being at least as interested as Starmer in closer security links. Reland also suggests that, if this is so, in many ways it will make the Burnham’s Britain a more congenial interlocutor to the EU.
It is significant that Ed Miliband, the new Foreign Secretary, has already publicly committed to deepening and strengthening the UK-EU relationship (his predecessor, Yvette Cooper, showed little interest in doing so, although her own predecessor, David Lammy, had been vocally pro-European). As ever, though, the question is what this means in practice. Specific Ministerial responsibility for relations with the EU moves from Nick Thomas-Symonds to Hamish Falconer who, like his predecessor, will attend, though not be a member of, the Cabinet (but unlike his predecessor will partly be located in the Foreign Office). There has been some speculation that this appointment betokens a softening, or abandoning, of Labour’s ‘red lines’, but speculation is all it is.
Also highly relevant is the post of Northern Ireland Secretary and the Cabinet reshuffle saw the departure of Hilary Benn, who from all accounts had been highly accomplished both in navigating Northern Ireland’s complex politics and in improving relations with Dublin, so strained by Brexit. However, there’s no reason to think that his replacement by Chris Bryant implies any substantive change of approach, and both of them were strong opponents of Brexit. Indeed, more generally, the construction of the new cabinet seems more to do with removing those most closely associated with Keir Starmer than with redefining Starmer’s approach to Brexit. Nor, for that matter, is the EU’s approach to post-Brexit relations likely to change as a result of Burnham’s arrival.
Burnhamism, Brexit, and Brexitism
The wider question is where Brexit and Brexitism sit within what is already being called ‘Burnhamism’. One part of the answer is that, as I wrote briefly after he won the Makerfield by-election, there is a strong current of nostalgia in Burnham’s politics. It’s no coincidence that in his acceptance speech as Labour leader he spoke of heeding the call of voters “for a return of the Labour they once knew”. That vision of the party is inextricable from his analysis of politics as a whole. For in that speech (and on numerous other occasions) his argument is that deindustrialization and the “four decades of … neoliberalism that began in the 1980s” are at the core of Britain’s economic and political problems, and he links this directly to the history of the Labour Party, in a passage which I will quote at length:
“And let us never forget: these are the very same places that built this Labour movement, this trade union movement, where we are today… Those are the places, but they were the places that were done down. This Labour movement, the trade union movement, was forged in the steelworks and iron works of Sheffield, Scunthorpe, Port Talbot, and Teesside, in the coal fields of South Wales, Central Scotland, Nottinghamshire, Derbyshire, Yorkshire, and Lancashire, in the mills across the Pennines, west and east, in the shipyards on the Clyde and on the Tyne, and in the dockyards of Liverpool, and here in London, the people of these proud places made Labour.”
In itself, none of this is necessarily connected with Brexit, but in a crucial phrase in that same acceptance speech Burnham suggested that it is:
“The right used the phrase ‘take back control’, but they are the ones who gave it away in the first place. If we want an economy and a country that works for all people and places, which to me should always be at the very core of Labourism, then it requires a new path to the one we’ve been on for the last 40 years.”
The invocation of the Vote Leave slogan in this way makes it clear what Burnham’s view of Brexit is, and it is a view which has been a common one amongst many on the left since the referendum result. In essence, it sees Brexit as having been a response, albeit a misguided response, by the working class, especially in the north of England, to the damaging consequences of neo-liberalism and (although it is hardly the same thing) London-centrism. On this view, the instinct to ‘take back control’ was right, but Brexit was the wrong way to go about it. Nor is such a view confined to the left. A version of it is what informed Theresa May’s argument that the Brexit referendum had revealed that too many people had been “left behind” by economic liberalism and globalization, and, subsequently, Boris Johnson’s “levelling up” agenda.
There may be an element of truth in this view, although it has always had limitations, as any mono-causal explanation of Brexit is bound to have. In particular, Professor Danny Dorling’s influential analysis has shown the importance of middle-class and southern English support for ‘leave’ in delivering the referendum result. There are difficulties with that analysis, too, but my point here is not to re-hash debates about the causes of the vote to leave, it is that Burnham adheres to a particular view of it, which is imprinted on his Prime Ministership. Specifically, it means that his position is that Brexit was a symptom of a deeper malaise and, therefore, tackling that deeper malaise, rather than tackling Brexit, is the primary task.
This explains why, whilst there is no doubt that Burnham was opposed to Brexit and campaigned against it, and he has said as recently as last September that he would like to see the UK rejoin the EU in his lifetime, his position now is that he does not intend to “re-run Brexit arguments” or to propose rejoining. In short, he wants to treat the illness, not the symptom. In this sense, Burnhamism represents the latest iteration of Labour’s attempt to respond to the challenges which Brexit created for the party.
The nostalgia problem
One obvious difficulty with his response is that, if his policy agenda is to revive manufacturing industry, then the barriers to trade created by Brexit are a major obstacle. But, with or without Brexit, Burnham invokes a world which no longer exists. The industries he cited in the speech quoted above – coal, steel, textiles, shipbuilding, docking – have largely disappeared and will not come back. And the places where they existed developed because of the presence of things like coal, water, humidity, or, in other cases, clay or minerals, which were necessary for them (or, in the case of docking, because of pre-containerization technology). Those reasons have also gone.
It obviously bears saying that the speech I’ve quoted was to the party faithful, on the occasion of becoming party leader, so some nods to Labour’s history were inevitable and to some extent ritualistic. Even so, it is significant that he chose not to use an important opportunity to frame his leadership of Labour in a future-oriented way. That points to him being wedded to a political psychology within which the Labour Party is inseparable from heavy manufacturing industries of the past or, at the very least, within which workers in those industries are the template of what the ‘real working-class’ looks like. This is the Labour Party voters “once knew” and which he has vowed to revive. Yet, leaving aside for a moment the economics of this, it is at odds with the political realities of a party whose membership and voting base are now much more fragmented and with the demographic realities of a class structure which is far more complex than in the past.
As for the economics, I don’t suppose for one moment that Burnham is proposing that the traditional industries he referenced will return. It must surely be the case that his vision for re-industrialisation is based on the kinds of modern manufacturing which do still exist and could be developed much further, such as aerospace, biotechnology or pharmaceuticals. He may well also include service industries within this vision.
But, assuming this is so, it is again notable that he is choosing not to frame his narrative in this forward-looking direction. Equally, if the geography of re-industrialisation is to be mapped on to the communities created by old industries then the key drivers of it will need to be infrastructure connecting those places and the education and training available within them. That may well be within the ambit of his policy agenda but, if so, it means creating new kinds of communities, not fetishising those of the past.
The significance of Burnham’s nostalgic framing of both the meaning of the Labour Party and the meaning of industry is, I think, that it replicates at least some of the politicised nostalgia of Brexitism. As with Brexitism, the ideas that the country has lost its way, that globalization has eroded traditional communities, and that centralized policymaking has caused the decline of the local high street, all speak to the inchoate resentment of something having been not just lost by, but taken from, ‘ordinary people’. Moreover, whilst there may be good arguments for Burnham’s strong commitment to devolution from London, there is within it more than a whiff of the Brexitist resentment of the metropolitan elite or just of those who live within the circumference of the M25.
One of the many difficulties of this kind of nostalgic resentment is that, by presenting contemporary Britain as having taken a form which has been inflicted on its population, it ignores how it also reflects the preferences of that population. It is true that globalization has removed many jobs and industries that used to exist here, but it is also true that British people have chosen to buy cheaper imported consumer goods and would be reluctant to stop. It’s true that high streets have declined, but it is also true that people have chosen to buy cheaper goods online and would be reluctant to stop. It’s true that people say they want decisions to be made locally rather than by ‘remote Whitehall bureaucrats’, with, as Burnham puts it “power returned to every postcode in the land”, but they also strongly object to ‘postcode lotteries’ in, for example, public service provision. And whilst ‘four decades of neo-liberalism’ may have been every bit as damaging as Burnham claims, voters gave Margaret Thatcher three big election wins and, subsequently, many accepted the proposition that any party advocating a major departure from what her governments bequeathed was ‘unelectable’. And many of those same people voted for Brexit.
The biggest question about ‘Burnhamist’ nostalgia is how far its overlap with Brexitism extends to immigration policy, and continues with the false proposition that it is possible to have economic prosperity and thriving public services as well as draconian immigration controls, and that this is necessary to see off the threat from Reform. The retention of Shabana Mahmood as Home Secretary might suggest that this is just what is in prospect. If so, that is going to make Burnham’s (highly laudable) aspirations to reform the social care system undeliverable. It will also undermine his ideas of regional re-industrialisation since central to any realistic possibility of this are universities, which are currently being immolated on the altar of ‘legitimate concerns’ about immigration.
I’m aware that all this may sound too dour, or too sour, or both. I’m also aware of the fault to which many politically-minded people are prone, whether on the left or the right, of demanding purity of political leaders, or of making the perfect the enemy of the good. In some ways, Keir Starmer suffered from the reluctance of ‘progressives’ (broadly conceived) to accept his imperfections and the compromises that all political leaders have to make. Indeed, with tedious predictability (yes, that is a link to an article by Owen Jones in the Guardian), there are some on the liberal-left who have already written Burnham off.
So it’s worth noting that there is a case for optimism. Burnham has already shown an ability, which it was widely agreed that Starmer lacked, to articulate an optimistic narrative and a sense of purpose. He has an engaging manner and he’s politically savvy. He has provided some simple, understandable priorities around devolution and regeneration and if he sticks to them that will be a contrast not just to Starmer’s flip-flopping on policy decisions but his tendency to say on any given day that this, that, or the other was his government’s ‘number one’ focus.
Farage’s fortunes
It might also be argued that it is precisely the way that Burnham’s political philosophy speaks to the nostalgic resentment of Brexitism which provides the basis for him to see off the electoral challenge of Reform. And, given events of the last few weeks, that challenge may be ebbing anyway. I wrote about this in my previous post, discussing Nigel Farage’s ill-judged resignation in order to re-fight his Clacton seat but since then there have been some developments.
One is just that his contest with Count Binface is already being spoken of as a national joke, and social media rage about the failure of the main parties to contest it seems to have had little cut-through with the general public. Perhaps more importantly, the stream of stories about the source of Farage’s and Reform’s funding continues apace, including its relationship to the murky world of cryptocurrencies. On this, Sian Norris’s article for Open Democracy is particularly eye-opening but it is probably of greater political significance that it is now being extensively reported by the BBC, and that there has been a spate of revelations in the Times/ Sunday Times (£) leading to several public [warning: link to X] and, reportedly, private attacks from leading figures in Reform on the Murdoch-owned media group. Even more remarkable has been a surge of negative stories in the Mail, including coverage of Reform’s various actual or alleged financial links to Russia.
Much of this is not exactly news, of course, and has been exposed for many years, not least by the indefatigable work of Pulitzer Prize finalist and Orwell Prize-winning journalist Carole Cadwalladr, in the face of massive abuse and intimidation. But, as she herself has recently written, it has been largely unreported and the reason, she says, is “Brexit. For years, investigating Farage was off-limits to Britain’s rightwing print media because ‘challenging’ Brexit was off limits. That included reporting on the money behind it.”
Quite what has shifted in the media establishment, and why it has done so now, is unclear (to me), but it is an observable fact that it has happened, and that marks an important political change.
The alleged murder of Ann Widdecombe
Within this changed environment, the other recent development has been the alleged murder of Ann Widdecombe. Much about this is, for the moment at least, unknown, beyond the facts that the injuries sustained were horrific and that a man has been charged with her murder and has appeared in a Magistrates’ Court where he did not enter a plea to the charge. It should go without saying that any such killing is repugnant, and that politically-motivated killings, if that is what this was (which has yet to be established), have an added repugnance. Beyond that I’m not going to comment or speculate about the case itself, but what is a legitimate subject for comment is the way in which it has been discussed.
That said, I can hardly bring myself to write about that in any detail by giving quotes and links to people whose conduct is contemptible. But, in summary, from the moment the news broke, there has been a frenzy of social media activity. Some of that has been mawkish and prurient, some of it conspiratorial, some of it frankly insane. Almost all of it was rancid and some of it may have prejudiced the fair trial of the accused man.
A recurring theme was denunciation of the police for disclosing that an initial suspect (who was subsequently released without charge) and the man who was eventually charged with murder were white Britons. This was presented as being in some way suspicious or ‘woke’, ignoring the fact that such disclosures arise precisely because failure to do so in previous high-profile cases has led to accusations of cover-ups from some of the very same people now complaining, and sometimes to riots as a result.
In response to their demands, last year the police were issued with new guidance encouraging disclosure in such cases. That they did so this time was undoubtedly because so many social media posters were fairly obviously salivating at the prospect of the perpetrator being an immigrant or an asylum seeker, and the danger of public disorder that represented. Inevitably, once that prospect seemed to disappear the on-line mob switched to speculating, or simply claiming, that the perpetrator must have been a left-wing extremist.
More generally, there have been constant demands to be given immediate information, before the facts were known, with the nonsensical assertion that the public had the ‘right’ to be told everything about the case, and, even, ‘to debate’ it, whilst it was still being investigated and/or whilst the judicial process is underway. When this prompted the police to state that, in the early stages, they had found “nothing to suggest” that it was a politically-motivated or terrorist act this, itself, was denounced as a cover-up, just as it would have been had they said nothing. The level of stupidity and irresponsibility displayed, not just by pseudonymous social media posters but by some public figures, politicians and supposed journalists, was the latest example of the increasingly disgraceful nature of, especially, on-line public discourse.
Alongside all this, there were, as the Times (£) and other newspapers reported, several accusations that Farage and Reform, specifically, were exploiting the alleged murder for political purposes, accusations made by, amongst others, the former Tory MP Harvey Proctor who had been a close friend of Ann Widdecombe. This was furiously denied by those accused, but what is certainly true is that, without knowing anything about the facts of the case, Reform immediately used it to claim that its MPs, and Farage in particular, needed more security than they receive from official sources.
In particular, there seemed to be an attempt to suggest that the alleged murder in some way justified the idea that Farage needed the £5 million gift he received from Christopher Harborne in order to provide him with security (although, at other times, he has said that it was unconditional and could be used to “buy Ferraris” and, anyway, the issue in dispute is the declaration of the gift, rather than the gift per se). So all of this stank of hypocrisy, as did numerous accusations that ‘the left’ had created this atmosphere of political violence by its use of intemperate language even as many of the same people making these accusations continue to laud Lucy Connelly as a free speech “martyr”.
Much of this replicated the ways that the murder of Charlie Kirk was exploited, both in the US and the UK, last year. However, repellent as this attempt to make use of Ann Widdecombe’s killing in this way has been, it does not seem to have dented the sense that the Farage/ Reform bubble is bursting, and it is hard to see how, whatever its outcome, the Clacton by-election can do anything but add to that. There was a telling headline about Farage and the by-election recently, to the effect that ‘when voters start laughing at you it’s over’. Even more telling was that it appeared in the Mail.
A new chapter?
Changes in Prime Minister do not automatically portend new eras in politics. It is only with historical distance that their significance or otherwise becomes clear. This makes it foolhardy to anticipate what that significance will be, but I will risk the guess that Burnham’s tenure will come to be seen within the common frame of the post-Brexit period as much, or more, as having an identity in its own right, if only in the sense of being another attempt to ‘make Brexit work’.
Even in the more immediate term, it is difficult to know whether the opinion poll bounce Labour has recently enjoyed, and the decline in support for Reform, will continue. Within the fates of these two parties are nested other questions, which will have a direct effect on how Brexit now develops.
One is whether the Labour government finds that an industrial renaissance is incompatible with its existing ‘red lines’ on UK-EU relations and comes to pursue some version of rejoining. The other is whether the prospect of a Reform government (or a Conservative one, given that party’s present positioning) remains realistic since, for so long as it does, that renders any version of rejoining impossible to negotiate with the EU. These are likely to be the main Brexit-related questions for the coming political period.
With that, I will now take a break from posting over the summer.
Showing posts with label Andy Burnham. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Andy Burnham. Show all posts
Friday, 24 July 2026
Friday, 26 June 2026
Brexit ten years on: unsettled and unsettling
It is fitting that virtually on the day of the tenth anniversary of the referendum yet another political crisis came to a head with the resignation of Keir Starmer. Within the next couple of weeks, or at most months, we are now set to have another Prime Minister, the seventh since the Brexit vote. With that have come three general elections, not to mention a massive churn of ministerial appointments. Taken together with the administrative bandwidth absorbed by Brexit, both before and since leaving the EU, it is fair to say that the British polity has been overwhelmed over the last decade.
It would be equally fair to say that the combination of current events has overwhelmed my ability to write about them concisely, so this is another inordinately long post.
Starmer’s downfall
Brexit is not the only reason for the shortening cycle of political leadership, and the UK is not the only European country (£) to have experienced it. But, for reasons I’ve discussed previously, there are multiple and complex links, both direct and indirect, between the referendum vote and the subsequent destabilization of British politics. In that sense, our political instability is one more piece of Brexit damage to be added to the long list which has accrued over the last ten years, and perhaps the one which was least predictable.
So far as Starmer, specifically, is concerned, the reasons for his downfall are various but Brexit was certainly part of the mix. In particular, ever since the referendum the Labour Party has been haunted by the possibility that the populists are right to claim to speak for ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’, a possibility which is deeply disconcerting to a party which regards doing so as its prerogative and foundational principle. In this way, Brexit exacerbated the longstanding difficulty Labour has had in facing up to the fact that its traditional electoral base in unionized manufacturing industry has been eroding for decades and, to the extent it does face up to that, still regards that eroding demographic as the template for the ‘real working class’. In its way, it is every bit as nostalgia-driven as Brexitism.
It is this which explains Starmer’s relentless focus on the sensibilities of leave voters in Labour’s erstwhile heartlands and his near disdain for the broader ‘progressive’ coalition characterizing most of the actual and potential support for Labour. This fed through most obviously into immigration policy and, closely associated, the ‘red lines’ on UK-EU relations. There was a logic to avoiding positioning Labour as a ‘rejoin’ party at the 2024 election, but Starmer went well beyond that in constantly seeking to appease Reform or Reform-curious voters’ hostility to immigration.
The result was always going to be that those voters would be unimpressed and, if anything, pandering to their ‘legitimate concerns’ made it more likely that they would support parties with more extreme ‘solutions’. Meanwhile, ‘progressive’ voters were alienated by this approach causing their support to leak away to other parties, especially the Greens.
That this is what has happened is borne out by academic research and further demonstrated by a YouGov poll this week, showing that 2024 Reform voters are most likely to feel that Labour are trying to appeal to them but least likely to say they will consider voting for Labour. The personal loathing which the public have for Starmer seems (to me, though not just to me) disproportionate, but the fact that it extends across the political spectrum to encompass both his ‘natural’ supporters and opponents is a reflection of the fundamental flaw of this approach.
All this, including of course the re-emergence of Nigel Farage from his post-referendum resignation to create the Reform party, refracts through Brexit and, along with other factors, created the context for Starmer’s demise. It meant that his party became convinced that he would fail the most basic and brutal test of a party leader: to win the next election. Worse, since the May elections, his MPs believed that he would lose it catastrophically
Enter Burnham, stage left – or stage right?
There is much more that could to be written about all of this, but the immediate fact is that, once again, there is the instability of a change of Prime Minister, and that is not just an issue in terms of the disruption and uncertainty it entails. Prime Ministerial changes between elections also raise questions of legitimacy. Of course, everyone knows that in our political system the PM is not directly elected, and is the person who can command a majority in the House of Commons, so such changes are not constitutionally improper and have happened many times in the past. But for these changes to happen so frequently strains that constitutional convention, which in any case is strained if the incoming PM seeks to radically depart from manifesto commitments.
Already, there are contradictory reports about whether Andy Burnham has or has not ruled out an early election, and it’s worth recalling the potential traps this creates. When Gordon Brown took over from Tony Blair in 2007, he initially refused to rule out an election and there was much speculation that he would call one. When he decided not to, he earned the nickname ‘Bottler Brown’. Conversely, when Theresa May took over from David Cameron in 2016, she was adamant there would be no election and the perceived opportunism of her sudden decision to hold one the next year was one reason for its disastrous outcome.
Regardless of whether there is an election, it is unclear at this point what Burnham’s policy agenda will be and to what extent it will differ from that of the last two years, especially as he will face many of the same constraints. His supporters’ main hope seems to be that he will change the political mood, if not the political programme, by being more communicatively and strategically adept than Keir Starmer. And it’s true that he has more ease of manner than his predecessor, although that does not place him in an especially exclusive club. It’s also true that he comfortably beat Reform in Makerfield, but it’s not clear how much can be extrapolated from the rather unique circumstances of that by-election.
For what little it’s worth, my personal view is that, probably within short order, he will become almost as unpopular as Starmer, will be as unwilling to make and stick to difficult choices, and will be seen as equally lacking in strategic coherence. The veteran political journalist Philip Stephens is of much the same opinion but, clearly, other views are available including from Ian Dunt, a commentator with whom I often agree, and I’ll be happy if I am proved wrong.
One reason for my pessimism is that so much of Burnham’s pitch, at least so far, seems to have its own version of Blue Labour nostalgia. There may be much to agree with in his analysis that “Britain has been on the wrong path for forty years” but it is hard to see how he can deliver on the promise of “re-industrialization” or whether it is a viable strategy for the British economy. And he has already indicated that, despite his previous criticism of them, he is now committed (£) to the immigration policies being pursued by Shabana Mahmood (or has he changed his mind again?), which is certainly not a viable strategy for the British economy. He has also said that he “agrees with what Farage is saying” about the need to go further in controlling immigration, and that he would make greater use of migrant detention centres. At first sight, then, his approach, at least on this key issue, looks set to replicate Starmer’s in trying to appease Reform voters whilst being careless of progressive voters.
Ten years on: what is Brexit?
Closely related to Burnham’s overall political strategy is the question of what his approach to the EU is going to be (and, more generally, his approach to foreign policy, about which he has said very little). Just before Starmer resigned, the date for the next UK-EU summit had, finally, been set for 22 July. In one scenario for how the leadership contest (or non-contest) plays out, Burnham might actually be Prime Minister by then, but in any case the President of the European Council has announced that the meeting will be postponed.
Already that is being spun by the pro-Brexit press (£) as a sign that the EU is expecting Burnham to be a “soft touch” who will make “more concessions”, which re-written in adult might mean Burnham pursuing the “more ambitious” agenda that Starmer recently promised. But the reality is that nobody knew what Starmer meant by that and, certainly, nobody knows what Burnham’s agenda will be. It seems highly unlikely he will not proceed with whatever has presumably now been agreed on SPS regulations, emissions trading, and youth mobility, but whether he might go further, and what that might consist of, is at this point opaque. It is a reminder that there is still no agreed meaning of Brexit, and ‘Burnham’s Brexit’ has yet to be defined.
The fact that UK-EU relations are still in flux and their direction uncertain, and even the framing of that by Brexiters in terms of the UK being forced into “concessions” by having a “soft” leader, is a microcosm of why the tenth anniversary of the referendum has a rather different meaning from that which features in most of the tidal wave of discussion about it. I will come back to what that meaning is but, for now, will focus on the broader discussion. Since almost every commentator has had their say (myself included, for example in Byline Times (£) and on the Oh God What Now? Podcast) it would be impossible to consider it all here, so I will provide just a very brief outline.
Analysing Brexit
Much of the discussion consists of analysis of the effects, especially the economic effects, Brexit has had, and a very good overview of these was provided by the BBC’s Economics Editor Faisal Islam. In terms of specific research studies, an excellent example is John Springford and Anton Spisak’s report for the Centre for European Reform, which is especially useful in disaggregating the (much larger) negative impact of leaving the single market from that of leaving the customs union. Also excellent is a new paper by Eleonora Alabresa and others about the variation in the regional effects of Brexit which, whilst assessing the overall negative impact at about 7-8% (which is consistent with some other studies), shows this to vary considerably by region.
These two studies can also be considered together in that the Alabresa paper shows that Northern Ireland is exceptional in having had little or no economic damage, reflecting it being effectively still part of the single market for goods. A long time ago, I wrote that Northern Ireland would provide a kind of natural experiment to understand the economic effects of Brexit (I can’t now find it to link to, and I’m sure others have made the same point). And so it has proved but, in fact, the outcome was already implied in the perhaps inadvertently revealing remark made by Michael Gove in 2020 when he said Northern Ireland would “get the best of both worlds”. Then as now that prompts the question: why not the rest of the UK?
There has also been much discussion of the domestic political effects of Brexit, some of which I’ve already touched on in this post. A particularly revealing analysis was provided by Jonathan Vincent in the Financial Times (£), which includes some illuminating infographics showing how voters’ behaviour is still significantly structured by how they voted in the referendum, underscoring the persistence of ‘remainer’ and ‘leaver’ as political identities. Meanwhile, the experiences of EU citizens living in the UK, some of the people most traumatically affected by Brexit, are recorded in the Brexit Lived Experience Archive (BLEA) created by Professor Tanja Bueltmann and publicly launched to coincide with the referendum anniversary.
Possibly the most comprehensive overall analysis, not just of the last ten years but of the future possibilities for UK-EU relations, is the report produced by multiple authors from the UK in a Changing Europe (UKICE) centre. UKICE, which throughout the whole process has been, and remains, the single best source of analysis of Brexit, has also produced a variety of themed reports marking the tenth anniversary, notable examples including Joël Reland’s on regulation (showing how little regulatory divergence there has been) and Jannike Wachowiak’s on how the EU has changed during the period (providing an important antidote to what has been, as so often, a largely parochial discussion).
Defending Brexit
None of these analytical reports and commentaries suggest that Brexit has been a success and, as most contributions to the anniversary discussion acknowledge, the polling evidence that a consistent and increasingly large majority of the population view it as having been a failure and a mistake is clear. But, of course, there have been numerous pro-Brexit comment pieces which continue to defend the project. They are all fairly similar in nature, since the arguments are now well-rehearsed, so I will only focus on three, but that should not be taken to imply that these pro-Brexit views are in any way rare.
Strikingly, they almost all share one common feature, which is that they are defensive. That is, they are framed as a defence against what they recognize to be the established narrative that Brexit has not been a success. That in itself is important. In January 2021, as the transition period ended, I wrote that what happened then would “shape the post-Brexit narrative”. It did, and what was established was a narrative that it had been a failure. So, whilst Brexiters do not accept this to be true, they do accept that it is the narrative. Had the battle for that narrative gone the other way, the terms of this tenth anniversary discussion would be entirely, unrecognizably, different.
As has long been the case, one of the major defences of Brexit by its advocates is that ‘it was not done properly’. Tellingly, the banner front-page headline in the Express on the day of the anniversary was a plaintive demand to “Give Us Proper Brexit”. Equally telling was a Financial Times report about how the various leading Brexiters all blame each other (as well, of course, as remainers) for this failure to deliver ‘proper Brexit’.
Those mounting such arguments have never been able to explain a realistic way in which Brexit could have been done successfully, or even to agree about what proper Brexit means. But it is an argument that can always be made, since it is, strictly speaking, irrefutable (which is makes it a weak, not a strong, argument in that it is not susceptible to any meaningful test). As many people have observed, it is an argument with the same structure as that made by those who insist that ‘real Communism’ has yet to be tried.
One of the slightly better articles making this kind of argument is that by Matthew Jeffrey at Conservative Home, but it shows no understanding of why the regulatory divergence it proposes has not happened, and relies on a wholly unrealistic claim about what ‘mutual recognition agreements’ could make possible for international trade. Most glaringly, it advocates using post-Brexit freedoms to follow “aggressive tax competitiveness” citing as an example the strategy followed by, er, Ireland – an EU member state. The conclusion, inevitably, is that (like real communism) “the real Brexit is still to come”.
The problems of defending Brexit whilst claiming it has been betrayed, or not done properly, are all too obvious, which is perhaps why Michael Gove’s article in the Spectator mainly takes a different tack. Asking the question ‘The Brexit decade: was it worth it?’ (to which his unsurprising answer is ‘yes’), Gove attempts to itemise how Britain has benefitted from Brexit. As with any such list, there are questions about the veracity and desirability of each claimed benefit, but the fact that he includes the demonstrably false ones that Brexit enabled a faster vaccine roll-out (a lie which Boris Johnson has also repeated this week), allowed the UK to support Ukraine, and provided “much more than £350 million a week extra for the NHS” makes it hard to take any of them very seriously.
Moreover, as is again typical of such lists of benefits, it is meaningless because there is little or no recognition of the costs of Brexit. In particular, Gove, with presumably knowing outrageousness, reprises his infamous line from the campaign in deriding “experts from organisations with acronyms who have got things consistently wrong in the past”. In fact, the Treasury’s pre-referendum long-term analysis of the impact of Brexit, giving as its central estimate of the scenario of a negotiated bilateral trade agreement – as happened – that GDP would be 6.2% lower after 15 years (see p.7 of the document), is remarkably similar to most of the credible estimates of what is actually happening which mainly lie in the range of 4% to 8% [1].
In the end, though, Gove simply falls back on the standard get-out that, whether the effects have been positive or negative, Brexit is definitively justified on the abstract grounds of ‘sovereignty’, with national politicians making national laws and being held accountable for them (though not, it seems, being accountable for advocating Brexit). As ever, there is no recognition that sovereignty-sharing is an act of, rather than a negation of, sovereignty; nor of the many ways in which EU members exert sovereignty and hold national politicians accountable; nor of the many ways that all sorts of international regulatory systems (including but not limited to those of the EU) continue, necessarily, to impinge on the UK; nor of any of the many other ways that the ‘taking back control’ thesis is flawed.
Effectively the same argument, though from a different part of the political spectrum, is made by Larry Elliott, the ‘Lexiter’ economics commentator at the Guardian. He, too, takes issue with the economic consensus about the damage of Brexit, in particular questioning the OBR’s estimate of 4% less GDP after 15 years. He does so on what, for an economist, is the rather innumerate basis that, if true, it would mean the economy would be “4% bigger today” [emphasis added]. Otherwise, he opines that “Brexit showed that class still matters in politics” (who knew?) and, like Jeffrey and Gove, that Brexit “creates an opportunity for change” though, in his case, that change should be to ‘reverse forty years of neo-liberalism’ which, he hopes, is what Burnham intends to do. In this, once again, we see the capacity of Brexit to have multiple, incompatible meanings amongst its adherents but also, more specifically, how already a Burnham premiership is being anticipated in the Telegraph as a ‘soft touch’ which will take the UK closer to the EU and by Elliott as the saviour of the Lexit project.
Reframing the anniversary
Thus, rather as I anticipated in a recent post, this latest ‘national conversation’ about Brexit is in many ways the same as that which we have had for ten years and more. And, in another recent post, I quoted the second edition of my book about Brexit pointing out that according to its advocates and supporters Brexit “certainly wasn’t proposed as, or supposed to be, the prelude to a country permanently divided on the wisdom of Brexit, still less to an interminable debate about whether it had been the right thing to do ….” (p.285) and I went on to quote David Frost saying (in 2022) that “one piece of evidence of failure [of Brexit] would be if we are still debating this in five- or six-years’ time in the same way. I think [if] it is to succeed it needs to settle in the British polity.”
It would be equally fair to say that the combination of current events has overwhelmed my ability to write about them concisely, so this is another inordinately long post.
Starmer’s downfall
Brexit is not the only reason for the shortening cycle of political leadership, and the UK is not the only European country (£) to have experienced it. But, for reasons I’ve discussed previously, there are multiple and complex links, both direct and indirect, between the referendum vote and the subsequent destabilization of British politics. In that sense, our political instability is one more piece of Brexit damage to be added to the long list which has accrued over the last ten years, and perhaps the one which was least predictable.
So far as Starmer, specifically, is concerned, the reasons for his downfall are various but Brexit was certainly part of the mix. In particular, ever since the referendum the Labour Party has been haunted by the possibility that the populists are right to claim to speak for ‘the people’ against ‘the elite’, a possibility which is deeply disconcerting to a party which regards doing so as its prerogative and foundational principle. In this way, Brexit exacerbated the longstanding difficulty Labour has had in facing up to the fact that its traditional electoral base in unionized manufacturing industry has been eroding for decades and, to the extent it does face up to that, still regards that eroding demographic as the template for the ‘real working class’. In its way, it is every bit as nostalgia-driven as Brexitism.
It is this which explains Starmer’s relentless focus on the sensibilities of leave voters in Labour’s erstwhile heartlands and his near disdain for the broader ‘progressive’ coalition characterizing most of the actual and potential support for Labour. This fed through most obviously into immigration policy and, closely associated, the ‘red lines’ on UK-EU relations. There was a logic to avoiding positioning Labour as a ‘rejoin’ party at the 2024 election, but Starmer went well beyond that in constantly seeking to appease Reform or Reform-curious voters’ hostility to immigration.
The result was always going to be that those voters would be unimpressed and, if anything, pandering to their ‘legitimate concerns’ made it more likely that they would support parties with more extreme ‘solutions’. Meanwhile, ‘progressive’ voters were alienated by this approach causing their support to leak away to other parties, especially the Greens.
That this is what has happened is borne out by academic research and further demonstrated by a YouGov poll this week, showing that 2024 Reform voters are most likely to feel that Labour are trying to appeal to them but least likely to say they will consider voting for Labour. The personal loathing which the public have for Starmer seems (to me, though not just to me) disproportionate, but the fact that it extends across the political spectrum to encompass both his ‘natural’ supporters and opponents is a reflection of the fundamental flaw of this approach.
All this, including of course the re-emergence of Nigel Farage from his post-referendum resignation to create the Reform party, refracts through Brexit and, along with other factors, created the context for Starmer’s demise. It meant that his party became convinced that he would fail the most basic and brutal test of a party leader: to win the next election. Worse, since the May elections, his MPs believed that he would lose it catastrophically
Enter Burnham, stage left – or stage right?
There is much more that could to be written about all of this, but the immediate fact is that, once again, there is the instability of a change of Prime Minister, and that is not just an issue in terms of the disruption and uncertainty it entails. Prime Ministerial changes between elections also raise questions of legitimacy. Of course, everyone knows that in our political system the PM is not directly elected, and is the person who can command a majority in the House of Commons, so such changes are not constitutionally improper and have happened many times in the past. But for these changes to happen so frequently strains that constitutional convention, which in any case is strained if the incoming PM seeks to radically depart from manifesto commitments.
Already, there are contradictory reports about whether Andy Burnham has or has not ruled out an early election, and it’s worth recalling the potential traps this creates. When Gordon Brown took over from Tony Blair in 2007, he initially refused to rule out an election and there was much speculation that he would call one. When he decided not to, he earned the nickname ‘Bottler Brown’. Conversely, when Theresa May took over from David Cameron in 2016, she was adamant there would be no election and the perceived opportunism of her sudden decision to hold one the next year was one reason for its disastrous outcome.
Regardless of whether there is an election, it is unclear at this point what Burnham’s policy agenda will be and to what extent it will differ from that of the last two years, especially as he will face many of the same constraints. His supporters’ main hope seems to be that he will change the political mood, if not the political programme, by being more communicatively and strategically adept than Keir Starmer. And it’s true that he has more ease of manner than his predecessor, although that does not place him in an especially exclusive club. It’s also true that he comfortably beat Reform in Makerfield, but it’s not clear how much can be extrapolated from the rather unique circumstances of that by-election.
For what little it’s worth, my personal view is that, probably within short order, he will become almost as unpopular as Starmer, will be as unwilling to make and stick to difficult choices, and will be seen as equally lacking in strategic coherence. The veteran political journalist Philip Stephens is of much the same opinion but, clearly, other views are available including from Ian Dunt, a commentator with whom I often agree, and I’ll be happy if I am proved wrong.
One reason for my pessimism is that so much of Burnham’s pitch, at least so far, seems to have its own version of Blue Labour nostalgia. There may be much to agree with in his analysis that “Britain has been on the wrong path for forty years” but it is hard to see how he can deliver on the promise of “re-industrialization” or whether it is a viable strategy for the British economy. And he has already indicated that, despite his previous criticism of them, he is now committed (£) to the immigration policies being pursued by Shabana Mahmood (or has he changed his mind again?), which is certainly not a viable strategy for the British economy. He has also said that he “agrees with what Farage is saying” about the need to go further in controlling immigration, and that he would make greater use of migrant detention centres. At first sight, then, his approach, at least on this key issue, looks set to replicate Starmer’s in trying to appease Reform voters whilst being careless of progressive voters.
Ten years on: what is Brexit?
Closely related to Burnham’s overall political strategy is the question of what his approach to the EU is going to be (and, more generally, his approach to foreign policy, about which he has said very little). Just before Starmer resigned, the date for the next UK-EU summit had, finally, been set for 22 July. In one scenario for how the leadership contest (or non-contest) plays out, Burnham might actually be Prime Minister by then, but in any case the President of the European Council has announced that the meeting will be postponed.
Already that is being spun by the pro-Brexit press (£) as a sign that the EU is expecting Burnham to be a “soft touch” who will make “more concessions”, which re-written in adult might mean Burnham pursuing the “more ambitious” agenda that Starmer recently promised. But the reality is that nobody knew what Starmer meant by that and, certainly, nobody knows what Burnham’s agenda will be. It seems highly unlikely he will not proceed with whatever has presumably now been agreed on SPS regulations, emissions trading, and youth mobility, but whether he might go further, and what that might consist of, is at this point opaque. It is a reminder that there is still no agreed meaning of Brexit, and ‘Burnham’s Brexit’ has yet to be defined.
The fact that UK-EU relations are still in flux and their direction uncertain, and even the framing of that by Brexiters in terms of the UK being forced into “concessions” by having a “soft” leader, is a microcosm of why the tenth anniversary of the referendum has a rather different meaning from that which features in most of the tidal wave of discussion about it. I will come back to what that meaning is but, for now, will focus on the broader discussion. Since almost every commentator has had their say (myself included, for example in Byline Times (£) and on the Oh God What Now? Podcast) it would be impossible to consider it all here, so I will provide just a very brief outline.
Analysing Brexit
Much of the discussion consists of analysis of the effects, especially the economic effects, Brexit has had, and a very good overview of these was provided by the BBC’s Economics Editor Faisal Islam. In terms of specific research studies, an excellent example is John Springford and Anton Spisak’s report for the Centre for European Reform, which is especially useful in disaggregating the (much larger) negative impact of leaving the single market from that of leaving the customs union. Also excellent is a new paper by Eleonora Alabresa and others about the variation in the regional effects of Brexit which, whilst assessing the overall negative impact at about 7-8% (which is consistent with some other studies), shows this to vary considerably by region.
These two studies can also be considered together in that the Alabresa paper shows that Northern Ireland is exceptional in having had little or no economic damage, reflecting it being effectively still part of the single market for goods. A long time ago, I wrote that Northern Ireland would provide a kind of natural experiment to understand the economic effects of Brexit (I can’t now find it to link to, and I’m sure others have made the same point). And so it has proved but, in fact, the outcome was already implied in the perhaps inadvertently revealing remark made by Michael Gove in 2020 when he said Northern Ireland would “get the best of both worlds”. Then as now that prompts the question: why not the rest of the UK?
There has also been much discussion of the domestic political effects of Brexit, some of which I’ve already touched on in this post. A particularly revealing analysis was provided by Jonathan Vincent in the Financial Times (£), which includes some illuminating infographics showing how voters’ behaviour is still significantly structured by how they voted in the referendum, underscoring the persistence of ‘remainer’ and ‘leaver’ as political identities. Meanwhile, the experiences of EU citizens living in the UK, some of the people most traumatically affected by Brexit, are recorded in the Brexit Lived Experience Archive (BLEA) created by Professor Tanja Bueltmann and publicly launched to coincide with the referendum anniversary.
Possibly the most comprehensive overall analysis, not just of the last ten years but of the future possibilities for UK-EU relations, is the report produced by multiple authors from the UK in a Changing Europe (UKICE) centre. UKICE, which throughout the whole process has been, and remains, the single best source of analysis of Brexit, has also produced a variety of themed reports marking the tenth anniversary, notable examples including Joël Reland’s on regulation (showing how little regulatory divergence there has been) and Jannike Wachowiak’s on how the EU has changed during the period (providing an important antidote to what has been, as so often, a largely parochial discussion).
Defending Brexit
None of these analytical reports and commentaries suggest that Brexit has been a success and, as most contributions to the anniversary discussion acknowledge, the polling evidence that a consistent and increasingly large majority of the population view it as having been a failure and a mistake is clear. But, of course, there have been numerous pro-Brexit comment pieces which continue to defend the project. They are all fairly similar in nature, since the arguments are now well-rehearsed, so I will only focus on three, but that should not be taken to imply that these pro-Brexit views are in any way rare.
Strikingly, they almost all share one common feature, which is that they are defensive. That is, they are framed as a defence against what they recognize to be the established narrative that Brexit has not been a success. That in itself is important. In January 2021, as the transition period ended, I wrote that what happened then would “shape the post-Brexit narrative”. It did, and what was established was a narrative that it had been a failure. So, whilst Brexiters do not accept this to be true, they do accept that it is the narrative. Had the battle for that narrative gone the other way, the terms of this tenth anniversary discussion would be entirely, unrecognizably, different.
As has long been the case, one of the major defences of Brexit by its advocates is that ‘it was not done properly’. Tellingly, the banner front-page headline in the Express on the day of the anniversary was a plaintive demand to “Give Us Proper Brexit”. Equally telling was a Financial Times report about how the various leading Brexiters all blame each other (as well, of course, as remainers) for this failure to deliver ‘proper Brexit’.
Those mounting such arguments have never been able to explain a realistic way in which Brexit could have been done successfully, or even to agree about what proper Brexit means. But it is an argument that can always be made, since it is, strictly speaking, irrefutable (which is makes it a weak, not a strong, argument in that it is not susceptible to any meaningful test). As many people have observed, it is an argument with the same structure as that made by those who insist that ‘real Communism’ has yet to be tried.
One of the slightly better articles making this kind of argument is that by Matthew Jeffrey at Conservative Home, but it shows no understanding of why the regulatory divergence it proposes has not happened, and relies on a wholly unrealistic claim about what ‘mutual recognition agreements’ could make possible for international trade. Most glaringly, it advocates using post-Brexit freedoms to follow “aggressive tax competitiveness” citing as an example the strategy followed by, er, Ireland – an EU member state. The conclusion, inevitably, is that (like real communism) “the real Brexit is still to come”.
The problems of defending Brexit whilst claiming it has been betrayed, or not done properly, are all too obvious, which is perhaps why Michael Gove’s article in the Spectator mainly takes a different tack. Asking the question ‘The Brexit decade: was it worth it?’ (to which his unsurprising answer is ‘yes’), Gove attempts to itemise how Britain has benefitted from Brexit. As with any such list, there are questions about the veracity and desirability of each claimed benefit, but the fact that he includes the demonstrably false ones that Brexit enabled a faster vaccine roll-out (a lie which Boris Johnson has also repeated this week), allowed the UK to support Ukraine, and provided “much more than £350 million a week extra for the NHS” makes it hard to take any of them very seriously.
Moreover, as is again typical of such lists of benefits, it is meaningless because there is little or no recognition of the costs of Brexit. In particular, Gove, with presumably knowing outrageousness, reprises his infamous line from the campaign in deriding “experts from organisations with acronyms who have got things consistently wrong in the past”. In fact, the Treasury’s pre-referendum long-term analysis of the impact of Brexit, giving as its central estimate of the scenario of a negotiated bilateral trade agreement – as happened – that GDP would be 6.2% lower after 15 years (see p.7 of the document), is remarkably similar to most of the credible estimates of what is actually happening which mainly lie in the range of 4% to 8% [1].
In the end, though, Gove simply falls back on the standard get-out that, whether the effects have been positive or negative, Brexit is definitively justified on the abstract grounds of ‘sovereignty’, with national politicians making national laws and being held accountable for them (though not, it seems, being accountable for advocating Brexit). As ever, there is no recognition that sovereignty-sharing is an act of, rather than a negation of, sovereignty; nor of the many ways in which EU members exert sovereignty and hold national politicians accountable; nor of the many ways that all sorts of international regulatory systems (including but not limited to those of the EU) continue, necessarily, to impinge on the UK; nor of any of the many other ways that the ‘taking back control’ thesis is flawed.
Effectively the same argument, though from a different part of the political spectrum, is made by Larry Elliott, the ‘Lexiter’ economics commentator at the Guardian. He, too, takes issue with the economic consensus about the damage of Brexit, in particular questioning the OBR’s estimate of 4% less GDP after 15 years. He does so on what, for an economist, is the rather innumerate basis that, if true, it would mean the economy would be “4% bigger today” [emphasis added]. Otherwise, he opines that “Brexit showed that class still matters in politics” (who knew?) and, like Jeffrey and Gove, that Brexit “creates an opportunity for change” though, in his case, that change should be to ‘reverse forty years of neo-liberalism’ which, he hopes, is what Burnham intends to do. In this, once again, we see the capacity of Brexit to have multiple, incompatible meanings amongst its adherents but also, more specifically, how already a Burnham premiership is being anticipated in the Telegraph as a ‘soft touch’ which will take the UK closer to the EU and by Elliott as the saviour of the Lexit project.
Reframing the anniversary
Thus, rather as I anticipated in a recent post, this latest ‘national conversation’ about Brexit is in many ways the same as that which we have had for ten years and more. And, in another recent post, I quoted the second edition of my book about Brexit pointing out that according to its advocates and supporters Brexit “certainly wasn’t proposed as, or supposed to be, the prelude to a country permanently divided on the wisdom of Brexit, still less to an interminable debate about whether it had been the right thing to do ….” (p.285) and I went on to quote David Frost saying (in 2022) that “one piece of evidence of failure [of Brexit] would be if we are still debating this in five- or six-years’ time in the same way. I think [if] it is to succeed it needs to settle in the British polity.”
In those terms Brexit has failed. It has not settled. This week there have been no great public celebrations of ‘national independence’, whilst the prospect, whether positive or negative, of rejoining (or joining) the EU has been very much part of the anniversary discussion. But, more than that, Brexit continues to be profoundly unsettling.
It is this which, I think, gives this tenth anniversary discussion a rather different meaning than most contributions to it suggest. It is not really a stock-taking exercise, still less a planning one. Nor is it a commemoration, or even a retrospection. Rather, just as the current political crisis is the latest episode within the continuing process of instability bequeathed by Brexit, this tenth anniversary is itself the latest episode within the continuing process of contestation to which Brexit has consigned the nation.
Note
[1] Gove made implicit reference to the Treasury short-term forecast, which is admittedly harder to defend, especially given the way it was used by George Osborne. But it is worth recalling that the value of sterling has never fully recovered since its very sharp fall immediately after the referendum result, and also that the forecast model did not assume any action by the Bank of England which, in fact, under the then Governor Mark Carney, immediately announced a programme to stabilize the financial system, which may well have averted some of the economic turmoil of the short-term forecast.
It is this which, I think, gives this tenth anniversary discussion a rather different meaning than most contributions to it suggest. It is not really a stock-taking exercise, still less a planning one. Nor is it a commemoration, or even a retrospection. Rather, just as the current political crisis is the latest episode within the continuing process of instability bequeathed by Brexit, this tenth anniversary is itself the latest episode within the continuing process of contestation to which Brexit has consigned the nation.
Note
[1] Gove made implicit reference to the Treasury short-term forecast, which is admittedly harder to defend, especially given the way it was used by George Osborne. But it is worth recalling that the value of sterling has never fully recovered since its very sharp fall immediately after the referendum result, and also that the forecast model did not assume any action by the Bank of England which, in fact, under the then Governor Mark Carney, immediately announced a programme to stabilize the financial system, which may well have averted some of the economic turmoil of the short-term forecast.
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